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I The Academic Ambience
1. The Schools
At the end of the eleventh century three kinds of 'school' existed in northern Europe. The first and most common of these was the monastic school. This was, as a rