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The Limits of
Orthodox Theology

Maimonides'Thirteen
Principles Reappraised

MARC B. SHAPIRO
o
Oxford, Portland, Oregon The Littman Library ofJewish Civilization
ONE



Introduction


FIRST BEGAN exploring the subject of this book a number ofyears ago Iafter reading an article by R. Yehudall Parnes in the Torah u-MaddaJour­nal, published by Yeshiva University. In this article Parnes argued that as far as Orthodox Judaism is concerned, heresy is defined by the Thirteen Prin­ciples of Maimonides (Moses ben Maimon, II38-1204), which appear in his Commentary on the Mishnah (Sanhedrin, introduction to chapter 10). Parnes further asserted that one is forbidden to study anything that disagrees with these Principles, since it is ipso facto heresy.1
Although I had never before read such a sharp formulation of the issue, Parnes' point made logical sense. Ifit is true-and most people seem to think so-that Maimonides' Thirteen Principles are the Orthodox catechism, then Parnes is correct in saying that any writer disagreeing with the Principles would be advocating a heretical position. The second stage of his argument relies on the notion, widely accepted in the Orthodox world, that one is for­bidden to study heresy. Thus, the equation is complete:
A (anything in dispute with Maimonides' Principles is heresy)
+
B (it is forbidden to study heresy)
C (it is forbidden to study anything that does not conform to Maimonides' Principles)

However, despite its apparent logical structure, 'Parnes' argument was without historical precedent, since it would mean that much of Jewish literature of the most traditional variety, including portions of the Talmud, Zohar, rishonim (early authorities), and alparonim (later authorities) were for­bidden reading, since they disagreed with aspects ofMaimonides' theological formulations in the Principles.2 Although the majority oftraditional scholars, induding the most right-wing among them, would certainly not go as far as Parnes, the underlying assumption that the Thirteen Principles are the
1 Parnes, 'Torah u-Madda'.

2 After I called attention to this fact in a short letter to the editor, Parnes reaffirmed his view. See TUM] 3 (1991-2), 155--6.
bedrock ofOrdlodoxy has never been openly challenged in modern times by dlose who identify with Orthodoxy. Indeed, dle most influential assault on the veracity of dle Thirteen Principles is Louis Jacobs's Principles oftheJewish Faith,3 and dlis book was written in part as an explanation ofwhy he could no longer regard himself as Ordlodox. That is, for Jacobs, Orthodoxy is essen­tially viewed as identical with the Thirteen Principles. This is so despite the fact that many post-Maimonidean scholars, continuing into modern times and including mose with impeccable 'Orthodox' credentials, have never felt entirely bound by the Principles.
It was this realization which led me to explore dle histOlY ofthe acceptance of Maimonides' Principles, and the first fmits of this research, an article entitled 'Maimonides' Thirteen Principles: The Last Word in Jewish The­ology?', appeared in the same journal dlat had published Parnes' earlier piece.4 This article, written under me pressure of time constraints, accomplished its purpose which, as indicated by its tide, was to show that traditional Jewish theology has allowed for much more latitude than found in me Thirteen Principles. As a result, many outstanding sages did not regard the Thirteen Principles as me last word in Jewish theology. Indeed, there is a history of opposition to Maimonides' Principles among the ranks oftraditional, or as it is called in modern times, Orthodox Judaism.
What is fascinating is dlat this opposition exists togedler wim widespread assertions that the Thirteen Principles are the defining features ofJudaism. As a method ofshorthand, me Principles are indeed a very good way ofexpress­ing the ftmdamentals ofJudaism as understood by most Jews until the rise of dle Reform movement. However, as with most shorthand formulations, while correct in many essentials, they are not correct in dleir entirety. A good parallel to dlis is the popular expression that a righteous person observes all 613 (taryag) commandments, an expression also mentioned by Maimonides.5 This catchphrase is even used with reference to the patriarch Jacob, who lived long before dle giving ofthe Torah. 6 Ofcourse, as everyone is well aware, it is impossible for any individual to observe 'all taryag mitsvof, but this does not take away from the power ofthe idea behind the phrase.
The nature of this subject is such that by the time me original article appeared, I had already assembled enough information to enlarge it signifi ­
3 New York, 1964. 4 TUMj 4 (1993), 187-242.
5 See Leuel'S, ed. Shailat, i. 53; Letters, ed. Kafih, lI8 n. 85.
6 Genesis 32: 5 reads: ~m~1:17 IJ», 'I have lodged with Laban.' Playing upon the letters ofthe word ~m~, there is an agadah that puts the following into Jacob's mouth: 'Though I have lodged (~m~) with Laban, I have observed the 613 (~"~'n) commandments.' See Rashi ad loc. For the textual issues concerning this comment ofRashi, which actually appears to be a later interpolation, see M. Kasher, Torah shelemah, ad loc. and the Ariel edition ofRashi (Jerusalem, 1988), ad loc.
Introduction
candy. Since dlen the material has continued to accumulate, tmtil I felt it was
time to put it all into book form. Hardly a week goes by widlout my coming
across more sources dlat bolster me book's conclusion, leading to the realiza­
tion that a delay in publication would have produced an even more complete
book. However, since such a concern would have prevented the book from
ever seeing the light of day, I thought it was better to adopt Hillel's maxim,
'Ifnot now, when?' (MishnahAvot I: 14). I realize that some readers of this
book might be put off by its somewhat encyclopedic nature, but no odler
approach seemed to be capable ofproving my point. I also recognize mat the
numerous sources I have gathered will become a reference tool for many,
although I hope that the interpretations I have offered will also be given due
regard.
Anyone dlinking about Maimonides' Thirteen Principles should be stmck by the irony of it all, in dlat just as Maimonides' halalduc masterpiece, the Mishneh torah, did not put an end to traditional talmudic dialectics and con­fusion about the law but instead led to even more disputes, so too Maimon­ides' formuhi.tion ofthe Principles did not put an end to discussion regarding the fundamentals ofJudaism, but radler propelled later tlllnkers into new dis­cussions on dle very topic which Maimonides thought he had closed. How­ever, in spite of all the discussions and disagreements with Maimonides, dle rhetorical acceptance ofthe Principles could not be avoided. This acceptance is illustrated by the popularity of the Yigdal hynm and dle Ani ma)amin catechism. To be sure, these popularizations carry on the spirit of Maimon­ides' ideas, yet they also vulgarize, and at times distort, a philosoplucally sophisticated text. It was this vulgarization which received widespread rhet­orical acceptance. As Menachem Kellner has noted, 'Not only were Maimon­ides' principles accepted wimout the theological substrate which gave them coherence and which made ofdlem somedling more than an elegant literary device for teaching Jewish ideas; they were not even accepted in the form in which Maimonides presented dlem, but, rather, in a simplified, even debased
fashion.'7

Maimonides and Dogma

Kellner, in his jusdy praised Dogma in MedievalJewish Thought,8 has already demonstrated the all-pervasive influence ofMaimonides' Thirteen Principles in late medieval times. Maimonides' formulation assumed such significance that all the post-Maimonidean dogmatists were forced to confront it. Kellner
7 Must a jew BelieveAnything?, 69. Oxford, 1986.

i
Introduction Introduction
I 5
also points out the interesting fact that the Principles, and dogma as a whole, generations, and indeed was unknown until modern times, presumably were not given extended treatment in the two centuries after Maimonides, because it was written in Arabic and did not appear in R. Sa'adiah's magnum and that it was only in the fifteenth century that scholars began to concentrate opus, Emunot vede)ot.l1
on issues of dogma. It was then, in response to Christian polemics, that Kellner himself notes dlat R. Hananel ben Hushiel ofKairouan (C.975-I057) thinkers first commented in detail on Maimonides' formulation. Before
anticipated Maimonides in saying dlat certain beliefs are necessary to merit Kellner, Louis Jacobs wrote his now classic Principles oftheJewish Faith, which the world to come.12 However, as Kellner points out, Maimonides goes provides a valuable elucidation of the text itself, in addition to examining dle further than R. Hananel, and R. Sa'adiall as well, by saying that acceptance of Principles from a modern philosophical and scholarly oudook. his Principles are also a sufficient condition for attaining paradise.13 That is, My goal is not to continue Kellner's treatment into more modern times, Maimonides holds that one can commit every possible sin, but as long as the nor to expand Jacobs' discussion. Rather, I will concentrate on those aspects sinner accepts the Principles and his sins are not part of a rebellion against of the Principles which did not receive unqualified acceptance, and, in doing God, he will receive a share in the world to come. Such a man is regarded as a so, will probe the outer limits ofOrdlOdox theology. Although Jacobs dealt 'sinner in Israel', and one must love him and show him compassion. 14 By the with this topic to some extent, and I freely acknowledge my debt to him in same token, Maimonides states that not only one who denies, but even one
this regard, it still demands a systematic and comprehensive treatment, which who harbours so much as a doubt about any ofdle Principles is a heretic who I attempt to offer in dlis book. To be sure, dlere are times when I depart from
has removed himself from the Jewish people. Odler Jews are in turn obli­these narrow confines and elucidate aspects ofthe Principles themselves. I do gated to hate and destroy lum.15 The fact dlat this 'heretic' may be a punc­so when the context requires it and when I believe that I can offer an original tilious observer of mitsvot is irrelevant according to Maimonides. 16 Contrary
contribution. However, throughout dle book I assume that the reader already to Kellner, these latter points need not be included in a definition ofdogma, has an lillderstanding ofthe Principles. Those who do not are well advised to
and there is dms no question that R. Hananel should also be regarded as a study the books ofKellner and Jacobs before taclding this one. dogmatist. As widl R. Sa'adiall, R. Hananel's dogmas had no influence on The Thirteen Principles are a very conservative document, yet the sources subsequent thinkers and were not even published lUltil the nineteenth century.
discussed by Kellner focus overwhelmingly on disagreements with Maimon­
ides over whether certain Principles are actually 'roots' ofJudaism -an entirely 11 See his Commentary on Psalms, 82 n.; Ben-Shamai, 'Sa'adiah', II-26. As Ben-Shamai shows, prin­semantic issue-rather than with the correctness of Maimonides' funda­ciples of faith are also found in R. Sa'adial1's other works, including Emunot vedtfot, but they are not numbered or listed together as a catechism. 12 Commentary, 28. 13 Dogma,8.
mental theological views. As Kellner puts it, 'the plethora of competing
14 Since Abarbanel, Rosh amanah, ch. 23, S. Luria, 'Hanhagat maharshal', 326, and a nUl1lber of systems reflects not conflicting views ofthe natUre ofJudaism, but a dispute modem scholars (see Kellner, Dogma, 35) have argued that Maimonides was influenced in his approach to dogma by early Islamic theologians, it is worth noting the similarity of his position to
concerning dle nature of dogmas or principles of faith.'9 For the scholars on
that of al-Ghazali, who also argued that 'not a single one ofthe faithful will abide eternally in the fire
whom Kellner concentrates, Maimonides' thirteen tenets are correct, even if
ofhell. One who has in one's heart the weight ofa single grain offaith will be brought out ofit.' See
many of them do not qualify as 'principles' -that is, as dleological positions th~ excerpt published in Williams, Word, 162-3. Although the Kharijites and Mutazilites disagreed,
tillS was the Orthodox Muslim position. See Wensinck, Muslim Creed, 45-9, 61-2, I03-4, 125, 130,

upon which Judaism stands or falls. My concern, in contrast, is with those
I~O-:-2, 192. .
scholars who thought that Maimoriides' Principles were wrong, pure and
:l~ See R. Samuel David Luzzatto's criticism of Maimonides in this regard, in id., Letters, iv. 599. simple. Latnm, 'Loving', ISO ff., argues that in his later works Maimonides somewhat softened his harsh stance t?wards heretics: 'At the velY least, there is enough material in his halakhic code to support the
With regard to the question of how far back Jewish dogmatics can be
f~n,tentlon that he was no longer as certain then that heresy leads to exclusion from the Jewish people
traced, Kellner has argued that Maimonides was rabbinic Judaism'S first true
~,he was when he wrote the Commentary to the Mishnah' (pp. 156-7). dogmatist. lO However, tlus is incorrect, for R. Sa'adiah Gaon (882-942), ··16 Commentary on the Mishnah, iv, San. IO: I, p. 145 (all future references will be to this edition). See: also ~ishneh torah, 'Hilkhot rotse'a~l' 13: 14. R. Joseph Albo, Sefer ha'ikarim, i. I, tmderstands
rabbinic Judaism's first great philosopher, had himself posited principles of '
M~I1l~omdes to be saying that one who does not consider his Principles to be just that, namely basic
faith. Nevertheless, this list of principles had no influence on subsequent
pr~clples oft?e faith, is also a heretic. In Sefer ha'ikarim, i. 1-2 Albo proceeds to refute this position, ~hile co~cludll1g n~netheless that such a person is a sinner. In trUtll, Maimonides says nothing ofthe 9 Dogma,!. ~d~ttrtbuted to hun by Albo. What is important for Maimonides is whether or not one accepts his 10 Kellner (ibid.) calls attention to the principles of biblical faith ofPhilo, but as he notes, Philo '. :'l?rll1~lple;;. I~ his view, one who accepts them but nevertheless believes that they are not basic to
not operate within the context ofrabbinic Judaism. .. Judrusm IS neither a heretic nor a simler.
Thus, even though Maimonides can no longer be regarded as the first Jewish addition of some others, are to be found in this work, scattered in a few dif­dogmatist, he is certainly the first dogmatist ofany lasting influence. ferent places.21 Yet ifhe had regarded the Thirteen Principles as his final state­
As noted above, Maimonides' Thirteen Principles appeared in his first ment on the ftmdamentals ofJewish faith, one would have expected them to major work, his Commentary on the Mishnah, which was designed to be.a be listed at the vety beginning of his code, in the section entitled 'Hilkhot popular work and was written in Arabic. Nevertheless, it is significant that yesodei hatorah' (Laws of the Foundations of the Torall). Furthermore, not Maimonides himself in his later years, even in his 'exoteric' works, did not feel all of tlle details of the Thirteen Principles are repeated in the Mishneh torah. bound to them in the way that later became the norm in Jewish histOlY. From Presumably, Maimonides would be surprised that in seeking to define the what is known ofthe subsequent history ofthe Thirteen Principles, one would essentials ofJudaism, later generations ofJews, botll scholars and masses, had have expected Maimonides to put great emphasis on them, quoting them in latched onto his earlier work rather than his more detailed formulation in the his later works and letters -but this is hardly the case. Although Maimonides Mishneh torah. revised the text of the Principles later in life, as he indeed revised his entire Finally, remembering that Maimonides stated that belief in the Thirteen Commentary on the Mishnah, he refers only once to the Principles as funda­Principles is essential to being a Jew, one must wonder why there is no men­mentals ofJewish faith. 17 Even here the Thirteen Principles are not set apart tion of the Principles in his discussion of what a ftlture convert should be as being fundamentally more significant than the rest of the Commentary on taught about the religion. While it is common today for prospective Ortho­the Mishnah or theMishneh torah. He writes: dox converts to be instmcted in the Principles, all that Maimonides himself
writes about theology and converts is the following: 'He should tllen be

When I learned of these exceedingly deficient folk and their doubts, who, although they consider themselves sages in Israel, are in fact the most ignorant, and more made acquainted with tlle principles of the faith, which are the oneness of seriously astray than beasts.... I concluded that it was necessary that I clearly God and the prohibition ofidolatry.'22 This limited theological instmction is elucidate religious fundamentals in my works on law . . . I therefore published itself significant, since the Talmud has nothing of the kind, mentioning only principles that need to be acknowledged in the introduction to the Commentary on
that a convert is instmcted in 'some ofthe less weighty and some ofthe more the Mishnah regarding prophecy and the roots of tradition and what every Rab­
weighty commandments'.23 As Maimonides was adding to the talmudic pre­banite had to believe concerning the Oral Law. In chapter 10 of Sanhedrin I scription, why did he not add the other Principles, especially the Third Prin­expounded fundamentals cOlmected with the beginning and the end, i.e. what ciple, that ofdivine incorporeality?

pertains to God's unity and the world to come and the other tenets ofthe Torah. I In the Guide there is also no listing ofthe Principles. Seeking to explain this acted the same way in my major work, which I calledMishneh Torah. ls omission, R. Isaac Abarbanel (I437-I508) writes: 'He postulated the Prul­
On the other occasions on which Maimonides makes reference to the
ciples for the masses, and for beginners in the study ofMishnah, but not for Principles, it is only with regard to specific points discussed there. For exam­
those individuals who plumbed the knowledge oftmth, for whom he wrote ple, in Guide ii. 35 Maimonides notes that he explained the nature of Moses'
tJie Guide.'24 In Abarbanel's mind, only limited attention should tllerefore be prophecy in the Commentary on the Mishnah (where the Principles appear).
paid to Maimonides' early formulation of dogma, and it would certainly be Another example is found in a responsunl where he refers to his discussion of improper to make conclusions about his theological views on tlle basis of a the Eighth Principle, concerning the equal sanctity of all parts of the Penta­

~ext designed for begumers. teuch.19 Certainly, had Maimonides continued to regard the Thirteen Prin ­',Even if one does not accept Abarbanel's understanding of Maimonides' ciples as the essence ofJudaism one would expect more than this.20
pUrpose in writing the Principles, the question still remains: why is there no

In his great code of Jewish law, the Mishneh torah, which also defines
rl~ce in the Mishneh torah and the Guide where all the Principles are listed? heresy and what Jews are obligated to believe, Maimonides does not list
!tcertainly seems that Maimonides was not as closely tied to his youthftli

the Thirteen Principles as a unit. To be sure, all of the Principles, with the . ":2i; See ibid. 228 n. 60. 22 Mishneh torah, 'Hilkhotisurei biah', 14: 2. 17 Essay on Resurrection, in Letters, ed. Shailat, i. 320 (Arabic), 342 (Hebrew). . ·'~'BTYev. 47a. See Twersky,Introduction, 474-5. 10 Translation in Halkin and Hartman, Crisis, 212-13. 19 Responsa, ii, no. 263· ~'-'~~ Rosh a~n~h,ch. 23. See also ibid., ch. 9. See the similar formulation ofR. Gedaliah b. Solomon 20 AI> Kellner, Dogma, 236 n. r8r, points out, in one of his medical works he makes reference to a". . .' ::.. ipschuetz 111 hiS commentary on Albo's Sefor ha'ikat'im, i. 3: 'He emunerated them [the Principles] , composition on the 'principles ofreligion', but this could just as easily refer to the Guide. Kellner ':::'fo~the benefit of the masses in order to strengthen their belief in the Torah.' See also ibid. iii. 18. refers to the almost certainly apocryphal Ma'amar hayi~ud as making reference to the Principles. )iowever, the conclusion R. Gedaliall draws from this is quite different from that ofAbarbanel.
formulation of the Principles as is often assumed. This would make the Prin­ciples one of a number of examples where one finds different emphases, if not outright contradictions, between what Maimonides writes in his Com­mentary on the Mishnah and what appears in his later works. In fact, this very suggestion has already been proposed by two rabbinic scholars, R. Joseph Schwartz (I804-65)25 and R. Shelomoh Goren (I9I7-96),26 both of whom called attention to the fact that Mainlonides did not include the Principles in his later works, in particular in theMishneh torah, where he presents his vari­ous categories of heresy. To their minds this indicates that he abandoned his earlier system ofThirteen Principles.
As far as Maimonides'Mishneh torah is concerned, it is also important to note that the definition ofa heretic in this work differs from that in the Com­mentary on the Mishnah. In the section 'Hilkhot yesodei hatorall' Maimonides does indeed discuss most of the Principles as part of his overall exposition of Jewish theology. Ifall we had was 'Hillchot yesodei hatorah' we would prob­ably aSSlUne that theMishneh torah shares the perspective of dle Commentary on the Mishnah, and that lack of belief in any of the Principles makes one a heretic. However, when it is time to define the parameters ofheresy for which one loses one's share in the world to come, Maimonides' formulation in the Mishneh torah reads: 'Five individuals are described as minim: I. One who says there is no God 01' ruler ofthe world; 2. One who says dlat dlere is a ruler but that there are two 01' more', and so fordl ('Hilkhot teshuvah' 3: 7-8). Maimon­ides also follows dlis model in defining an epikoros and a kofer batorah (two other types ofheretic),27 In other words, according to dus text it is essential that one's heresy be stated publicly. Apparendy, one who has heretical thoughts but conducts hinlself as a good Jew does not lose his share in the world to come.28
To be sure, in dle Mishneh torah Maim01udes warns people to keep away from heretical thoughts, which can lead to spiritual destruction. Citing
25
Divreiyosef, iii-iv, no. 57.
26
Torat hashabat, 570. Goren even suggests that Maimonides retreated from his Thirteen Principles in favour ofa conception ofJewish theology later advocated by Abarbanel. As we shall see, Abarbanel argued that ohe cannot distinguish between so-called principles of Judaism and other aspects ofthe religion, since all must be regarded as equal.
27 For his own conceptual reasons, which have no talmudic basis, Maimonides distinguishes between the epikoros, the min, and the koftr batorah. This is only a technical differentiation since all of these people are guilty of a form of heresy and lose their share in the world to come. See Mishneh torah, 'Hilkhot teshuvah', 3: 6-8, and Rabinovitch, Tad peshutah, ad loco At times, the distinctions between the terms break down and they can be seen as synonymous. For example, in 'Hilkhot teshu­vah', 3: 8 Maimonides defines a IlOftr batorah as one who says that the Torah is not from Heaven. However, in his Responsa, ii, no. 263 (based on BT Berakhot IW), he refers to this person as a min. See Kellner, Dogma, 20-1; Shailat's note in Letters, i. 37-9; Shloush, Ifemdahgenuzah, ii. lIS.
20
Cf. Nissim b. Moses, Ma'aseh nisim, 159-60.
Introduction
NlUI1bers IS: 39, he even regards dlis as a negative commandment. Yet aldlough he comes close in dlis halalchic formulation, he never actually states that entertaining the dlought alone makes one a heretic widl no share in the world to come.29 Similarly, Maimonides writes: 'Whoever permits dle thought to enter his mind dlat there is another deity besides this God violates a prohibition, as it is said, You shall have no othergods before Me (Exod. 20: 3, Deut. 5: 7), and denies dle essence of religion-this doctrine being the great principle on which everydling depends.'30 However, once again, MainlOn­ides does not say dlat such a person is a heretic. He has violated a command­ment and has, in his mind, denied dle essence ofJudaism, but as long as his heresy is not publicly voiced he apparendy remains a (shming) Jew in good standing.
R. Hayim Hirschensolm (I857-I935), a liberal halakhist oflie last cenhlry, particularly stressed dlis point, expanding upon it in a way that goes be­yond anyiliing Maimonides wrote hl dle Mishneh torah.31 According to Hirschensohn, someone who merely thinks heretical thoughts is absolutely blameless, for one does not have control over one's dloughts. In support of this asslUI1ption, he cites R. Asher ben Jehiel (C.I250-I327),32 who put forth an hmovative understandhlg oflie talmudic statement that, in contrast to other sins, when it comes to idolatry liere is plUlishment for mere intention. 33 According to R. Asher, all dlis means is dlat, if you worship an idol, God combines your intention before lie act together with the act itself. However, if you do not worship dle idol, lien your thoughts remain no more than thoughts. According to Hirschensohn, this is a proof that simply having a heretical thought, in this case that idols have power, does not make you a heretic unless you actually concretize dlis heresy hl the real world.
Hirschensohn also offers his own distinction between publicly voichlg one's heresy and attempting to hlfluence others to follow in one's path. According to him, it is only the latter which causes one to lose one's share in the world to come, as well as to be punished by an earthly court. The lone heretic, even if his heresy is publicly voiced, is left to God, who can punish him as He sees fit. However, such a person does not lose his share in dle world to come. Hirschensohn thus denies Jewish courts lie role of inquisitor, except when the ilmocent population is put at spirihlal risk.
29 'Hilkhot avodah zarah', 2: 3.
30 'Hilkhot yesodei hatorah', I: 6. See also 'Hilkhot melakhim', II: I, 'Hilkhot ishut', 8:5, and Seftr hamitsvot, Negative Commandments, nos. I and 47.
31 See his comments in Hamisderonah, I (1885), 188-9, 233, 240-3; id., Malki bakodesh, ii. 168, 170. See similarly S. D. Luzzatto, Tesodei hatorah, 70-9.
32 RBI: 6 (36b in the Vilnaedition). For Maimonides' view ofthis passage, see 'Hilkhot ishut', 8: 5.
33 BT Kid. 40a.

Hirschensolm himself notes that his point about humans being unable to control their thoughts was also the opinion of a leading medieval philoso­pher, R. Hasdai Crescas (died C.1412). Crescas was adamant that beliefs are always involuntary, as one cannot force oneself to disbelieve that which one believes. Contrary to Maimonides, according to Crescas there can dms be no reward or punishment for belief. If someone, for whatever reason, does n~t believe in one of Maimonides' dogmas, he cannot be held culpable for thIS disbelief. What, then, does Crescas do with the notion, found throughout rabbinic literature, dlat a heretic is punished in dle afterlife? In very original fashion, Crescas argues dlat, while one is not punished for disbelief, he is plmished for dle joy he feels through dlis disbelief as well as for the lack of effort made to discover the trudl. Similarly, and again contrary to Maimon­ides, 'one is not rewarded for belief, but for the effort [hishtadlut] to appre­hend the truth ofthe belief',34 and for the joy that accompanies thiS.35
To return to the Thirteen Principles: not only does Maimonides require one to affirm them without any doubt, but he also leaves no room for honest error, a point concerning which there was a good deal of debate in medieval times, with R. Simeon ben Tsemall Duran (1361-1444)36 and R. Joseph Albo (fifteenth century)37 emerging as Maimonides' great critics.36 According to them, even one who disagrees with a basic Jewish doctrine is not regarded as a heretic ifhis error arose as a result ofwell-intentioned study. R. David ibn Zimra (1~79-1573) goes so far as to include in this category one who thinks it reflects positively on Moses that some ofthe ancients thought he was God.39 These opponents of Mainl0nides thus made it very difficult to condemn someone as a heretic, as long as the person in question was known to be a committed Jew who erred lmintentionally.
Approaching matters from a different angle, R. Abralum Isaac .Kook (1865-1935) also differed with Maimonides. While, as noted above, Malffion­ides does not leave any room for dle honest doubter, Kook specifically excludes such a person from being categorized as a heretic. In a passage that deserves to be quoted at length, Kook writes:
Know that, as far as the halakhah is concerned, it is absolutely forbidden and a fes­tering sore for one even to cast a doubt concerning the truth of the content ofour
34 W. Z. Harvey, Physics, 145-6. ,.. ,. . 3,\ See Crescas, Or hashem, ii. 5: 5. According to Harvey, the upshot ofCrescas view IS that It IS better to be a spiritually tormented infidel than an apathetic, passionless believer' (Physics, 146).
R. Obadiah Sfomo also claims that one does not have control over one's thoughts, and that therefore there are no biblical commands 'to believe'. See Sforno, Kitvei, 4II-12, 418.
36 Ohevmishpat, 15a. Duran excludes from his defence one who rejects the 'roots' ofthe ~~ligi.on,.for instance by believing in two gods. . .37 Sefor ha lkartm, I. 2.
30
See Kellner, 'What is Heresy?', 55-70; id., 'Inadvertent Heresy', 393-403; Id., 'Heresy'.

39
She'elot uteshuvot haradbaz, no. 1258.
Introduction
perfect faith. However, we do not find our Sages deeming such individuals heretics. Only one who definitely denies, that is, who decides that the vety oppos­ite of our faith is true, is included in this category. A categorical denial cannot possibly be found in Israel ex~ept in one who is completely ,:icked an~ an inten­tionalliar, for the greatest WICkedness can only sow doubt 111 the m111ds of the weak. One who is brazen enough to say that he is a complete denier is thus cer­tainly wicked ... and he cannot claim that he has no control over his thoughts. If the heresy in our generation was honest it would always be in a position of doubt, and its doubts could be easily clarified. However, it intentionally falsifies and claims certainty in its denial, even though those weakest in faith can only arrive at alevel ofdoubt.40
Kook's recognition dlat doubt is part ofdle religious struggle, and his con­sequent refusal to label the doubter a heretic, is in direct contradiction to Maimonides. He does not stand alone in dlis view, however. R. Nalunan of Bratslav (1772-18IO) stated: 'It is entirely proper that objections can be found to God. It is right and suitable that dus should be so because ofGod's great­ness and exaltedness. Since in His exaltedness He is so far above our minds there are bound to be objections to Him.'41 Concluding a wide-ranging anal­ysis on the subject of doubt in the religious experience, the contemporary Modern Ordlodox leader R. Norman Lamm wrote: 'We found that there is place for doubt within the confines ofcognitive faidl; it must not be allowed to interfere with normative halaldlic practice, which is dle expression offunc­tional faith.'42 In this regard, it is also wordl quoting dle following story, immortalized by Martin Buber.
Once when Rabbi Noah [of Lcldl0vitz] was in his room, he heard how one ofhis disciples began to recite the Principles of Faith in the House of Study next door, but stopping immediately after the words 'I believe with perfect faith,' whispered to himself: 'I don't understand that!' and then once more: 'I don't understand that.' The zaddik left his room and went to the House ofStudy.
'What is it you do not understandr' he asked. 'I don't understand what it's all about,' said the man. 'I say "I believe." IfI really do believe, then how can I possibly sinr But if I do not really believe, why am I ~(!lling lies r'
Crt means', answered the rabbi, 'that the words "I believe" arc a prayer, meaning 5~Oh, that I may believe!'" Then the hasid was suffused with a glow from within. 'That is right!' he cried. 'That is right! Oh, that I may believe, Lord of the world,
6h, that I may believe!'43
!L Maimonides, however, had a very different view. According to him, one ~ho does not believe in his Principles, or even doubts one of dIem, is a
40 Igerot hare'iyah, i. 20-1.
41 Likutei moharan, 2nd sel'., no. 52, trans. in Jacobs, Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 24.

42 43
Faith and Doubt, 30. Tales, ii. 158.

heretic, and it makes no difference ifthe heretic knows no better (e.g. ifhe has been taught to think in this way from his youth). It is true that in his later works Maimonides cOW1SelS tolerance when dealing with Karaites who do not realize that they are heretics,44 but there he is only concerned with how Jews are supposed to relate to them. That is, rather than hating them and hoping for their destruction, which is normally the case with regard to heretics, one should treat them with friendship and respect and attempt to convince them to abandon their errant ways. From a theological perspective, however, a heretic is doomed to eternal perdition and cannot be exculpated on the basis ofthe argwnent that he did not know any better. 45
To be sure, Maimonides' position has found its modern defenders, and in a famous rhetorical flourish R. Hayim Soloveitchik (1853-1918) proclaimed that a 'heretic, nebich, is still a heretic'.46 That is, it is wlfortunate that he is a heretic and condemned to hell, but what can one do-this is the way of the world. Yet Orthodoxy as a whole, both ultra-Ordlodox and Modern Ortho­dox, has not accepted Maimonides' judgement in this regard. One must search long and hard to find a contemporary Orthodox writer who asserts dlat a non-religious Jew who doesn't know any better is damned.
Why did Maimonides adopt dus uncompromising view that unintentional heresy prevents one from attaining dle world to come? The answer is found in Ius tmderstanding of how one attains immortality, which for him is not a 'reward' bestowed by God. Rather, as with prophecy, it is a natural process dlat depends on the perfection of one's intellect so that one can apprehend the Creator and the various intelligibles. It is this knowledge which gives one immortality. Ifone were to hold a heretical opinion,47 for whatever reason, dlis acts as a block on the intellect's move towards perfection.48 In trying to
44 Maimonides' later edition of his commentary on Mishnah I;Iulin I: 2 (see J. Kafih's edition, ad loc., n. 33); Mishneh torah, 'Hilkhot mamrim', 3: 3; Respoma, no. 449.
45 See R. Isaac Ze'ev Soloveitchik, quoted in Sternbuch, Teshuvotvehanhl1iJot, 452.
46
Wasserman, Kovets ma'amarim, 19; Gerlits (ed.), Hagadah, 175. For elaboration ofSoloveitchik's view, see Schulzinger,Mishmar halevi: I;Iagigah, unpaginated letter at the end ofthe book (called to my attention by Rabbi Chaim Rapoport).
47 According to his formulation in the Thirteen Principles, denial, or even doubt, about any ofthe
Principles causes one to lose his share in the world to come. However, from a Maimonidean philo­
sophical perspective, it is only denial ofone ofthe first five Principles that causes one to be excluded :,
from the world to come. Denial of the other eight only leads to exclusion from the community of ['
Israel. See Kellner, Dogma, 34-49; id., Must a Jew Believe Anything?, 83-6. See also Hyman, 'Mai: i
monides' "Thirteen Principles''', 141-2. '
48 According to Alexander Altmann's last essay on the topic, this perfection is not conjtU1ction with
the Active Intellect, but merely the achievement of similarity to it. In Altmann's words, 'Similarity,
not identity, is the only realistic goal of accomplishment.' See his Aufkliirtmg, 85. A development 10
Altmann's views is apparent here. In his essay 'Verhaltnis', 305, he spoke ofconjunction without any
hesitation. In his later article, 'Beatitude', he wrote, with less certainty, that Maimonides 'seems
refer to conjunction' with the Active Intellect.
Introduction
make dlis medieval idea more palatable, Rabbi J. David Bleich suggests: 'The situation is Cludely analogous to that ofdle student who fails to master algebra through no fault ofhis own and must dlen be refused permission to enroll in a calculus course. Such denial is not by way ofpunishment, but an assessment of the fact that one who has not mastered the rudiments of a subject cannot profit from advanced instruction in that discipline.'49 For the opponents of Mainlonides, on the odler hand, immortality is a reward bestowed by God through a supernatural act. He can therefore forgive heretical opinions arrived at unintentionally. He is the Almighty, after all.
Once Maimonides' conception ofimmortality is properly understood, we are confronted with how, in his discussion ofheresy in 'HilldlOt teshuvah', he could state that the heretic must publicly voice his heresy for him to be con­demned to perdition. In dle Mishneh torah Maimonides writes as if God has some role in this affair, and can choose to give someone a share in the afterlife ifthe person is prudent enough not to voice his heretical opinions. However, according to Maimonides, an anthropomorphist or an idolater is by defin­ition unable to achieve dle intellectual perfection required for immortality. Whether this heresy is stated or only believed is thus of no significance in Maimonides' theology. Any assertion to the contrary, as was attempted by Harry A. Wolfson,50 is direcdy contradicted by Maimonides' words in Guide
i. 36: 'I do not consider as an infidel one who cannot demonstrate that the corporeality of God should be negated. But I do consider as an infidel one who does not believe in its negation.'51 It is also obvious, according to Maimonides, that one who voices a heretical opinion widlout believing it is not denied a share in the world to come. As Maimonides states in Guide i. 50: 'Belief is not the notion that is uttered, but the notion that is represented in the soul when it has been averred ofit that it is in fact just as it has been repre­sented.'52
",We must therefore conclude that Maimonides' use of the words 'one who iliys' in describing a heretic are only in imitation of Mislmah Sanhedrin 10: 1, where the same formulation is found, and not too much should be read into ~s. One who believes in a qxporeal God or in the existence of many gods, ~yen without saying so publicly, is indeed a heretic as far as Maimonidean

j!l'eology is concerned. Such a person will not face any penalties from an ~~ycourt, but he is certainly denied a share in the world to come.
With Perfect Faith, 180. Studies, ii. 443 ff.
also Maimonides' introduction to MishnahAvot, ch. 2: 'I maintain that observance and trans­
may also originate in the rational faculty, in so far as one believes a true or a false doctrine,
no action which may be designated as an observance or a transgression results therefrom.'
the commentaries of Narboni, Efocli, and Abarbanel ad. loc.; Mishnch torah, Se.for hamada,
608 n. 31; H. A. Wolfson, Studies, ii. 163-4.

IS

Returning to the Thirteen Principles, the characteristic that gave them the theology ofthe Thirteen Principles; This latter point will not concern me dleir afterlife and caused dlem to become the formulation ofdle Jewish creed gready, however, since my focus is prinlarily dle rabbinic scholars who were, is precisely their outer form, dlat is, the fact dlat they were formulated as almost without exception, oblivious to dle radical possibilities inherent in a catechism widl all the Principles listed togedler. Had Maimonides listed a Maimonidean philosophy as expressed in the Guide. different number ofPrinciples in theMishneh torah (e.g. twelve or fourteen), . It is certainly one Of the great ironies of Jewish histOlY that the Thirteen dlese would have become the principles ofJudaism. But he did not, and thus Principles became the standard by which ordlodoxy was judged, for, as is well the Thirteen Principles stuck. known, Maimonides himself was attacked for supposedly holding heretical
Had Maimonides never drawn up his Principles, issues ofJewish belief in views, at odds widl his vety own Principles. Where else, in Judaism or any dle popular mind would have developed very differendy. In fact, lie wide­other religion, do we have a parallel example in which an audlority's doctrinal spread acceptance of Maimonides' creed is not so much a function of schol­formulations, dependent in large measure on his religious standing, are arly approval but radler of popular acceptance. Although later authors tried regarded as binding but dle authority himself is condemned for insufficient to offer competing creeds,53 none could displace that of Maimonides, both orthodoxy? because of his supreme authority and because popular piety prefers more Quite apart from the debate over dle esoteric meaning ofdle Guide, some dogmatic statements radler than fewer.54 That is, dlirteen principles are more ofMaimonides' openly proclaimed views were also attacked mercilessly, even appealing than wee, as were offered by Duran and Albo.55 by scholars who at other times were great defenders of Maimonides. For
In addition, the masses could never be expected to latch on to any of the example, he argued that certain stories recorded in dle Torall only occurred in competing systems of dogma, with dleir subde distinctions between prin­dreams. Concerning.this view, Nahmanides (1194--1270) writes: 'Such words ciples of faith without which lie religion is inconceivable, and other equally contradict Scripture. It is forbidden to listen to liem, all the more to believe true and required beliefs which are less significant in a structural sense, in them.'56 R. Yom Tov Ishbili (Ritva, c.12SO-133o) defended Maimonides in dlough not in any essential way. Since popular piety is attracted to a creed, the face of dus attack,57 but on another occasion, in discussing dle latter's somedung which people can hold on to and look towards as dleir document view of biblical exegesis,58 was just as unrelenting as Nahmanides had been, offaith, it is not surprising dlat Abarbanel's approach,. in which dlere are no t:eferring to Maimonides' view as 'heretical' (daJat minut).59 In the Igeret special beliefs but rather all aspects of the Torah are equal, was never able to hakodesh, wmch for a long time was mistalcenly attributed to Nalunanides and win widespread acceptance. ",~kh Charles Mopsilc has most recently argued was written by R. Joseph
I have mentioned above that in dle Guide Maimonides did not record the (i~atilla (I24-8-c.I32S),60 Maimonides' view, in agreement with Aristotle,61 Tlurteen Principles as lie fundamental beliefs ofJudaism. Indeed, as we shall thatdle sense oftouch is a 'disgrace to US',62 is characterized as having a 'taint see, dlere is at least one Principle dnt is explicitly contradicted by dle Guide,
}~Commentary on Gen. 18: 1. R. Abraham Hayim Viterbo uses almost identicallangl1agc when and if read as an esoteric work it is clear dlat the theology ofdle Guide is not '.. referring to this view of Maimonides; sec his Emunat hakhamim, 33a-b.
53 Even in our day new principles offaith contimie to be formulated: see e.g. Peli, 'Attempt'. Peli does not reject any ofthe Maimonidean Principles; he only wishes to add some more.
54 Petuchowski, Theology, 25, attributes the Orthodox acceptance ofMaim on ides' Principles to the popularity ofYigdal, 'which has found its way into all synagogues'. This merely begs the question, why did Yigdal find its way into synagogues, and further, why were poetic compositions of Mai-'. monides' Principles, of which Yigdal is only the most famous, composed? Obviously, widespread acceptance of the Principles pre-dates the poetic versions, not the other way around. As for YigdnJ '.
'(~! See his Sefer hazikaron, 55-62. .
·'J"T,·See the introduction to Maimonides, Commentary on the Mishnah, i. ro, where Mail110nides thatasmakhta (a type ofscriptural support for a law) is only a mnemonic provided by the rab­the law to Scripture, but that in reality the law is entirely independent of any scriptural . . Schimmel, Oral Law, 55-6; Kooperman, Peshuto, ch. 9. l,Cc:>mnaenltary on BT RH 16a. Ritva does not mention Maimonides by name, leading M. Roth, ii, nos. 21-2, to argue that he had Ibn Ezra in mind, and that had he known that held the same view he would not have used such harsh language. See Ibn Ezra's com­

finding its way 'into all synagogues', this too is incorrect, as will be documented below. . Exod. 21: 8 (long and short versions), 25: 18, Lev. 21: 2, 22: 7. This shared position ofIbn
55 I should call attention to a significant philosophical and halakhic point which appears to have •. Maimonides was overlooked by my late teacher, Professor Isadore Twersky, 'Did Ibn Ezra gone lUllioticed. The Vilna Gaon (R. Elijah b. Solomon Zalman, 1720-97) apparently believed Maimonides?'. See also Judall Halevi, J(uzari, iii. 73, who appears to be the first to suggest the First and Second Principles are the only true principles in Judaism. According to him, one later offered by Ibn Ezra and Maimonides. believes in God's existence and unity, despite his otller sins, is regarded as a Jew in good 13 ff. 61 Niromachean Ethics iii. ro. he is thus able to be included in a minyan (quorlU11 for public prayer). None ofthe nlU11erous . ii. 36, 40, iii. 8, 49. In Guide iii. 51 Maimonides states tllat Moses' intellect 'attained such sions regarding whetller a Sabbath violator may be included in a minyan seems to have taken that all the gross faculties in the body ceased to function; I refer to the various kinds of the the Gaon's comment, which appears in his commentary on Tikunei zohar, 42a. See also the . Strauss, Persecution, 75-6, argues that Maimonides' esoteric opinion is somewhat less ing approach ofR. Jacob Moelin, Shelelot uteshuvot maharil, no. 194. this.
ofheresy' (shemets minut).63 As is well known, Maimonides believed that only humans can receive individual providence and that the animal and plant king­doms receive a general providence. Individual animals, plants, and inanimate objects are thus subject to the vagaries ofchance.64 Yet two hasidic leaders, R. Simhah B1Ulem of Przysucha (C.1765-1827)65 and R. Hayim Eleazar Shapira (1872-1937),66 both claimed that this view is heresy. R. Simhall Bunem was not merely satisfied with asserting that the view itself is heresy, but even stated that the one who holds this view is a heretic!
Some kabbalists taught that as a punishment for what Maimonides wrote in his philosophical writings he was condemned to be reincarnated as a worm.67 The kabbalist and rabbinic scholar R. Joseph Ashkenazi (1525-77), known as the 'tana of Safed', publicly denounced Maimonides as a heretic. 68
R. Gedaliah ibn Yahya (1515-87) reports that opponents of Maimonides defaced his tombstone, writing on it 'excommunicated' and 'heretic'.69 In more recent times, R. N ahman of Bratslav is also known to have held a very negative view of Maimonides, reportedly even saying, 'There are certain philosophers generally considered great, particularly Maimonides, but in the future it will be known that he was a heretic <.U1d an unbeliever.'7o Itis a testa­
63
Although R. Israel b. Joseph al-Nakawa incorporated the entire Igeret hakodesh into his own Menorat hamaor, he was careful to omit the criticism ofMaimonidcs. SeeMenorat hamaor, iv. 90. An almost identical formulation to that which appears in Igeret hakodesh, and clearly adapted from it, is offered by the kabbalist R. Abraham Saba; again Maimonides is not mentioned. See id., Tseror hanwr, on Gen. 4: I. R. Jacob Emden, whose own sexuality was quite complex, also spares Maimonides. See hisMor uketsiah, no. 240: mlnn n)l"Ill ,,~ tJlt.l~ C~) ll'7 ~m no,n \!Il\!l'r.m 1!!ln tJ"r.:n~ n"l~ m:m tJl (.... nm'7~n ; id.,Amudeishamayim, 35W: l'li CIlIOll ll? ~'n no,n IlIllllr.m IlIln C'OlOl?On \!I"Y.Il
R. Moses Sofer writes almost identically: see id., She)elotuteshllvot, 'Even ha'ezer', 2, no. 40. Elsewhere Emden takes great glee in recounting how Aristotle himself succumbed to physical lusts: see id., Migdal oz, 49a ('Neveh ~akham: J:Ialon tsuri', no. 64); id., Mitpa&at sej'arim, 154. Regarding this legend, see Shmuel Ashkenazi, Alfa, 234-6. For the many scholars who agreed with Maimonides' negative view of the physical, see Kaufmann, Sinne, IBB--9; Malter, 'Shem Tob', 4Bo; Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, 93.
64 Guide iii. 17. This view is shared by many others. D. M. Halperin, J:Ienulahgenuzah, I, provides ref­erences to Nahmanides, Sefer ha&inukh, R. David Kimhi, R. Bahya b. Asher, Gersonides (R. Levi b. Gershom), R. Obadiall Sforno, R. Moses Cordovero, R. Moses Hayim Luzzatto, and R. Joseph Ergas.
65 Sim&at yisra)el, 'Ma'amrei sim~ah', no. 32. See also R. Pinhas Shapiro ofKorets, Imrei pin&as, vi, , no. 95, that one is obligated to believe that God's providence extends to everything. . 66 Min&ai ele)azar, i, no. 50. Shapira writes that it is forbidden to read such a view, which I assume means that he regards it as heretical.
67 R. Joseph Karo-or rather the magid or heavenly guide who appeared to him-claimed iliat although this was indeed Heaven's decree, Maimonides' Torah learning and good deeds protected him so that he was not forced to become a worm, altllough he did have to go tllrough one reincarna· tion before reaching heaven. This passage appears in an expurgated version in Magid meisharim, 'Vayakhel' (batra). See Werblowsky, I(aro, 31, 170 n. 2. For kabbalists, belief in the doctrine of . metempsychosis (gilglll) is itself one of tlle fundamental principles of Judaism, and, in the words of
R. Levi b. Habib, 'we are all obligated to believe in it without any hesitations or doubts': id., She>ewt .
uteshuvot ralba&, no. B. 68 See the text published by Bloch, 'Streit', 26+, 69 Shalshelet hakabalah, 101. 70 Green, TormentedMaster, 331 n. 8.,
Introduction
ment to Maimonides' towering stature that, despite such assaults on his
orthodoxy, his doctrinal formulation retained its authority.
To return to the point already mentioned above, if there is one thing
Orthodox Jews the world over acknowledge, it is that Maimonides' Thirteen
Principles are the fundamentals ofJewish faith. The common knee-jerk reac­
tion is that there is room for debate in matters offaith, as long as one does not
contradict any of these Principles. In line with this conception, R. Abraham
Isaiah Karelitz (the Hazon Ish, 1878-1953), one of the last century's pre­
eminent non-hasidic scholars, stated that he ordered his life on the basis
of complete faith in the Thirteen Principles.71 Among hasidic luminaries,
R. Hayim Eleazar Shapira stated: 'We are believers, sons of believers, in the Thirteen Principles in accordance with their simple meaning, in accordance . with their innermost trudl.'72 Anodler hasidic leader, R. Pinllas Shapiro of Korets (1726-91), recommended daily recital of the Principles.73 Similarly, the non-hasidic and saindy R. Israel Meir Halcohen (the Hafets Hayinl, 1839-1933) wrote dlat it is a mitsvah to recite the Principles every day.74 Going even further, R. Aaron (Arele) Rodl (1894-1944) wrote that it is praise­worthy to repeat the Thirteen Principles upon walcing, before going to sleep, and at other times during the day.75 It seems dlat dlere is even halaldlic sig­nificance to the Principles, as seen in the fact dlat R. Israel Meir Hakohen records that one who denies the divinity of the Torah, reward and punish­ment, the future redemption, and dle resurrection cannot serve as a prayer leader?6 Had Maimonides not included these Principles in his list, it is unlikely that denial ofthe last two, which are not necessarily ofprime import­ance to a religious life, would disqualifY one in dlis way.
Earlier I noted Kellner's observation that Maimonides' Principles were not th,e subject ofscholarly discussion in the first two centuries after their appear­ance, though dus did not stop dlem from achieving a great measure of popu­larity even then. This can be seen from dW early date of the hymn Yigdal,
;·;71 Kovets igerot, ii. 41, III. Interestingly enough, it was actually Karelitz who softened Maimonides'
harsh judgement about the status ofa heretic and 'redeemed' him. He argued that all the harsh things
said about heretics, not least of which was that they should be killed, were only stated with
:reference to an era in which one could properly rebuke sinners and in which God's providence was
!hanifest; however neither ofthese apply in contemporary times. See id., J:Iazon ish, 2: 16, 2B. How­
:l:\>er, while rebuke was certainly more of a possibility in Maimonides' day than in Karelitz's (since

'more Jews in medieval times accepted the authority of the Torah), divine providence was hardly ·~tYibre manifest in the twelfth century tllan in the twentieth. Concerning this point, Karelitz should be . as disputing with Maimonides, not interpreting him. torah, iii, no. 96. 73 Midrash pin&as, II9. 74 Milthtevei &afets &ayim, no. lB. emunim, i. 232b. See also R. Abraham Isaac Hakohen (the leader of the conservative sect ofToldot Aharon) , Zel1hor le)avraham, 124-, and Magid, 'Modernity'. Mishnah berurah, 126: 2. In the section "Sha'ar hatsiyun', 11. 3, he claims that this formulation is from Orenstein's Yeshuot ya)akov, but I have been unable to find the reference.
which summarizes the Principles and was composed by either Daniel ben Judah Dayan of Rome (C.1300) or, less likely, by Immanuel ofRome (c.1261­after 132S), who is the author of a very similar poem.77 Yigdal is known to have entered the daily Ashkenazi liturgy in the fifteenth century/8 and is mentioned in this regard by R. Yom-Tov Lipmann Heller (1579-1654-).79
R. Joseph Yuzpa Hahn (C.1730-IS03) recorded that it was the practice in Germany to recite Yigdal after every prayer, which apparentiy means three times a day. He also recommended studying it carefully and saying it with
kavanah.80
In anotiler illustration of how popular tile Principles became, we know of almost a hundred different poetic versions of them, of which Yigdal is only the most famous. These originated in a variety ofcountries, beginning in the early fourteenth century.8! Today Yigdal is a standard prayer, appearing in most prayer books. Yet there are different customs related to it, with some people reciting it every day and otilers saying it only on Friday night, when it is usually sung publicly. Many Moroccan Jews recite it on Sabbath morning before the Barukh sh~amar prayer.82 This custom is probably based on the notion that the Thirteen Principles are hinted at in Barukh sheJamar, with each of the thirteen instances of the word barukh (blessed) in this prayer corresponding to a different Principle.83 In Morocco and Gibraltar there was also a custom of reciting Yigdal at circumcisions, redemptions of the first­born, and burials.64 There is even a Christian adaptation ofYigdal which to tilis day is sung in many Anglican as well as otiler Protestant churches in the
77 See Elbogen,fewish Litm;gy, 77; 1. Davidson, Otsar hashirah, ii. 266---;. R. Eliyahu Katz sees ahint i of Daniel b. Judah's authorship in the first word of the song, 7')'. The first two letters allude to the ' Thirteen Principles and the last two letters allude to the author's name, Daniel. See his letter in :
D. Barda, Revid hazahav, lO8. Surprisingly, R. J. S. Delmedigo, Novelot ~okhmah, 92b, assumed that ., Solomon ibn Gabirol wrote Yigdal. R. Jacob Emden, who at times went so far as to deny Maimonides' : authorship of the Guide (see Schacter, 'Iggeret', 442 n. 12), actually believed that Maimonides wrote " Yigdal. See his Amudei shamayim, 176b (introduction to Shir hayi~ud, no. 3). Although Emden did l not include Yigdal in his prayer book, it is found in the popular and oft-reprinted Sidur beitya'alwv, : which, although attributed to Emden, is largely a product of the printer. In this Sidur, 95a, 'Emden' advised the God-fearing to recite the Thirteen Principles every day-words ofadvice which are notto , be fOlmd in Emden's Amudei shamayim. Although he nowhere offered his own list of principles of ' faith, Emden claimed that a literal understanding ofthe kabbalistic notion oftsimtsum is a fundamen, ' tal concept ofJudaism: u", 7V:l7 n1l1l!l~'n nl7:1l!1l1lnl:l. See hisMitpa~atsejarim, II7. ,
70 See Davis, 'Philosophy', 215. In this article Davis argues that 'the belief in dogmas of Judaism entered Ashkenazic culture in the late Middle Ages'.
79 See his introductory derashah to R. Asher b. Jehiel, Or~ot~ayim, lo (final numbering).
00 Yosifomets, no. 60 (although the title of this work is often given as Yose!omets, this is incorrect;
see Ben-David, Shevet miyehudah, no. 20). 01 See Marx, 'List', 305-36; 1. Davidson, Otsar hashirah, iv. 492. 02 See Ovadiah,Natandavid, 336; Azrad, Toratimekha, lOl-2. . 03 See Auerbach, Ora~ ne'eman, 'Oral) l.layim', 51: 1. 04 See Gaguine, Ketershem tov, i. 196:
Introduction
English-speaking world.65 In addition to Yigdal, most prayer books also con­tain the Ani maJamin, and in years past some Sephardi communities would gather in the synagogue the day before Rosh Hodesh (New Moon) in order
to recite this as well.86
The widespread popularity ofYigdal and similar compositions actually led to concern among some rabbinic authorities that this concentration on the Thirteen Principles would overshadow the rest of what Judaism has to say.
R. Jacob Moelin (C~1360-1427) wrote:
The rhymes and poems that people write in Yiddish on the unity of God and the Thirteen Principles-would that they were not written! For most of the ignorant believe that all of the commandments depend on this, and they despair of various positive and negative commandments, such as tsitsit and tefl/in and the study of Torah. And they believe that they fulfil their obligation by saying those rhymes with kavanah. And those rhymes do not mention a single one of the 613 com­mandments that Jews are commanded-only the fundamentals ofJewish belief.S?
R. Solomon Luria (C.15IO-74) expressed himself similarly to Moelin. He noted that there were people in his day who believed that they could commit all the sins in tile world as long as they accepted tile Thirteen Principles. Luria agreed with Abarbanel's suggestion that Maimonides' formulation was no more than a Jewish response to the medieval Islamic philosophers who put their own faith in the form of principles. Not surprisingly, he recited neither Yigdal nor theAni maJamin.88
85 See Petuchowski, Theology, 25; Rothkoff, 'Yigdal'. ~ ~ee Gaon~ 'Recitation', 39-41. Gaon refers to special Hebrew and Ladino publications of the Prl11clples, deSigned to be recited at this time, printed in Venice, 1700 and Salonika, 1775. See also Isaac De Fes' Hebrew and Judaeo-Spanish Hoda'at emunat yisra'el. Strictly speaking, one cannot speak of the Ani ma'amin, for in addition to the Ashkenazi (standard) version there are at least two
Sephardi versions. It is not known who composed any ofthe versions. .
"Both the standard Ani ma'amin and Yigdal formulations ofthe Thilteen Principles differ in a num­
b~~ of ways from what Maimonides actually wrote. Regarding this, as well as textual variations of

Twda1
,see Gaguine, Keter shem tov, i. 198; Lamm, Faith and Doubt, 159 n. 31; Goren, Torat hashabat, .," " 572; Schueck,.She'elot uteshuvot rashban, 'Oral} ~ayim', no. 45; Hirschensohn, Malki bakodesh, ii. , E. M. Preti, Hamaor, 13-15; Waxman, 'Maimonides', 402-3; Pines, History, 16-20; id., 'Philo-Purport, 3; Messas, Mayim (Jayim, 97; Berliner, Writings, i. 19-20, 122, ii. 230; Birnbaum, soferim, 83-4; Sparka, Yesodeiha'emunah, 63-8; Rosenberg, 'Biblical Research' 88' D. Cohen
kapai, 92; David Yitshaki's comment in Tsefimot, 5 (Tishrei 5750 [Oct. 1989D, ~07; Warhaftig: 18; Katan,.'I Believe', 41-4; Cosman, 'Maimonides' Thirteen Principles', 337-48 (some of contam errors because they rely on the fanlty translation ofMaimonides' Mishnall com­ron,'>n,,.,,,, in tlle standard editions ofthe Talmud).
maharil, 626 (~ral~slation i~l Davis, :Philosophy', 215). R. Joseph 13. Soloveitchik is reported opposed the recitation ofYzgdal, whICh he regarded as an imitation ofthe Christian practice ofthe catechism; see Schachter, Nefesh harav, 231. ',lI.O:trbaneL Rosh amanah, ch. 23; S. Luria, 'Hanhagat maharshal', 326. As has already been noted, also argued that Maimonides' Principles were designed exclusively for the masses.

R. Isaac Luria (1534-72) is also known to have opposed recitation of Yigdal, but for a different reason entirely, which has nothing to do with the practical concerns expressed by Moelin. As his student R. Hayim Vital (1542­1620) explained, Luria did not recite any song or poetic composition that was not a product of the early luminaries such as R. Akiva, R. Ishmael, and
R. Eleazar Kalir. 89 He believed that such early 'Yorks were full of kabbalistic significance, unlike works composed by later authors, 'who do not know what they are saying'.90 Luria's influence was so great dlat R. Isaac Safrin of Komarno (1806-74), an important hasidic teacher, was led to remark dlat those who do not remove Yigdal from the prayer book are showing their 'lack offaith'.9l Taking Luria's words most seriously, hasidic prayer books are COll­spicuous in their exclusion ofYigdal.
Although in more recent centuries dle Thirteen Principles have indeed become identified with dle fundamentals ofJudaism, there were also scholars in earlier times, such as R. Meir Aldabi (C.131O-C.1360),92 R. David ben Yom Tov ibn Bilia (fourteenth century),93 R. Simeon ben Samuel of Reg ens burg (fourteendl-fifteenth centuries), 94 and R. Moses ben Joseph Trani (1500-80),95 who regarded dle Thirteen Principles as the beliefs that defined Judaism. The outstanding medieval philosophers did not share this view, however. This was so even when they believed in the Principles, and even when dley believed that denial of a Principle equalled heresy. Believing the Principles to be true, even obligatory, and regarding them as the fundamentals ofJudaism were regarded by medieval philosophers as two separate things. It is because of this that they spent so much time dissecting Maimonides' medlod and categories and defending their alternative systems.96
09 He believed Kalir to be a tana, as is stated in Tosafot, Ifagigah I3a, s.v. veraglei; Ma~zorvim, 362-4 (quoting Rabenu Tam); Asher b. Jehiel,Berakhot 5: 21; and see Langer, 'Kalir'. Some medieval . scholars recognized that Kalir's dates were much later. See Tosafot, Menal;ot 35b, s.v. vekamah aod Ifulin I09b, s.v. nidah.
90 Vital, Peri ets ~ayim, i. IS (also recorded in the commentary on the Shull;an arukh by Judah Ashke­nazi, BaJer heitev, 'Ora1,l1,layim', 68: 3). The anonymous Ifemdat yamim, 57a, claims that Luria's objec-; cion was to the first four stanzas, which are not in accord with kabbalistic truth. Therefore, Ifenu/at : yamim concludes, there is no objection to reciting the rest ofthe poem. For a suggestion as to what, in i particular, motivated Luria's kabbalistic objection, see It. Meir Mazuz's comment in Y. Barda, Yitsl;ak \ yeranen, II3. Citing unnamed kabbalists, and calling attention to some problematic linguistic aspects in the poem, Emden also opposed recitation ofYigdal; see id.,Amudei shamayim, I7Sb. ..
91 Shul~an hatahor, 68: 3 (section 'Zer zahav). On the other hand, the famed kabbalist R. Isaiah ; Horowitz, Shenei lul;ot haberit, i. 94a ('Sha'ar ha'otiyot'), refers to Yigdal as an 'excellent hymn'. r.
R. Shabetai Sofer was unaware ofany kabbalistic opposition to Yigdal. After mentioning that other f scholars, in particular Abarbane1, disputed with Maimonides as to the proper number of principles, :, he wrote: 'Perhaps it is due to this dispute that a small number ofpeople refused to recite this hymn.' : See id., Sidur shabetai softr, ii. 2. 92Shevilei emunah, Netiv I. Yesodot hamaskil, 56.
93
94 95
See Davis, 'Philosophy, 195-222. See Kellner, Dqgma, 77, 198-9'
96

See Kellner, Dogma, who discusses the different theoretical bases for the various dogmatic formulations.
Introduction
The disputes ofdle medieval rabbis were soon forgotten, however, and as mentioned above, in more recent centuries there was general agreement among traditional Jews that the Thirteen Principles were indeed the funda­mentals ofJudaism. Denial ofeven one Principle was usually enough for one to be branded as a heretic. For the masses, and for many rabbis as well, this became unquestioned truth. In the seventeenth centuty, R. Saul Morteira (C.1596-1660) declared that 'all agree' widl Maimonides' Principles, 'and who­ever denies them has no share in the world to come'.9? In dle eighteenth century, Isaac Wetzlar (c.1685-1751), in his Yiddish Libes briv, urged that all children be taught the Principles.98 Sharing Wetzlar's sentiments, Gedaliah ben Abrallatn Teilcus published his Emunat yisraJel (Amsterdam, 1764)) a Hebrew-Yiddish elaboration of the Principles designed for the common people. It was reprinted a number of times, thus illustrating its popularity. For those rabbis who were aware of many of the disputes we shall be dis­cussing, appeal to dle Principles still had religious and, just as important, rhetorical power, in particular when confronting religious dissenters. Many citations illustrating the centrality the Principles assumed could be given, and I offer here only some representative examples.
As part of his attempt to undermine traditional Judaism, Saul Berlin (1740-94), in his notorious forgery Besamim rosh, aimed his arrows at the Thirteen Principles. He inserted into dle mouth of R. Asher ben Jehiel dle notion that dle Principles ofFaidl are not eternal but can be re-evaluated widl me passage of time.99 In his response to Berlin, R. Mordechai Banet (1753­1829) wrote, with reference to the Thirteen Principles: 'Our teacher Moses [Maimonides] did not add or subtract atlydling, and all his words are explicit in Scripture atld in dle writings of the Sages.'lOO In his polemic against the 11aScent Reform movement, R. Tsevi Hirsch Chajes (1805-55) noted that until me rise of this heretical movement all of Jewry was united around dle Thirteen Principles. lol In atl anonymous, harshly worded letter to R. Esriel Bildesheimer (1820-99), while attempting to show that one of his students had departed from the proper padl, the author wrote: 'I don't know if he p~lieves in the Thirteen Principles.'102 Moses Leib Lilienblum (1843-1910), 9,iscussing his path to heresy, wrote, 'When I rejected Maimonides' articles of faim, I did not rejoice.'103 It was obvious to Lilienblum dlat since he had r~jected the Thirteen Principles he was an unbeliever. When dIe Orthodox

.;. 97 GivatshaJul, 76a ('Tetsaveh'). ,,98 See Faierstein, Libes Briv, 96-7 (English), 50-1 (Yiddish). .... :99. Besamim rosh, no. 25I. Nahman Krochmal agreed with Berlin; see Krochmal, Kitvei ranak, 439. ,1\!9° Parashat mordekhai, no. 5. See also Hayim Berlin, Nishmat ~ayim, no. 180 (beginning). .. 101 Kolsifrei, ii. 979-80. See, similarly, Z. J. Friedman, EmetveJemunah, 52-5. }~2 See my 'Letter', 18. 103 'I;Iatotne'urim', II2.
Introduction

22
Jewish Congregational Union of America was formed in 1898, it included ill its convention statement dle following: 'We affirm our adherence to the acknowledged codes of our Rabbis and the dlirteen principles of Maimon­ides.'104 Half a century earlier in Philadelphia, Isaac Leeser (1806-68) had also declared dlat the Thirteen Principles were dle authoritative Jewish creed. 105
A prominent Lidmanian rabbi, who insisted th~t all Jews .are o,bligated to believe in the Principles, also addressed dle gentlles, declanng: As long as you do not believe in these Thirteen Principle~, yOl~ ha~e ~o belief.'106 A we~­known hasidic leader, who did not share Malmollldes vlews as expressed 111 the Guide, nevertheless declared that all Jews are obligated to believe in the, Thirteen Principles.107 When, in dle face of harsh criticism, an anti-Zionist figure wanted to defend his rejection of the Balfour Declaration, he stated
· P" I >'108 A
simply: 'Does this equal denial of one of the T hlrt.eel: nnclp es .. nineteenth-century false messiall accused his non-behevlllg antagolllsts of denying one ofMaimonides' Printiples.109 In trying to discredit his .ka.bbalis. tic opponents, R. Yihyeh Kafih (1850-1932) accused ~lemofcont~adictlllg the Thirteen Principles, a charge they vehemendy demed,llo In trylllg to show the great wickedness of Jews who chose to have dleir bodies cremated,
R. Hayim Eleazar Shapira assumed as a matter of course dlat they must also deny the Thirteen Principles. l1l More recendy, when R. Immanuel Jakob· ovits (1921-99) announced that he intended to give a lecture under Conserva· tive auspices, a local Orthodox rabbi protested that his 'presence would serve
104 See Mendes-Flohr and Reinharz (eds. ),Jeu' in the Modern World, 470.
lOS See Snssman,IsatU Leeser, 78. " '

106 Broide, Shir ~adash, 63-4. While not going this far, R. Haylm D~vld Regensberg arg~es ~at~ Maimonides requires ager toshav (a resident alien who keeps the Noalude laws) to accept hIS Prm.:, ciples; see his Mishmeret ~ayim, ISS. R. Abba Mari Astruc ofLu?e1 states that one ~hould not conde~: Aristotle for not believing in creation, since it is not included m the seve~ N oahlde c~mm~ndme~ts.~ See id. Minhat kenaot, ed. Dimitrovsky, 257. (That non-Jews are not obitgated to .belteve m cr~at1oft ~

is also ~tated'by Kamenetzky, Emet leya'akov, 311.) The implication ofR. Ab,b~ Man's c?mment IS  ," 
Noalrides are not obligated to believe in any principles of faith, since nOl~e I~ mcluded m th~  , 
commandments. Although, to be sure, Noahides are forbidden to ~~actIse Idolat!)" there I~ . 
mand against believing in polytheism. As Aviner, ~he'elat~he~moh, VI~, no. 214, pomts out, It IS 
for a non-Jew to be an atheist than an idolater, Slllce belteflll God IS not one of the seven 
comma~dments. See, however, Maimonides,Mishneh torah, 'Hilkhot melakl~im', 8: II, who 

requires Noalrides to affirm at least some aspects of a proper theology. Regardlllg the old aue~nul1V'1!
which is worse, an atheist or an idolater, see Ibn Ezra, commentary on Exod. 2?: I (en~);
ha'illarim, i. 14; Herzog, Decisions, ii, no. II9; Jacobs, Principles, 55;Kook's vIe,; as inte:rpn:teC!,
Naor 'Rav Kook' and in Naor's translation of Kook, Orot, 51 ff.; and the quotatIon from
Azul~i, see below: Ch. 2 n. 3. Maimonides apparently believed that atheism is worse. See Lette:s,

107
See Safrin, Heikhal haberakhah, I.
Kafil 1, III n. 79· , . Z'kh t
lOB M. Friedman, Ifevrah vcdat, 320. 109 See GOltelll, t. ron avo, 110 See Araki et aI., Emunat hashem, 176 ff., 325 ff. This book reprints Y. Kafih, Mtl~amot followed by tile kabbalists' refutations. See Tobi, 'Who Was the Author?'. 111 See his responsum in J. J. Weinberg, Seridei esh, ii. 282.
Introduction
to add a great deal of prestige to an instiwtion that denies many of the
Thirteen Principles'. 112 The guidelines of a popular Orthodox website state:
'The Rambam's Thirteen Principles of Belief (and/or the Ani Ma)amins and/
or the Yigdal) are baseline standards for our discussion group.'113
Other contemporary authors in the Orthodox commlUlity express dlem­
selves similarly: 'It should be stressed that all Torall scholars agree on the
validity and significance of the Principles'Y4 'The fact is that Maimonides'
Thirteen Principles are all derived from the Tahnud and the classic Jewish
tradition, and were never in dispute'. 115 'The principles have been discussed for
the past eight hlUldred years, and are still accepted by all Jews as the one clear
unambiguous creed of Judaism',l16 'It is universally recognized as definitive
halacha that firm belief in, and adherence to each ofdlese Thirteen Principles
is dle sine qua non ofTorall faith'l17 (emphasis added to all four quotations).
'From an Ordlodox standpoint, though the 13 Principles of Faith have a
history, they are obligatory nonedleless.'118 'Fundamentalists we are indeed
in the original sense ofthe word. We hold the dlirteen Ikkarim [Principles] to
be fundamental to Torall Judaism.'119
What emerges clearly from what we have seen is that Maimonides' Prin­
dples came to be regarded as central to Jewish belief.120 Once his Principles
were accepted, it was only a short step to agreement with Maimonides that
arty deviation from dle Principles was enough to categorize one as a heretic.
After this became something ofan unofficial dogma, the notion further devel­
oped, as seen in some statements cited above, that Torall scholars throughout
history have always been in agreement with the Principles. Some interesting
fljghts offancy were also made in support of the authodty of the Principles.
p§r example, Morteira points out that the singular noun mitsvah appears thir­
tR9~ times in the Torah in contexts in which one would have expected
~~plural, mitsvot. Morteira illustrates how each of these examples points to
gpe of the Principles.121 In more recent years, R. Hayim Eleazar Shapira
WR}lght it significant that the gematriyah of inN, signifying God, is 13.122
$lwer examples are R. Nathan Adler's (1803-90) assertion that the Principles
~:'i~: ']. M. Coh~n (ed.), Dear, Ch~I!(Rabbi, 2 5?. <www.~ishdas.org> .
113

<~"H /Mordechal Blumenfeld millS mtroductlon to Y. Wemberg, Fundamentals and Fatth, 18. /(l;~t Genack, 'Ambiguity', 73. 116 A. Kaplan, Maimonides'Principles, 3. :\~;~;~Fendel, Torah, 314. I1BYaakov Elman, as quoted in Wellsprings (Summer 1996), 19. , ,Danziger, 'Modern Otthodoxy', 5. ' other Orthodox works that reflect this notion, see Sparka, Yesodei ha'emunah; Kutner, ,~:ff.CJiltun,rtIJ )Jeha~akirah; RoUer, Ma'aml'ei be'er ~Jayim mordellhai; Gottesman, Emunah shelemah; " emunah; Neriyah, Yod-gimel ha'ikarim; anon. , Ma'ayanot ha'emunah. sha'ul, 129a-I32a ('Ekev'). See also ibid. 76a ('Tetsaveh'), where he finds another allusion Thirteen Principles in the Torah. ,'22 Divrei torah, ix, no. 6.
Introduction

are already present in Onkelos' Aramaic translation ofthe Torah,123 and, also in the nineteenth century, R. Elijah Soloveitchik's claim that the Principles are taught in the New Testament, which he believed was written by faithful Jews,124 R. David Cohen, a contemporary scholar, even claims that one can find the Thirteen Pririciples in the Passover Haggadah. 125
Maimonides' rationalism notwithstanding, his Principles became too sig­nificant to leave to the philosophers and talmudists, and it therefore should not surprise us that there are also kabbalistic and hasidic interpretations of them.126 In fact, the prayer book of the Biala hasidim includes an 'updated' version of the Principles. The seventh Principle reads: 'I believe with perfect faith that all the words of the prophets and the [kabbalistic] teachings of Rabbi Simeon ben Yohai, Rabbi Isaac Luria, and the Ba'al Shem Tov and his students are true.' In the Eighth Principle it is stated that these kabbalistic teachings were given to Moses. Apparently, even this is not enough, so the prayer book adds two more Principles: that Israel is the chosen people, and that 'in every generation there are righteous ones like Abraham, Isaac, and ' Jacob'.127 '
Because Maimonides' Principles were so important, it also should not . surprise us that the maskilim and early nineteenth-century proto-Reformers, who composed a variety of manuals of Jewish belief, placed great emphasi~ upon the Thirteen Principles. Yesodei hadat, by Judah Leib Ben-Ze'ev (1764:­18n), is typical, for it states tllat all religious people must believe in the Prin:.·.
ciples.128 Indeed, 'the Maimonidean creed is hardly ever absent from these' presentations'.129 Needless to say, the Principles were reinterpreted in accord; ance with these tlunkers' Zeitgeist, wlllch placed an emphasis on the 'spirit' .... the law while playing down the Torall's ceremonial and ritual '-Vl"IJ\·Jll'-.."', Thus, books were written which summarized the essence ofJudaism withcmt';,j' mentioning traditional religious obligations such as kashrut and the
or even explaining what Jewish law is all about. Mordechai Gumpel ",'-llll<lIU'­
Levison (1741-97), a prominent maskil who wrote Shelosh-esreh yesodei
(The Thirteen Foundations of the Torah; Altona, 1792), provides
good example ofthe importance ofthe Principles in the maskilic i'rna~~in;ati()ll
as well as how they were used (and misused). As David Ruderman puts
'Levison began with a putative discussion ofMaimonides' thirteen
offaitll only to subvert them radically in tlle end .... He had virtually
123 Introduction to Netinah lager, sect. 4.
124 Kol kore, introduction.
126 See Safrin, Heikhalhaberakhah, i. 29a-37b; Gurary, Thirteen Principles.
127 Anon., Sidur ~elkat yehoshua, 291-5 (called to my attention by Rabbi Daniel Yolkut). See


1. D. B. Hakohen, Ohel yisakhar, 16-17. 128 (Vienna, 18Il), 2nd intr,odw:ttl
129 Petuchowski, 'Manuals', 63. See also Eliav,JelVish Education, 73-44, 244, 262.

Introduction
formed a Maimonidean theology of tlle twelfth centuty into a conventional deism ofthe eighteentll.'13o
Some modern Reform thinkers have continued along tllis path, as seen in the recent book by Keny M. Olitzky and Ronald H. Isaac, The Thirteen Principles ofFaith: A Confirmation Textbook. l3l Nor could tlle Donme, the believers in Shabetai Tsevi after his conversion, overlook the popularity oftlle Principles. For Maimonides' Nintll Principle (tlle immutability oftlle Torah), they substituted tlle following: 'I believe Witll perfect faith that tlle Torall will hot be changed and there will not be another Torah; only the mitsvot are null but the Torah will be forever and ever.'132
Even when Maimonides' original formulation is not tlle focus, tlle notion ofthirteen principles has remained strong. Thus Ibn Bilia added an extra thir­teen principles to those of Maimonides, addressed specifically to the philo­sophically inclined intellectual.133 In an example entirely removed from Maimonidean thinking, R. Yekutiel Aryeh Kamelllar (1871-1937) identified . thirteen principles ofBeshtian hasidism.134 Concluding that beliefs could no .\<j>nger 'function as a means of Jewish unity', Mordecai Kaplan (1881-I983), ;,the founder of Reconstructionism, set forth the principles of his new move­,ment in terms of thirteen 'wants' .135 The Jewish secular humanists have also '.gotin on tlle act, with their leader Sherwin Wine outlining tlurteen principles ,to guide their movement, including 'selecting an alternative that one believes ft!1\: [and] s~edding expectations of magical powers' .136 Further reflecting ••... populanty of the Thirteen Principles, even the Jewish sectarians were . Thus, Simhah Isaac ben Moses Halutski (1670-1746) enumerates of thirteen Karaite principles, which are actually quite similar to those . . 137 Finally, even Christian missionaries, in an early 'Jews -type manifesto, developed their own formulation of tlllrteen prin­
138
~'-"'LLU.IlllJl~ to the statements mentioned above concerning the unanimous . accorded the Principles -and many more examples ofsuch rhetoric ,be cited-a comment by Gershom Scholem, made in a entirely differ­
seems relevant: 'Thls seems to me an extraordinary example of
129-30: .. Ja1 Hoboken, NJ, 1999.
Post~Sabbatlan Sabbattanmn, 8. As Naor points out, Shabetai Tsevi was actually less than hiS followers, and stated unambiguously that Maimonides' Ninth Principle was 151 n. 10).
Ibn Bilia, Yesodot hamaskil, and Kellner, Dogma 77-9. 134 Dor de'ah i 46-;, Scult (ed.), Communings, i. 218; Kaplan and Kolm (eds.), Sabbath Prayerbook, 562-5: . . (IS Oct. 1999),6. 137 Kevod eif)kim (Ramleh 2000) Del'tzs h B'k . J ' •
. I C, t uret teenah, Hebrew introduction. (Not all of these hanahot as Delitzch are ~eological.) Is it only a coincidence that the Mormons also have thh:te;n 'Articles of J; Smith, Pearl, 60-1.

how a judgment proclaimed, Witll conviction as certainly true may neverthe­less be entirely wrong in every detail.'139 This is so, for as the present book seeks to demonstrate, even a CurSOlY examination ofJewish literature reveals that, bOtll before and after his time, Maimonides' Principles were not regarded as tlle last word in Jewish tlleology.
Nevertheless, it is amazing tllat so few modern rabbinic scholars have explicitly acknowledged this fact, even when writing for their peers. It is pos­sible that many scholars simply regarded it as obvious and perhaps others even began believing tlleir own rhetoric. Whatever the reason, I have found only tllree modern traditional scholars who openly acknowledge the validity of disputes concerning tlle Thirteen Principles. R. Samuel David Luzzatto (1800-65),140 after noting that some sages had disagreed with the Principles, writes: 'Heaven forbid tllat we agree with Maimonides in what he said (in his commentary on Sanhedrin, ch. IO), that anyone who does not believe with perfect faith in the Thirteen Principles tllat he set up for our religion has left the fold and is a complete heretic.'141 R. Reuven Amar writes: 'With regard to the Principles ofFaith, Maimonides' words are not to be regarded as divinely revealed since he did not receive them via tradition dating back to Moses, but they are the product ofhis own reasoning and knowledge.'142 R. Bezalel Naor writes: 'The trutll, known to Torall scholars, is that Maimonides' formulation of the tenets ofJewish belief is far from universally accepted.'143 I have found one other source that departs from tlle notion that the Thirteen Principles are . the last word in Orthodox theology, though it is not as blunt as the scholars: quoted above. Surprisingly enough, it is the editors of tlle Artscroll publish-. ing house, regarded by many as the quintessential Orthodox obscurantists,
who offer a careful formulation, stating that the Principles achieved 'virtually universal acceptance'. 144 Mter examining the evidence, I think most readers [ will agree that even this statement is wide oftlle mark. '
139 Major Trends, 130, ' 140 Although, strictly speaking, Luzzatto should perhaps not be categorized as 'Orthodox', I h~ve

included him because ofhis strong ties to tradition. In fact, it is probably not helpful to refer to ~t.ah:m, scholars by categories developed in western Euro~e. In Italy he was always re~ard~d as a traditlon~ scholar, and he trained a generation ofItalian rabbiS. My ~eluctance to catego~lze him as Orthodox l~ due to the fact that in a private letter he admitted that he did not accept a certam halakhall as set down in the Talmud, preferring instead Ibn Ezra's interpretation ofthe verse in question. I:I0weve~, he ~s~, noted that this was a completely private opinion. See Luzzatto, Letters, 24-6 (con~ernmg shavmg ~l~ a razor). In one essay, Luzzatto claimed that the book ofEcclesiastes was a heretical wor~: seePenl~ : shadal 161-206. However he later retracted this view: see Vargon, 'Idelitity', 365-84-. Wltll regardt~,Luzza~to's original view ~fEcclesiastes, the closest parallel.among traditio~l~l sou~ces .is that oflt' Israel Bruna, who seemingly states that the book of EccleSiastes was not dlvmely msplred; see
She'ewt uteshuvot, no. 66. .
141 Studies ii. 19. 142 S. Beriin, Besamim rosh, appendix,
143 Post-Sdbbatian Sabbatianism, 8. In his note, Naor writes that he heard this insight from
teacher, R. Shelomoh Fisher ofJerusalem. 144 Scherman (ed.),ArtscrollSiddur,

Introduction
Many years ago Leon Roth wrote: '0 for the masterpiece (but it will have
to be published not only anonymously but also posthwnously) which will
demonstrate to our formula-bOlUld souls that there is no single one of the
Thirteen Articles even ofMaimonides' alleged creed which was not rejected,
explicitly or implicitly, by leading lights in the history ofJudaism, including, I
fancy (but only whisper the suspicion), no less a person tllan Maimonides
himself.'145 As we shall see, ROtll has exaggerated only slightly in this state­
ment. His basic tllrllSt is certainly on tlle mark, even Witll regard to his sug­
gestion about Maimonides himself. Unlike ROtll, however, I do not believe
that the present book, masterpiece or not, must appear anonymously or
posthumously. Mter all, the Jewish inquisitorial authorities closed up shop a long time ago. 146
The plan oftllis book is simple enough. After a short examination ofthe place of dogma in Judaism, I will proceed to examine each of Maimonides' Prin­ciples .and ~oc~~nt~he controversies concerning them.' Since tllis is a study ofMatmorudes PrmClples and not Maimonidean philosophy as a whole, I shall generally refrain from detailed discussion of an esoteric Maimonides who would be regarded as a heretic according to his own Principles. However, where Maimonides openly contradicts tlle Principles in his other writings, fur­
ther examination is called for.
I must make one more point about the structure of this book. As I have already demonstrated, it is often asserted that Maimonides' Principles were accepted as dogma by the traditionalists -what is today known as the Ortho­dox denomination ofJudaism. This being the case, it would make no sense in ~econtext of this book, which deals Witll traditional responses to tlle Prin­
CIples, to discuss those scholars who are not regarded as acceptable to tlle tra­ditionalists (and who, in fact, usually did not regard themselves as traditional ()r,Orthodox). To be sure, some figures mentioned in this book have been invo~ved in disputes and opposed by members of the wider community, as
.. mdeed tlle case with Maimonides himsel£ 147 However, the scholars dis­
. Roth, Is ThereAJewi~hPhilosophy?, II (called to my attention by Professor Menachem Kellner).
be sure, there are still some heresy-hunters about. After my original article appeared in the
U-~aJournal, bOtll myself and the editor oftlle journal, Rabbi Dr Jacob J. Schacter were
. 0 111 a scurrilous fashion by Binyamin !olko~sky in tlle Satmar paper Yidishe tsaytung (2'8 July
lkovsky, who telephoned me for an mtervlew, was at least honest enough to admit that he "A~l Jlr.o'pr read the article.
, .good ex~ple is .R..Abrall,arn Isaac Kook, who was regarded as a heretic by many of the anti­. Hungarian rabbIS, mcludmg a figure who is himself quoted a number oftimes in this book UHJ"'''''lZarShapira ofMunkacz. See H. E. Shapira, Divrei torah, vi, no. 82; id., Sha'aryisakhar:
(ed.),Igerotshapirin, no. 219.

cussed in this book always regarded themselves as part ofthe traditional com­mtulity. They were also regarded as such by significant, ifnot overwhelming, segments of this conumulity, in particular by the religious and intellectual leadership, both during and after these scholars' lifetimes. In many cases, these men were even leaders of their commlUlity. The fact that they differed with aspects ofMaimonides' Principles never caused them to lose this status, . which itself shows that traditional Jews rejected a central facet of Mai­monides' Principles, namely, that denial of any of them turns one into a heretic. For my purposes, this acceptance on the part of their peers and succeeding generations suffices to place these scholars in the traditional or 'Orthodox' category. While it is true that some of these individuals are only minor figures, and thus probably not an acceptable source for those seeking to create a new Ordl0dox theology, dley are still significant from a historical standpoint, that is, when one seeks to document how traditional figures did not feel bound by the Tllirteen Principles.
I have omitted those scholars whose overall views place them clearly at odds widl what traditional Jews have generally regarded as religiously accept­able. In modern times dlese scholars are usually, but not always, at odds with , the halakhic system (in whole or in part), and do not regard themselves as part of the Orthodox community. When dealing with medieval society, mat-• ters are more complex since there is no clear breakdown of denominations~ • Furdlermore, dle radical philosophers whose writings have come down to us i: all seem to have lived in accordance with Jewish law, even ifdleir view ofits j significance diverged drastically from that ofthe talmudists. In choosing whom i' to include, I shall concentrate on figures who were accepted by significant 1 segments of the community and whose religious legitimacy was, when occa· t sion warranted, publicly defended by their colleagues. This explains why, for r example, I include R. Samuel ibn Tibbon (c.II60-c.1232), and his son-in-law'
R. Jacob Anatoli (C.II94-12S6),148 but not Moses ben Joshua of Narbonne· (commonly called Narboni; died 1362), Isaac Albalag (dlirteenth
140 See Gordon, 'Rationalism', 128-33; G. Stern, 'Menahem ha-Meiri', 204; Halbertal, Torah and Wisd{}m, 18. R. Abba Mari Astruc ofLunel, who instigated the assault on extreme IdLl'VU., .;s ism in Provence, denied that he was including Anatoli in this category. See Gordon, ~"'llV1J'U'O'" ISO n. I; G. Stern, 'Menahem ha-Meiri', 204 n. 71. Aside from Maimonides' positive comments Ibn Tibbon (see p. 77), R. Abraham Abulafia quotes Ibn Tibbon and even agrees with his of providence. See Scholem, Origins, 377 n. 32. R. Isaac b. Jacob Lattes also refers very ._~.,;.''',>IV·'. to Ibn Tibl?on and his Ma'amar yikavu hamayim. See Halbertal, Between Torah and Wisdmn, Nahmanides refers to Ibn Tibbon's Ma'amar yikavu hamayim in his sermon on Ecclesiastes. id., Kitvei ramban, i. 187. R. Menallem Meiri was influenced by Ibn Tibbon and Anatoli and great deal of respect for them, though I think Stern exaggerates somewhat when he writes (p. 'Meiri reveres Anatoli and the Tibbons' (emphasis added). See Halbertal, Between Torah and ch.2.
Introduction
and a host of odler radical medieval philosophers who constitute a veritable 'school' ofextreme rationalism. 149

Dogma in Judaism
There is no need for me to attempt here a detailed study ofthe place ofdogma in Jewish intellectual history. Fortunately, this task has already been carried out by other scholars, in particular Louis Jacobs and Menachem Kellner, from whose work I have benefited greatly. However, because of its import­ance it is necessaty to make a few comments on dlis issue.
There is no question that one of the great misinterpretations ofJudaism, so frequently repeated that it is often assumed as a matter of course, is dlat Judaism does not have dogmas. To be sure, all would agree that belief in God and some sort ofrevelation are dogmas that the tradition has always affirmed, but, aside from these, Judaism has commonly been portrayed as granting complete freedom in matters of thought. However, even if one discounts Maimonides' original advocacy ofwhat can be termed salvific dogmas (nanlely, dogmas the belief in which guarantees one a place in heaven), the fact remains that for all me&eval authorities, as well as the talmudic rabbis, there were certain dogmas which Jews were obligated to believe in, simply because the religion is unintelligible widlout them. Although it is likely that the talmudic rabbis had fewer of these dogmas dlan their medieval colleagues, dley too were prepared to lay down some paranleters of belief. For example, Mislmah Sanhedrin 10: 1 states: 'These are they who have no share in the world to come: he who says dlat there is no resurrection ofdle dead in the Torah, he who says that the Torall is not from Heaven, and the epikoros.'150 Although it
)·\i' Dov Schwartz has performed a tremendous service in bringing to light these philosophers, most Ofwhose writings are still in manuscript. In addition to his many articles, see his books, Old Wine and Idea.
Maimonides understands epilwros to have a theological connotation (Mishneh torah,
teshuvah', 3: 8, 'Hilkhot gezelah', II: 2, 'Hilkhot rotse'al.I', 4: 10), and this is clearly the con­
which it appears in Mishnah San. 10: I, the Talmud offers a few different definitions of the
npne ofwhich has anything to do with theology. Thus, an epikoros is defined as one who shows
the sages, for one's neighbour, or for one's teacher (see BT San. 99b-1Ooa). For analysis
U"'UUU'lIlU<" uses the term, see Abraham di Baton, Le~emmishneh on 'Hilkhot teshuvah', 3: 7;
Dogma, 19 fT. In 'Hilkhot avodah zarah', 10: I, Maimonides states that an epikoros is to be
he leads people away from God. See also 'Hilkhot edut', II: 10. In his commentary on
10: I, Maimonides explains epikoros as coming from the root heflur, and not from the philosolpher Epicurus. This is surprising as Maimonides knew ofEpicurus and refers to him in
17· (Even if Maimonides had not heard of Epicurus when he wrote his commentary on the we know that he revised it throughout his life and yet he never altered this explanation.)
b. Yehiel,Arukh hashalem, s.v. epikoros. Simeon Duran, Magen avot, i. 2 (p. 4b), and the
work on MishnahAvot 2: 14, also calledMagen avot (Leipzig, 1855), points to the Greek as the origin of the term epikoros.

ii.
30
Introduction

is hard to know what the Mishnah meant by dle term epikoros (probably/ someone who denies God's providenceI51), clearly iliis mislmaic formulation,. does not exhaust the list ofrabbinic dogmas. It is likely that ilie Mishnah only mentions those beliefs which were not ilien obvious, that is, dlOse concern­ing which dlere was dispute in the Jewish commlU1ity. This would explain why nodling appears here regarding belief in God.
In his classic study of ilie dogmas in Judaism, which totally disproves dle notion iliat Judaism is unconcerned wiili belief, Solomon Schechter stated
ilie point very well.
Political economy, hygiene, statistics, are velY fine things. But no sane man would for them make those sacrifices which Judaism requires from us. It is only for God's sake, to fulfill his commands and to accomplish his purpose, dlat religion becomes worth living and dying for. And dlis can only be possible with a religion which I possesses dogmas. It is true that evelY great religion is 'a concentration of many, ideas and ideals', which make dlis religion able to adapt itself to various modes of thinking and living. But there must always be ~ point round which all these ideas concentrate themselves. This centre is Dogma. 152
That so many scholars could, in dle face of all ilie evidence, continue to

assert iliat Judaism has no dogmas probably tells us more about their attempts
to justify their own freeiliinking ilian about ilie history of Jewish dlought.
Aliliough ilie denial that Judaism has dogmas was more common in previous
generations, dus view continues to be advanced by some modern iliinkers. In
their opinion, Judaism is a religion of law and one can basically believe what
one wishes. Thus, to give one example, the late Zvi Kurzweil, a Modern
Oriliodox dlinker, argues for dlis position and writes that 'while funda­
mentalism in Christianity includes dogmatic belief in certain basic tenets of
faith, Judaism lacks such dogmas. There is more than a grain oftmth in Leon
Roili's reference to "dogmalessness as ilie only dogma in Judaism".'153
Kurzweil supports his view regarding dle lack of dogmas in Judaism by.

citing Moses Mendelssohn (I729-86), Isaac Breuer (I883-I946), and Isaiah
Leibowitz (I903-94). Leaving aside the question ofwheilier Mendelssohn is ~
a representative of traditional Judaism, Kurzweil is correcr-.dlat, in his
Jerusalem, Mendelssohn asserted dnt Judaism has no dogmas~~Yet Kurz·
weil neglects to point out that matters are more complicated than dUs, and it '
may be iliat Mendelssolm himself was unsure on dUs point. Indeed, he often;
151 See Schiffman, Who Was a jew, 44. As Schiffman points out, Josephus describes the Epicureans, as well as d1e Sadducees, as d10se who deny God's providence, The Sadducees also denied both the ; resurrection and that the Oral Torah was from heaven, thus making it very likely that this Mishnah : was formulated against this latter group. See ibid. 42 ff.;s2 Studies, i. 181, 153 Kurzweil, 'Fw1damentalism', 9. See L. Rod1,Judaism, 125, 154 jerusalem~t;'J.
Introduction
3I
acct1pted the existence of certain dogmatic principles, although dlese are not to be understood as dogmas in dle Christian sense-that is, articles of faith which have been formulated by an audloritative body or which stand in contradiction to reason. Furthermore, even according to the most liberal understanding of the passage referred to by Kurzweil, Mendelssohn obvi­ously agreed dlat some beliefs are required, for without them one cannot even speal, ofa Jewish religion. 155
As for Bl:euer, it. is tme.dlat he had some interesting views regarding d1e nature offalili and Its relatIOn to Jewish law. However, although he put indi­vidual faith in dle background and acceptance of ilie law in the forefront he never denied that Judaism required dogmas, widlout which, he believed, 'ilie religion would be incomprehensible. For Breuer, it was the acceptance ofthe dogmas by the community which was Clucial, and it was only for dle wavering individual dlat he emphasized dle importance oflaw over dogma. That is, ilie dogmas of Judaism are important, dlOUgh, ex post facto, an individual who observes ilie halak-hall is not to be viewed as a heretic because of his lack of belief.156 However, it is essential to note iliat Breuer did not regard this situa­tion favourably. According to lum, non-believers are in error and every effort must be made to set iliem right. He was clearly not a relativist in matters of belief.
. Only Leibowitz remains to support Kurzweil's contention. However Leibowitz was the first to admit that his views disregarded vast portions of what has always been regarded as part and parcel of Jewish iliought and values. 157 Thus, to give one example ofmany, Leibowitz did not believe that

15. See e.g. 'jerusalem' and. Other, 154, wl~er~, in his reply to Charles Bonnet's Patinge11lfsie, ~endelssolm wrote tha~ Judaism has d1ree pnnclples: God, providence, and legislation (i.e. revela­tion ofd1e Toral1). In hiS reply to Lavater, Mendelssohn offered the identical opinion. See Altmann, ~enM.ls~ohn,:44. See also E. Jospe,Mendelssohn, 121, for his letter to Elkan Herz, in which he clarified hiS oplmon: We have no dogmas thatgo beyond or against 1'eason' (emphasis added). A hundred years ago, ~olomon Schechter called attention to this common distortion of Mendelssohn's views: see his StudieS, 147-8. See also Friedlaender,jewish Religion, 16-18, and Altmann's note in his edition of J~~tem, 217. Mendelssolm also believed that Maimonides' Thirteen Principles had significant rehglous and e~ucational value, and he dlerefore translated d1em into German and included them ill ~bookhe pubhshed for students: ~ee A. Shoh.et, Changing Etas, 256; A. E. Simon, 'Philanthropism', 3· How~ver, rather than recordl11g them With the formulation '1 believe', he used the phrase 'Ich ~kenne flir wahl' w1d gewiss' (I recognize it as true and certain). In section I ofJerusaiem (p. 63 ill citma~n's an.d Arkusl~'s, edition) he listed God, providence and future life as the fundamental prill­
pies on which all rehglons agree, and widlOut which felicity is but adream'. c~~~No~ surprisingly, th~~ ~iew encount~red opposition. See 1. Breuer, Concepts, 3-4; M. Breuer, ' ges., 174 n. 38; Id.,Judlsche Orthodoxte, 493 n. 35; E. Stern, Ishim vellivunim 135 n. 29. Yeral1miel YIsrael Yltshak Db' I' I' . '
thi . om , 111 11S po emlc agal11st d1e ethos of German Orthodoxy, refers specifically to S view ofBreuer; see his Ha'atalwt 275-6
157 ' .
.. d See tl~e n~merous refutations of Leibowitz's various positions in Ben Yeruham and Kolitz (e s.), Sheltlah ltshemah.

32 Introduction Introduction
33

Israel is tlle 'Holy Land'. As he explained on numerous occasions, ilie worQ' Torah, be it small.or ~r~at, is a sectarian and ep~koros. For'ls::1Ce the Torah is true, 'holy' can only be applied to 'the disciplined and saintly conduct of hU1l1<lJi no belief or narratIve 111 It has an advantage over any other.
beings who master tlleir desires and inclinations and serve ilie Lord by lead H wever it would seem tllat tllis comment misses the mark, because, wiili
o

ing a life ofTorah and mitzvot' .158 Tlus attitude enabled Leibowitz to call fOI th excep~ion of the words of criticism directed against him, Maimonides the demolition of tlle Western Wall, which he considered to be an idol 01 bel' ved ever\Tthing advocated here. One who denies the divine origin ofany­
. l' e Ie oJ'
stone. The fact tllat Leibowitz was probably tlle first observant Jew Ul ustol) thing in ilie Torall is indeed regarded by him as a heretic, in accordance Wi~l who did not .view tlle Land of Israel ~r. tlle :vestern Wall as holy was of no the Eightll Principle. It ~s also quite im?recise fo~ Ab~rbanel, as p~rt of ~us concern to hIm, yet we shOl~ld k~ep It Ul n~md wl~enever son~e~ne, such.3l polemic against Maimollldes, to assert WltllOUt clarificau01~ ilia~ a behef wluch Kurzweil, tries to quote LeIbOWItz as an illustration of tradItIonal JewIs~ is found in tlle Torah cannot be denied. Abarbanel's assertIon SImply begs tlle iliought. What Kurzweil does not mention is tllat at least since tlle rabbini( uestion: who is to determine tllat the belief is really found in tlle Torah? As period, every important rabbi, talmudist, Bible commentator, and ·philoso. ls book will demonstrate, the fact that traditional scholars, none of whom pher believed in dogmas. Salis Daiches is tllerefore entirely correct in writin~ ould dream of denying a 'belief of the Torall', argued about basic issues of
. w tllat 'all authoritative exponents ofJudaism are agreed as to ilie necessIty oiJewish theology shows tllar even explicit Torah texts can be interpreted in a making spiritual truth tlle basis for material action.'159 variety of ways. Abarbanel also speaks of denying a narrative of tlle Torall. A few more points must be n?te~ in tllis re~ard. ~we shall see, tllere.hav(. Again, this begs ilie question: what ~oes 'de~y' me,an? !s ,one wl~o .1Uld~r­been iliose who opposed tlle PnnClples ofMalmollldes because iliey beheved stands a narrative in tlle Torah allegoncally gudty of delllal ? All thIS IS qUlte tllem to be mistaken. This is very different from tlle attitude ofAbarbanel,1~ apart from ilie fact that many ofMaimonides' Principles are not found expli _
R. David ibn Zimra,161 and R. Samson. Rapl~ael,Hirsch (1808-88),162. W~O, citly in ilie Torah. Maimonides believed iliem to be latent, but this is not ilie
altllough iliey accepted ilie truili of Maunollldes dogmas, opposed Ius sm-same as being explicit. gling iliem out as being ilie most significant aspects ofJudaism. According to Furthermore, although Abarbanel does not make the distinction, iliere is a iliem, no special dogmas can be established because everything contained in difference between believing something and simply not doubting it. For ilie Torah is, in and of itself, a dogma of paramount importance. Thus, onf example, iliere is a great deal which ilie masses do not doubt, but which by who delues any Torall teaching is to be regarded as a heretic. One example 01 the same token they do not believe eiilier, because iliey simply know notlung Abarbanel's tliought on tllis matter is as follows: about the subject. By positing his Thirteen Principles, Maimonides dis­
I, therefore, believe that it is not proper to posnuate principles for the divine tinguished between obligatory truths (tllat is, truilis which everyone must Torah, nor foundations in the matters of beliefs, for we are obliged to believ~ believe) and non-obligatory trutllS. With regard to tlle Thirteen Principles, everything that is written in the Torah. We are not permitted to doubt even thf one cannot remain in blissful ignorance or be agnostic. This is acceptable smallest thing in it .... For he who denies or doubts a belief or narrative of thl., with regard to otller true beliefs, even tllose recorded in tlle Torah, but ilie
150 Kurzweil, Modem Impulse,s!. See also Leibowitz,]udaism, index, s:v. ho!ines~. ~ibo~itzcitdq Principles are in a separate category in iliat iliey must be positively affirmed.
R. Meir .Simhah of D~ins~, M~shellh ~o~h~a~, ~n Exod. 32: 19, as agreel11g With IllS Vie,:", sl11ce thl:: As R. Hayim Soloveitchik quite properly explained in relation to the distinc­
latter wrItes that notlung 111 tillS world IS I11trl11sICally holy, but rather becomes holy by vIrtue of O~;i • . • . I if d 1 b observance ofthe mitsvot. See also the discussion in Fox, 'Holiness', 157 ff. Yet even R. Meir Simhah'l; tlon between ilie 613 mttsvot and ilie Pnnclp es, one oes not mow a out a view, which I believe is unique in traditionalliteratur~, is somewhat different from that presented b!rcertain mitsvah his Judaism is lacking but tllere is nothing heretical about tllis Leibowitz, for he posits that if J~ws fulfil God's will, ph~sieal ~bjects, such as the ~emp!e and th(! person. However one who does not acknowledge tlle Thirteen Principles is a
Land ofIsrael, tW assume real holiness. See Ben-Sasson, PhIlosophIcal System, 164--'7. leIbOWitz, on thli '0'., 0
.' '"

other hand, denies that the concept of holiness can ever be applied to inanimate objects. Th~re are,,~j ~e,retlc.164 So we see tllat tllere are many true beliefs WlllCh are not necessarily course, many halakhot whose very basis is the holiness ?f the Land (~f Is.ra~1. See J. D. BleICh, Ct»J:,; obligatory beliefs, i.e. beliefs which every Jew must hold in order to be a Jew temporaryHalachicProblems,ch.8,'TheSanctityoftlleLlberatedTerntones. in d din I' tho b' . h Ab b I erlooked
159 'Dogma', 249. , . goo stan g. t IS IS aSK POUlt t at ar ane ov .. tl ill
160

See Kellner, Dogma, 184 ff., for an important analysis ofAbarbanel's position. Returning to the stiucture oftllis book, I have already menuoned lat I w
161 She'elot uteshuvot haradbaz, no. 344. '. not generally concern myself witll those scholars who opposed Maimonides'
162

Neunzehn Brieje, 79 (fifteenth letter). See, however, the seventeenth letter, 111 whICh he ledges that Judaism may indeed be based on the Thirteen Principles, but points out that they comprise the entire religion. Rosh amanah, eh. 23. Gerlits (ed.), Hagadah, 197-9.
163 164

Thirteen Principles and substituted their own. They did not, for the mOSt Orthodox circles departure from a traditional viewpoint is often justified by part, deny dlat Maimonides' Principles were correct and indeed obligatory saying 'This is not one of dle Thirteen Principles.' Yet it is unlikely that any on Jews to believe. Their disagreement with Maimonides concerned which rabbinic figure ever adopted this approach. I say this for the simple reason doctrines dley viewed as indispensable to Judaism, that is, without which that Maimonides' Thirteen Principles are not all-inclusive. For example, they Judaism would be inconceivable. do not include dle idea that the Jews are God's chosen people. 169 In addition,
This is most important, for scholars have often tried to show dlat, because there are a number of dogmas which Maimonides discusses in other places Albo only postulated dlree articles of faidl, this meant dlat he did not think but excludes from dle Thirteen Principles. 1?O Thus, there is no mention in dle dlat the others were essential, or that dleir denial equalled heresy. In fact, a Principles about dle existence of free will or miracles, despite dle overriding leading halakhist, R. Jacob Meshulam Orenstein (1775-1839), is among those importance ofdlese notions in Maimonides' thought. Although creation and who advocates this position and even adopts it as his own. According to him" resurrection, Principles 4 and 13, are examples of dle miraculous, the tradi­one is only a heretic if he denies dle existence of God, Torall from heaven, tional belief in miracles encompasses much more than this. Nor does Mai­
,
and reward and plmishment, which are Albo's three fundamental principles. monides include providence as a Principle. Reward and punishment are
\
One who denies Maimonides' other Principles is to be regarded as complete. mentioned, but while they can be included under dle general rubric ofprovi­ly wicked but, contrary to Maimonides, is not a heretic and thus has not dence, dle concept itself implies much more than simply reward and punish­removed hinlself from the religion. 165 ment. In fact, most post-Maimonideans include providence in their detailed
While Orenstein's liberality is certainly noteworthy, his assertion dlat he is lists of dogmas, and some of them include it in addition to reward and following Albo is incorrect, at least with regard to Albo's dominant position, punishment. l ?1 Only R. Shem Tov Falaquera (thirteenth century), in his Albo's differences with Maimonides regarding dogma relate to 'classification Sefer hamevakesh, follows Maimonides in listing reward and punishment as and grading', 166 not substance. Indeed, Albo himself regards one who only' a principle while omitting providence (aldlough in another work he does list accepts his principles as a heretic. Thus, although Albo did not view belief, it).172 . in dle messiah as a 'fimdamental' principle-without which Judaism would:
be inconceivable -he still thought dlat one who denied the coming of rllei 169 Regarding this omission, seeMainwnides'Introductions, ed. Shailat, 219. For the view that this is a basic principle of Judaism, denial of which is heresy, see M. Klein, Mishneh halakhot, introd., 3
messiall, knowing it was incumbent upon Jews to believe this, should be
(wmumbered).
viewed as a heretic widl no share in the world to come.16? In fact, R. Simeon

170 See Kellner, Dogma, 53 ff. ben Tsemah Duran, whose reduction of the principles to three was later 171 See Kellner, Dogma, 200 ff. Albo lists reward and pnnishment as a basic principle and provid­ence as a 'root' or derivative principle. See ibid. 146-9.
adopted by Albo, states explicidy dlat Maimonides' Thirteen Principles are;
172 See Kellner, Dogma, 74-5. Hyman, 'Maimonides' "Thirteen Principles''', 139, writes: 'Even
dle 'roots ofour faith' (shorshei emunatenu) .168 :

more striking is Maimonides' omission of the World to Come from the "thirteen principles".' He One final point: although we have seen that many traditional thinkers! contrasts this to 'Hilkhot teshuvall'; where 'the World to Come forms a part of the discussion of reward and pWlishment'. This is incorrect, as Maimonides includes the world to come as part of the­
identified heresy with denial of the Thirteen Principles, this should not .
Eleventh Principle. In his words: 'The greatest reward is the world to come and the greatest pnnish­

taken to mean dlat they regarded these Principles as the sole aetermllnarm; ment is karet'. Hyman's assertion that Maimonides does not mention creation of the world in the
of what constitutes heresy. This is certainly a popular conception, and ~rinciples has also been shown to be inaccurate, with the publication ofthe Kafih edition ofMaimon­Ides' commentary on the Mishnah. For attempts to explain the omission of free will, see Simeon ?uran, Ohev mishpat, 13h; Gedaliah b. Solomon Lipschuetz's commentary on A1bo's Seftr ha'ikarim,
165 Yeshuot ya'akov, 'Ora~ll.layim', 126: 1. I have seen a number ofother writers who also .
1·3 (fonnd in the standard editions); Leibowitz, Faith, 85-6; Mainwnides'Introductions, ed. Shailat,sent Albo's position, despite the fact that thronghout Book I ofhis Seftr ha'ilmrim he leaves no 187-8; Goldman, 'Halachic Foundation', Il7-IB. Goldman concludes that 'free-will was not for him for doubt. See e.g. Graetz, Structure, 167; Taenzer, Religionsphilosophie, 36; and I. Epstein, Faith, 321 , adecisive dogma to be compared with Revelation or Resurrection'. However, in 'Hilkhot teshuvall', 13. Moses Mendelssohn also seems to err in this regard; see id.,jerusakm, 102.
~: 3, Maimonides writes that free will 'is a fundamental concept and a pillar [on which rests the total -
Husik, History, 416.
Ity] ofthe Torah and mitsvot' (see also ibid. 6: I). In Guide iii. 17 Maimonides terms free will 'a funda­
167 See Seftr ha'ikarim, i. 23. See also Schechter, Studies, 171-2; Jacobs, Principles, 392-3; and Ch.
~ental principle ofthe Law ofMoses our Master'. In his 'Letter on Astrology' he states that free will n. 26 of this book. See also the careful way in which the messianic belief was formulated at the

IS not simply a fundamental principle ofthe Torah, but is also acknowledged by all the philosophers. pute ofTortosa, in which A1bo participated; Lopez, Disputa, i. 544. There is, to be sure, a
See Letters, ed. Shailat, ii. 486. In Shenwneh perakim, eh. 8, Maimonides writes: 'IfMan's actions were contradiction in Albo regarding this point, and this is perhaps what Orenstein had in mind; see p.
done under compulsion, the commandments and prohibitions of the Law would be nullified and ofthis book. 168 Introduction to Magen avot
they would all be absolutely in vain.... All of this is utterly absurd and false, contrary to what is
Introduction
All this may lend credence to Arthur Hymarl's argument, anticipated by Duran173 and Abarbanel,174 that the Thirteen Principles were never intended to comprise all of the most important aspects ofJudaism. Rather, they were formulated so as to correspond with the strucUlre of the Mishnah in tractate Sanhedrin upon which Maimonides was commenting. In addition, Duran claims that Maimonides chose as Principles only those that were explicitly found in biblical verses.175 Another suggestion noted by Duran is that Mai. monides' choice of thirteen is parallel to God's thirteen attributes, and tlli! forced him to omit principles which should have been included. 176 According to Albo, Maimonides only included those Principles which can be seen as deriving from Albo's own three foundational beliefs: the existence of Go~ Torah from heaven, and reward and punishment.177 R. Joseph Joshua Preil (1858-96) argued that Maimonides' Principles only include those beliefi
grasped by the intellect and perceived by the senses, destructive of the wall around the Law, and a
judgement upon God, the Exalted, as being unjust-may He be exalted above that.' " Shlomo Pines and Alexander Altmann have identified Maimonides as a determinist and regard th~ view as his esoteric doctrine. In fact, this approach was anticipated by Abner of Burgos. See Pinesl:
'Studies', 195-8; Altmann, Bssays, 47-59; Gershenson, 'View'. Still, even if correct, this would hav/. nothing to do with the omission of free will in the Principles, since there is no question that the' Thirteen Principles represent the exoteric teachings of Maimonides. See Altmann, Bssays, 54: 'There can be no doubt that in theMishnaCommentary and kindred texts ofa theological character Maimoq·i:
ides subscribes to the theOlY that, no matter how strong the impact of circumstances and motiva.! tions, man is able to overrule them by his free choice.' (C£ however, W. Z. Harvey, 'Maimonide.( Interpretation', 18, and id., TheMishneh Torah', 24 ff., who does not make any distinction betweeni; the Guide and the more popular texts.) For recent discussions of this issue, see Gellman, 'Freedoml;:
Safran, 'Maimonides'. "'.
173 Magenapot,2b. :'i 174 Rosh amanah, ch. 6. Abarbanel also claims that Maimonides' Thirteen Principles can be derived'; from the creation story. See id., Mifalot elokim, i. 4. 175 Ohev mishpat, ch. 8,\ 176 Ibid. 13b. See similarly Albo, Sefer haJikarim, i. 3. R. Isaiah Horowitz, Shenei ltt~othaberit, i. ' also relates the Thirteen Principles to God's attributes, and not merely in terms oftheir regards them as 'hinted at' in the thirteen attributes ofGod. See similarly Safrin, Heikhal hal'erakha,&,;'
i. 29a and Rothschild, Oniyah belev hayam, 33b. On the number 13, see also J. D. Bleich, With Faith, 13 n. 2: The notion that the credal principles of faith are thirteen in number may well ancient tradition. R. Avraham ha-Levi [sic] Horowitz ... cites a certain prayer ascribed to yomi, one of the talmudic sages, which contains a reference to thirteen principles.' Actually, point was anticipated by R. Moses Sofer, SheJeWt uteshupot, 'Yoreh de'ah', no. 356. However, mistaken. Horowitz, Shenei ltt~ot haberit, 97a, never refers to Rap Tavyomi. He simply prayer composed by a certain Tavyomi, which is another way of writing the name Yom Tov. See letter f~om Leopold Loew in J(erem ~emed, 9 (1856),78; J. Schwartz, Divreiyosef, iii-iv, no. 57. (In' earlier responsum, SheJelot uteshupot, 'Even ha'ezd, ii, no. 148, Sofer himself realized that prayer has nothing to do with Maimonides' Thirteen Principles. His change ofmind remains a tery.) This prayer was actually composed by R. Yom Tov Lipmann Muelhausen (14th-15th and was published by Efraim Kupfer, 'Sefer haberit', 340-1. For a fanciful explanation as to why monides picked the number 13, see Schueck, Sidur haminhagiin, iv. 42a; id., Sidur rashban, 2a. also Michael Chilton's ridiculous suggestion that 'the very number thirteen perhaps received added emphasis in Jewish tradition because it was considered unlucky by Christians', in id.,
Bffict,193. 177 Sqerha'ikarim,i,
Introduction
which separate Judaism from other religions, a point he used to explain why
the coming ofthe messiah is included as dogma even though, as pointed out
by Albo, it is not indispensable to the religion. 178 All these scholars are thus in
agreement that not evelydling Maimonides regarded as a basic Jewish belief
was included in the Thirteen Principles, but this need not imply that it was
any less important in his eyes. 179
Since one can view the Thirteen Principles as less than all-inclusive, it should not surprise us that since MainIonides' day many traditional scholars felt comfortable expanding the list ofobligatory beliefs. To give one example, I referred earlier to R. Abraham Isaiah Karelitz's comment that he ordered his life on complete faith in the Thirteen Principles. Yet Karelitz added a new dogma to the list, nanIely, the belief dIat all agadot in the Talmud have their origin in the sages' prophetic power. 180 As with every dogma, one who denies this is to be regarded as a heretic.
' ,Maimonides himself, however, did not share Karelitz's extreme fundamen­
t'alism in this regard, for he rejected the authority of various agadot and ~cknowledged that the talmudic sages could err .181 Occasionally, one even
" , finds him subtly criticizing the talmudic sages: 'You also know tlleir [the t;Jmudic sages'] famous dicUlm -would tint all [their] dicta were like it.'182 Maimonides also expresses a tolerant opinion of 'a perfect man of virUle'
who, because of his own speculation, improperly rejected agadot. According tp Maimonides, even though such a man is led to regard various talmudic~ sages as ignoramuses, 'in this there is nothing that would upset the founda­
tions ofbelief.'183
•,178 Bglti tal, 24a. The san1e approach is followed by Schechter, Studies, 179; Petuchowski, Theology,
23;Neumark,History ofJewishDogma, ii. 130; Maimon, Maimonides, 63.
; /7;9 See Hyman, 'Maimonides' "Thirteen Principles"', 131 n. 73, 138-9. See also Raffel, 'Maimonides'
~~damental Principles', 77-88. According to these scholars, Kellner is not correct when he says that
Maimonides would not regard as a heretic one 'who inadvertently denies some teaching not included
ini'the principles'. It would depend upon which teaching he is denying. Sec Kellner, 'Heresy', 309.

180, J(ovets igerot, i. 42-3. 181 See my 'Maimonidean Halakhah'. For the l1lunerousge'onim and rishonim who did not share Karelitz's embrace ofall agadot, see Saperstein, Decoding the Rabbis, ch. I. '; ,1,~2 Guide i. 59.
183
Ibid., introduction.


22222222222

JUDAISM AND THE LINGUISTIC INTERPRETATION OF FAITH
Kenneth Seeskin
However difficult it may be to solve, the question to be discussed in this essay is easy to state: What
does it mean for a Jew to have faith in God? The domi­nant view among philosophers is that faith is a species of belief--that reduced to simplest terms, faith in God is a commitment to certain propositions about Him. For
I
my purposes, it makes no difference whether we speak of thoughts, propositions, sentences, or statements. We could even speak of dogmas. Whatever word is used, the question remains the same: Is faith what contemporary philosophers call a propositional attitude?
In asking this question, I am not asking whether Judaism has propositional content. I shall take for granted that it does and that any religion worthy of the same is committed to certain claims about God. If the existentialist theologians deny this, then in my opinion, they have gone too far. But to say that Judaism has propositional content is not to say that faith.!§. the acceptance of those propositions. The issue is one of priority: Is faith intrinsicallY and irreducibly propo­sitional or is the propositional content somehow deriva­
tive?
!he Two Kinds of Faith
Martin Buber argued that it is this issue which
separates the Old Testament and the New. 1
There are two and in the end only two, types of faith. To'be sure there are very many contents of faith but we can only know faith itself in two basic forms. Both can be under­stood from the simple data of our life: ~he t one from the fact that I trust someome, wlthou being able to offer sufficient reason for my trust in him; the other from the fact that,
215
216
likewise without being able to give a sufficient
reason, I acknowledge a thing to be true.
The former (emunah) he connects with the early period of Judaism, the latter (pistis) with the early perod of Christianity. It is clear that a Buber sets things up, eistis is a propositional attitude whie1 emunah is not.
The philological evidence does not support so sharp a contrast. pistis, too, can mean confidence or trust. It is used this way by Xenophon in his defense of Socrates and in numerous places in the New Testament. 2 So the difference between the Old Testament and the New is not as simple as Buber implies. By the same token, there are, as Buber admits, places where congnate forms of emunah refer to the acceptance of a statement or report. 3 But he is right in this sense: pistis smacks of intellectualist psychologies of which early Judaism knew nothing. Philo, writing in Greek around the time of Jesus, describes the faith (eistis) of Abraham as an apprehension of the value of earthly existence, and in another passage, as knowledge of the nature of piety
(9nosis eusebeias).4
The view that faith involves an act of seeing or apprehension is supported by some passages in the New Testament. Paul rejected obedience to law as a source of salvation and turned instead to a mental attitude. The community of those Who will gain salvation is a community of believers. At Romans 10:9, he describes this belief by saying: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy servant that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved."
It is possible to read this passage as one of the
ear~iest statements of an official dogma or creed. One
is tempted to say that Judaism, too, has a creed insofar
as it espouses monotheism. But for the Jew, monotheism
is less a body of d t i h
oc r ne t at it is a body of law. As Solomon Schechter once remarked, the Bible hardly contains
\­
217
a command bidding the Jew to believe.S Or, to be more
precise, the Bible hardly contains a command bidding the
Jew to believe that somethings is the case, though it
often commands him to believe in the God of Israel. The
difference is important.
To conceive of faith as belief ~is to conceive of it as an epistemologist would. Thus Paul tells us in another context (Hebrews 11:1) that faith (pistis) is "the evidence of things unseen." Again, the notion of apprehension is primary. On this view, the man of faith is the one who believes certain things about God with the same, or greater, conviction than he believes the evidence of his senses. In some cases, these things are dogmas which but for an exercise of faith, many people would not accept.
But if we conceive of faith as belief in, then, as Heschel argued, it is not.so much assent to an idea as consent to God. 6 When we are told at Genesis 15:6 that Abraham believed in God, the point is not that Abraham accepted certain propositions about Him, but that Abraham was God's servant--that his loyalty to God was absolute. To be sure, the Bible does not exclude the possibility that Abraham accepted certain propositions about God; on the other hand, it sl significant that it never stops to tell us what they are. On this view, faith is not so much an epistemological notion as a moral one, and the man of faith is not the one who believes what others reject, but, reflecting the root meaning of emunah, the one who stands firm when others falter.
These are, of course, idealizations. It is to be doubted whether anyone could manifest one type of faith exclusively. But as idealizations, they provide a useful framework. The Christian theologian John Hick expressed the difference between these conceptions of faith as that between fides and fiducia. But after admitting that the Bible is concerned almost entirely with the latter, he

218
went on to write a book concerned almost entirely with the former. 7 He is not alone in this respect since most theologians have a vested interest in the propositional view. Theology, as its name implies, is an attempt to. provide a logos of the divine. But how does one do this? The temptation to think of religion along the lines of a science is, for many people, irresistible. To provide a logos of the divine is to specify the causes and prin­ciples from which the conclusions of religious discourse can be derived. If one asks how we know that these causes and principles are true, the answer is that they are the immediate products of revelationi in short, the answer is faith. What the intuition of first principles is to logical inquiry, faith is to theological. The Effects of Hellenization
The grounds for this comparison derive from Aristotle. At Topics IOOa30-l00b2l, he tells us that the first principles of a science are true and primary because they command belief (E!stis) in and by themselves. But it is clear from other passages that something also can command pistis because it follows from an argument, either inductive or deductive. a It is possible to have a conception of something and not have pistis (Topics l25b35). This case would arise when we are not sure of ourselves. But if we are sure, in particular if we have the right to claim knowledge, then we must have pistis. For our purposes, the Aristotelian understanding of pistis amounts to this: it is an inner conviction that something is as we conceive it to be, a hold on the
truth.
On this view, E!~ is not only compatible with knowledge, the former implies the latter. To know some­things is in part to be convinced that one's opinion is right. In some places, Aristotle claims that for the person with knowledge, this conviction is unshakable. 9 Notice, however, that the Aristotelian view of pistis
\

makes no mention of, and in all likelihood eXcludes, an act of the will. Put otherwise, it does not require an exercise in the way that ~ speak of an exercise of faith. On the contrary, Aristotle claims that we have only to understand the first principles of a science to be convinced that they are right.
The view that faith is an inner conviction of truth receives additional support from the Septuagint. By the third century B.C.E., a number of Greek words had acquired strong philosophical connotations. This is the case not only with pistis but with the Greek word for the truth aletheia. Truth in a biblical context normally refers to fixedness or reliability. In fact, the word for truth (emeth) is derived from the same root as emunah. The idea. is not that faith seeks correspondence with reality, but that it seeks security. This is clear from Psalm 31:3-6.
Incline Thine ear unto me, deliver me speedily:
Be Thou to me a rock of refuge, even a fortress
of defense, to save me.
For Thou art my rock and my fortress;
Therefore for Thy name's sake lead me and guide me.
Bring me forth out of the net that they have
hidden for me;
For Thou are my stronghold.
Into Thy hand I commit my spirit;
Thou hast redeemed me, 0 Lord, Thou God of truth.
But the Greek word aletheia means truth as opposed to falsity or reality as opposed to appearance. So when ~munah and its cognates are translated by'aletheia--as is true for the Greek translation of emeth in the verses just quoted--there is, once again, a subtle shift from a moral quality to an epistemological one.
Where the Hebrew text is talking about God's faith­fulness from generation to generation, the Greek text appears to be talking about the eternality of truth. A good example of this tendency is Exodus 34:6. Here God is described as abounding in faithfulness and mercy; but a reader of the Greek text could easily take this verse to mean that he is the source of true utterances.10 The same applies to numerous passages in the Psalms.ll In other contexts (e.g., Isaiah 65:16), the Greek text is talking about the true God where "true" has the sense of "real" or "genuine." This meaning may be compatible with the Hebrew original but it is not quite what it says. For in a biblical context, "God of truth" means that He will not break His promise to Israe11 in short, that He is a worthy object of man's trust.

The point in mentioning these passages is not to suggest that the septuagint is a bad translation, but that there is a natural tendency for a reader of the Greek text to think along propositional lines. God is the ultimate reality, the One in whom all truth resides. When we accept His revelations, we are accepting divinely authorized pronouncements. If, however, we ignore His revelations and set about to do philosophy, we will, if successful, reach the same results. There are, then, two ways of arriving at truth: faith and reason. We can either believe what God has told us or prove that it must be so. But in either case, we are accepting propositions. The only difference is the way in which we accept them.
Articles of Faith
Since the propositional view can trace its lineage to Aristotle, it is hardly surprising that it has influenced the Jewish philosophers who looked to Greece for inspiration. To take several noteworthy examples,
Philo, following Aristotle, defines pistis as an unyielding and steadfast conception, and in one place, comes close to Paul in connecting it with the apprehen­sion of what is unseen. 12 For Saadia, faith is:13
••. a notion that arises in the soul in regard to the actual character of anything apprehended. When the cream of investigation emerges, [and] is embraced and enfolded by the minds and through them acquired and digested by the soul~, then the per~on becomes convinced of the truth of the
notlon he has thus acquired.
SEESKIN
221
So, too, Maimonides: 14
When reading my present treatise, bear in mind
that by "faith" we do not understand merely that
~hich is uttered by the lips, but also that which
~s apprehended by the soul, 'the conviction that
the object is exactly as it is apprehended.
And crescas: 15
Faith is nothing other than seeing as necessary
that a things exists outside of the soul as it
is in the soul.
Nor is it surprising that there have been attempts to introduce into Judaism a formal doctrine or creed. If faith is a conviction that something is as we conceive it to be, then a religion without articles of faith is a contradiction in terms.
Still, it is fair to say that these attempts have not been entirely successful. The number alone should give us pause. Is a Jew required to accept the articles of Maimonides, Crescas, A1bo, their followers, or someone else? Whichever we pick, problems are certain to arise. Not many Jews would dispute Solomon Schechter's claim' that belief in creation ~ nihilo without keeping the Sabbath is of no value. And with the possible exception of Maimonides, adherence to articles is for Judaism at best a necessary condition for a share in the world to come and not, as it would appear to be for the paul of Romans 10, a sufficient condition. l6
Take the Thirteen Articles of Maimonides: (1) the existense of God, (2) the unity of God, (3) the incor­poreality of God, (4) the eternity of God, (5) that God alone is to be worshipped, (6) the existence of prophecy,
(7) that Moses is the greatest of the prophets, (8) that God gave the Torah to Moses, (9) that the Torah is immu­table, (10) that God knows what men think and do, (11) divine reward and punishment, (12) the coming of the MeSSiah, (13) resurrection. If we were to ask how many Jews subscribe to all thirteen today, we would find that many do not. For some this would be a sign of spiritual decaY1 but for others, perhaps for the majority, it would not be a sign of anything very important. There is no such thing as a Christian who does not accept the divinity of Jesus. But despite Maimonides' arguments to the contrary, a Jew who refuses to accept some of the Thirteen Articles is still a Jew.

The difference is that while Christianity under­stands itself in terms of a common belief, Judaism under­stands itself in terms of a common heritage. Jews are the living descendants of the patriarchs, and this is true no matter what they think of prophecy, incorpopore­ality, or resurrection. So however appealing it may be to theologians, the propositional view cannot be thrust on JUdaism without creating problems. These problems are at least as old as the Septuagint and are the result of looking at the religion not as a heritage or a culture but as a theory. It is a great intellectual achievement to show that a theory follows from a small number of axioms or principles. But this simply cannot be done when the "~eory" includes such diverse modes of expres­sion as narrative, law, prayer, poetry, proverbs, and
midrash.
Faith and Knowledge
Not all the problems which arise from the proposi­tional view of faith are unique to Judaism, however. If faith and knowledge are both propositional, and if, in the last analysis, they are directed to a single body of propositions, then we have two modes of access to the same thing. The result of such an uneconomical theory is that one mode invariably dominates the other.
Suppose one can demonstrate something about God but
only after a long and difficult process. Those who accept
this truth on faith would seem to be short-circuiting the
process or, as Saadia would have it, undertaking it with
a promissory note guaranteeing the outcome. On this view, faith plays second fiddle to reason: it is the
refuge of those who cannot or have not yet mastered
theological dialectic.
Suppose, on the other hand, that we take a modern approach and emphasize the extent to which faith involves submission or surrender. After all,no moral or religious values are affirmed by completing a syllogism. What religion asks of us is that we accept certain truths not because reason has demonstrated the impossibility of their den~a1s but because we are willing to take God's word for them. But how can we take God's word for some­thing if reason for~ its acceptance? On this view reason plays second fiddle to faith: it is the refuge of those who are unwilling to open their hearts to God.
In either case, we get a paradox. If one mode of access to truth is sufficient, why do we need the other? Now I am hardly the first person to call attention to these difficulties. I only wish to point out that in its classical formulation, the problem of reconciling faith and reason arises because it is assumed that both have a propositional structure. If this assumption is false, then the classical formulation is misleading. The Priority of Trust
There is an immediate reason to think that the assumption is false. When dealing with religious matters, commitment to a proposition is only as secure as the person, document, or institution on whose authority the proposition is accepted. Suppose there is a proposi­tion I accept on faith. If someone asks why I believe it, I cannot prove that it is true or claim that it is self-evident. As Buber remarked above, I cannot offer sufficient reasons for its acceptance. All I can do is point to the legitimacy of its source, whether God, the Torah, or a prophet. To put this in a different way, my faith in the source of the proposition, the person who vouches for it, is prior to my faith in the truth of the proposition. In a scientific context, the source of the proposition may have nothing to do with its acceptance. But in a context where prophecy and revelation are taken for granted, the situation is quite different. Here the primary meaning of faith is not the acceptance of dogma but the acceptance of authority, not assent but trust. Perhaps that is why Heschel, who is sometimes given to overstatement, maintained that dogmas are the poor man's share of the divine. l7 His point was not that dogmas are untrue but that they owe their truth to something else.
It will be objected that we would not put our trust in someone unless we had reasons for doing so. In one sense this is right: no one can manifest trust or belief in exclusively. To put infinite trust in someone about whom one knew nothing would be madness. But while reasons can be given for trusting someone, it may not be the case that reasons alone are sufficient. We can imagine a person who trusts someone and continues to trust him even though he is not entirely sure why. His trust is not a conclusion based on the evaluation of evidence but a decision to remain loyal to that person through thick and thin. Indeed, the notion of "evidence" may be beside the point since the decision to trust some­one often determines what sort of things will count as "evidence" in the first place. Not only can we imagine such a person, we can respect him. Job, to take one example, continues to trust God despite pain and bewil­derment. Or, to take a modern example, Yossel Rakover, one of the last survivors of the Warsaw Ghetto:l8
I trust in God, ,the God of Israel, even though
he doe~ ev~ryth1ng to destroy my trust. I have
trust 1n H1S statutes, although I cannot justify
His deeds • • • I followed Him, though He pushed
me back: I fulfilled His commandments, even though
~e made me suffer for it: I loved Him and remain
1n love with Him, though he has pressed me into
the dust, afflicted me to death, reduced me to
mockery and derision •..
Neither figure exemplifies what we would call blind faith. They ask too many questions and vent too much anger for that. It would be more accurate to say that faith, though it often has reasons to support it, is something more than all of those reasons taken together: it is more a commitment to God than a judgment about Him. In this way, the man of faith stands firm even when his reasons do not. Faith as Belief In
Up till now, I have been speaking as if the contrast between the two kinds of faith is roughly that between the English "believes in" and "believes ~~.II But it is important that the case for this distinction not rest on linguistic intuitions alone. In many cases, the two expressions are synonymous. According to H. H. Price, most philosophers would regard the reduction of one to the other as not difficult enough to be interesting.l9 But if there are contexts where the reduction will not work, where belief in does not appear to be a proposi­tional attitude, examination of them may help us clarify the Jewish understanding of emunah.
To begin with, belief in is not always directed to a person. It is possible to believe in a practice (e.g., daily prayer), an institution (e.g., the U.S. supreme Court), an area (e.g., the city of Evanston), a process (e.g., social change), an ideal (e.g., the brotherhood of man), or just about anything which arouses emotion or inspires confidence. Price has shown that for many of these cases, reduction of belief in to belief ~is straightforward.
Consider what he calls factual belief. "I believe .!n. ghosts" says nothing more than "I believe ~ghosts exist." Similarly, "I believe!!! life after death" can be rewritten as "I believe ~life after death occurs." In cases such as these, the difference between belief in and belief that is in price's terms, "a mere difference
--,
226
of idiom." The same is true for a large number of what he calls judgmental beliefs. "I believe in daily prayerll might be rewritten as III believe that daily prayer is good for one." In some cases, the reduction requires a bit of ingenuity. Suppose a person says that he believes in his dentist. Here the object of his belief is a person. But his attitude can be captured'in a formula. like: He believes that his dentist is good at curing diseases of the mouth and that curing diseases of the mouth is a valuable skill for someone to have. Should we conclude that the reductionist's thesis is correct?
If one hopes to capture anything like the Jewish understanding of emunah, the answer has to be no. Take belief in God. As we have seen, belief in is sometimes nothing more than an existence claim. "I believe in ghosts" is just another way of saying 11 I believe that ghosts exist. II But it would be ludicrous to interpret Abraham's belief in God the same way. God's existence is never at issue in the Bible, and even if it were, we would have no trouble imagining someone who believes. ~ God exists but who lacks the faith (emunah) of an Abraham when it comes to doing His will.
It is here that Price, having introduced the dis­tinction between belief in and belief that, stops short of its full implications. He sees that there are impor­tant cases where the reduction will not work, in partic­ular those where the object of one's belief in is a person. According to Price, the reason is that belief in involves trust. But he has trouble saying what he means by "trust" and wavers between "warmth, II l1a pro-attitude," and a tendency to be "for" the person. The problem is that all of these expressions refer to mental attitudes and belief in a person seems to involve something more. It is not just that Abraham had a high opinion of God but that he recognized His authority and could be counted on to obe~ it. It is noteworthy, in~is conn~tion, tha~

227
emunah is sometimes translated as "faith" and sometimes
as "faithful." I would venture to say that from the
standpoint of traditional Judaism, there is no difference
between them. The idea is that the man of faith is
reliable. Much the same is true of the original meaning
of faith in English, which the Oxford English Dictionary
defines as "loyalty to a person to whom one is bound by
promise or duty, or to one's promise or duty itself."
Loyalty is, above all, an action-oriented concept. If I believe in my wife, she has a right to expect more than a pro-attitude or vaguely defined tendency. 1 am, of course, favorably disposed toward her. But this seems a poor way to describe the requirements of marriage. It is no surprise, then, that the Jewish understanding of faith finds its natural expression in the notion of ~nant. Having put our trust in God, we are committed to His commandments, not just the recognition that they ought to be obeyed, but the promise that we will, in fact, obey them.
It follows that for Judaism, there is no conflict between faith and work. Though Paul opposes faith (pistis) and law (nomos), this opposition makes no sense in the case of emunah. 20 For Judaism, he who rejects the law rejects the faith. Thus we cannot reduce Abraham's belief in God to the acceptance of propositions. As we have seen, the Bible never tells us what these proposi­tions are. This would be a curious fact is emunah were a type of belief that. Moreover, the propositions ~ would supply if we had to would be much too abstract to account for the faith of an Abraham. We can say, if we wish, that God is all-good, all-powerful, all-knowing, that His wil ought to be obeyed, and that those who obey His will are better off as a result. Would we say, however, that acceptance of these propositions, or others like them, is ~that it takes to stand firm--that anyone who truly believes them would rival Abraham in his devotion to God?

This seems a fantastic conclusion. The trials of Abraham, or Job, or any other religious hero are tests of moral character; they retain their integrity in situations where the rest of us would fail. It trivializes their achievement to look for theological generalities which they believed but which we supposedly do not. Faith and Commitment
There is a second reason why belief in is a better approximation to ernunah than belief tha~. Belief in a person involves an on-going relationship with another human being. In this sense, it is always open-ended. Because people change over time, it is impossible for anyone to say in advance what a relationship of trust will demand. The point of trust is that whatever is demanded, the relationship will continue. Put otherwise, trust involves a willingness to follow someone even if one is not sure where the other person is going to lead.
This is easily seen from Genesis 12, where God asks Abraham to leave his father's house and "Go to a land that I will show you." Abraham is to embark on a journey whose final destination is unknown to him. It is a mark of his belief in God that he is ready to go. So, too, when the Israelites proclaim their loyalty to God at Exodus 24:7, they do so with the words na-aseh v'nishmah
(n We shall do and we shall hear.") The traditional interpretation of this passage, the one which children learn on their mother's knees, is that the Israelites have entered into an agreement with God before all the terms of the agreement are known. True, this is the God who has brought them out of Egypt. But at this point in the story, they do not know everything He is going to ask of them; they have not bothered to read the "fine print"
in the contract.
Note two things. First, the importance of action. The text does not say "We believe" but "We shall do." Acceptance of God's authority is expressed in practical rather than intellectual terms. Second, the open-ende1 nature of commitment. A person who insisted on knowing all the terms of the contract would not be putting his trust in God but making a prudential judgment.
When we look at faith as the acceptance of a dogma, however, we lose the open-ended quality which the Bible considers essential. Religious dogmas are typically short, timeless pronouncements whose meaning is apparent, e.g., "The dead will be raised. II It is part of the nature of a dogma that there is an air of finality to it. A proposition is not a moral agent and thus cannot make new demands. It follows that the order of faith needed to believe in a person, with all that the term person implies, is more than that required to apprehend a theological truth.
What is more, because the object of faith is a moral agent, faith, in the biblical sense of the term, can be reciprocated. The Bible does not hesitate to attribute emunah to God as well as man. 21 This would make no sense if emunah were a cognitive state in which propositions were accepted without evidence. But it makes perfect sense if emunah is interpreted as loyalty to a person or a promise. God remains loyal to man just as He expects man to remain loyal to Him. In fact, we can imagine cir­cumstances in which God might say, in words similar to those of Yossel Rakover, that He has kept His faith in us even though we have done everything to destroy it. We may conclude, therefore, that there is a sense of belief 1£ which involves a relationship of trust between moral agents and which is not reducible to belief ~--or at least is not reducible without begging a number of reli­gious questions. Faith as a Moral Ideal
To sum, we may conceive of faith in either of two ways: as trust in a person or conviction that something is true. Although both can be found in Judaism, the
230
latter presupposes the former: to be convinced that something it true, we must trust the person who vouches for it. In Judaism, however, trust is more than a belief that someone is telling the truth, it is a willingness to be guided by that person in everything one does: hence the concept of loyalty. In biblical times, loyalty meant that one followed the commands of God and kept His cove­nant. When the prophet tells us that the righteous shall live by his faith (Heb. 2:4), the point is not that the righteous shall live by the truth of a dogma, but that the righteous shall live by remaining true to God. In modern times, the situation is more complicated. In addition to putting his trust in God, the Jew is asked to have a derivative kind of trust in the tradition of scribes, rabbis, and commentators who have copied and interpreted His word. But the key notion of trust or loyalty is the same.
In Aristotelian terms, faith is closer to a moral than to a intellectual virtue. But if this is so, an important consequence follows in regard to man's faith in God: that to be genuine, faith has to be tested. According to Aristotle, moral virtues are the sort of thing we learn by doing. One does not become just or charitable by acknowledging the benefits of responsible behavior. He must actually take part in the political process or contribute to a worthy cause. By the same token, faith is not the sort of thing one can merely proclaim. He must feel pain, experience temptation, and remaln true to God in spite of it all. Hence the words of Job (13:15): "Though He slay me, yet will I trust in Him." The easy thing for Job would have been to follow the advice of his wife: curse God and die. But this he does not do. He remains firm in his loyalty to God and the conviction of his own innocence. By the end of the book, he emerges as a hero: it is Job who is rewarded and his friends who are rebuked.
,'-----~

Looked at in this way, faith is remarkably similar to courage. Plato defines courage as the quality which enables a person to hold fast to the injunction of reason despite the onslaught of pleasure or pain. 22 Substitute "God II for "reason," and you will not be far from an acceptable definition of faith. Like courage, faith is the sort of thing which sustains people in times of stress or need. It sustained many of the victims of Hitler's death camps and allowed them to preserve a vestige of human dignity in a world taken over by demons.
It is common for people to speak of faith as if it involved a leap, a deliberate attempt to jump from the rational to the irrational. Thus Kierkegaard describes it as the act of shutting one's eyes and plunging con­fidently.into the absurd. 23 The biblical understanding of emunah, however, suggests the opposite. Instead of taking a leap, the man of faith remains exactly where he is. Let everyone else betray his trust in God, the man of faith will not budge. In this sense it is the coward, the one who betrays God, who makes a leap. Faith and Reason Again
What, then, becomes of the problem of faith and reason? A complete answer must await further argument. But it is clear that if faith is not at bottom a proposi­tional attitude, much of what has been written on this issue is wide of the mark. Faith is not a shortcut or a refuge for the unsophisticated. Nor do reason and argu­ment make an exercise of faith unnecessary. The Book of Job is enough to lay both of these suspicions to rest. If the purpose of reason is to search for truth, the pur­pose of faith is to insure the integrity of behavior. Does this mean that if we understand faith as belief in, the problem of faith and reason will evaporate? Of course not. It does mean, however, that the problem will have to be reformulated. The issue is not: Why do we have two modes of access to the same thing? but: How can

loyalty and intellectual curiosity be integrated in the
same person? Conclusion
One of the standard criticisms of Judaism is that it is concerned only with outward manifestations of piety and ignores the inner life of man. Some have gone so far as to call it orthopraxy, by which they mean that it is nothing but a theological behaviorism. The charge is unfair, of course, but we are not able to understand why. As Price maintaned, philosophers have had a lot to say about belief that but precious little to say about belief in. The latter form of belief is not propositional, but for that reason, does not fit into the usual epistemolo­gical categories. It is clear why philosophers would not pay much attention to this sort of belief and try to force everything into a propositional mold. But it is equally clear that when everything is forced into a pro­positional mold, Judaism comes up short.
The failure of philosophy to pay adequate attention to belief in ought to make us suspicious. Judaism has much to contribute to an understanding of the inner life. Perhaps it is time for philosophy to listen.
NOTES
1.
Martin Buber, ~Types of Faith, trans. by N. P. Goldhawk (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), 7.

2.
Memorabilia 1.1.5. Cf. Sophocles, Oedipus Rex 1445. For references to the New Testament see A Greek­English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian LiteratUre;-a-rranslation and adaptation of the fourth revised and augmented edition of Walter Bauer's Griechisch-Deutsches Worterbuch zu den S7hri~ten de~ Neuen Testaments und der Ubrigen ur7hrlstllchen Llteratur (Chicago: University of Chlcago Press, 1959), 662-4. The weight of this evidence shows that on philological grounds alone, the New Testamentls understanding of pistis defies easy characterization. For another view of early


-

Christiani~y, see Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Faith and Belief (Prlnceton: Princeton University Press 1979), esp. ch. 5. '
3.
E.g., Exodus 4:8.

4.
~is, ~. 93, gg. Abr. 26B.

5.
Solomon Schechter, "The Dogmas of Judaism" Studies in Judaism, first series (Philadelphia: ~ewish Publication Society, 1911), 151.

6.
Abraham Joshua Heschel, Man Is Not Alone (New York: Farrar, Straus & Young, 19511; 166.

7.
John Hi7k, Faith and Knowledge (Ithica: Cornell
Universlty press, 1957), xi-xii.



B. Topics 103b7, E,osteriorAnalytics 72a30ff., 90b14. For more on the Aristotelian notion of pistis and its development by subsequent thinkers see Harry Austryn Wolfson, "The Double Faith Theory in Clement, Saadia, Averroes and St. Thomas, and its Origin in Aristotle and the Stoics." Jewish Quarterly Review 33 (1942-3), 213-64.
9.
For example, Posterior Analytics 72b4.

10.
Here, as elsewhere, I am indebted to C. H. Dodd, The Bible and the Greeks (London: Hodder & Stoughton~

1935).---­

11.
See, for example, 25:5, 31:6, 86:15, 117:2, 119:90

and 138.

12.
De Virt. 216,

13.
Saadia Gaon,



trans. by S. Press, 1948),
De. ~. 1.68.
The Book of Beliefs and opin~~, RosenEIat~(NeW Haven:-Yale University
14.
14.
Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedlander (New York:--oover, 1904, rpt. 1956), 67.

15.
Q! ha-Shem, 2.5. lowe this reference to Menachem Kellner.

16.
Maimonides' principles are found in his c~mmentary on Sanhedrin 10. For an English translatlon, see Isadore Twersky (ed.), ~ Maimonides Reader (NewYork: Behrman House, 1972), 401-23. For fu~ther discussion see Arthur Hyman, "Maimonides' Thlrteen Principles," in A. Altmann (ed.), Jewish Medieval ~g Renaissance Studies (Cambridge: Harvard press,


LINGUISTIC INTERPRETATION OF FAITH234
1967), 22-40. According to Hyman, Maimonides thought that acceptance of the principles is "a necessary, if not sufficient" condition for a share in the world to come. Also see Menachem Kellner, "What is Heresy?" unpublished manuscript. Note that if acceptance of the principles is bo~h necessary and sufficient, then the logical structure of Judaism is not much different from that of Christianity.
17.
Heschel, ibid.

18.
Taken from a translation found in Eliezer Berkovits, With God in Hell (New York: Sanhedrin Press, 1979),

131.

19.
H. H. price, "Belief 'In' and Belief 'That'," Religious Studies I (1965), 5-28.

20.
But see James 2:14 ff.

21.
See, for example, Deuteronomy 32:4, Psalms 33:4,

119:90 and 138, Lamentations 3:23.

22.
Republic 442b-c.

23.
Fear and Trembling, Lowrie trans. (Princeton: Prince~on University Press, 1941: rpt. 1974), 44. Cf. E1~ezer Berkovitz, Ea. cit., 122-5.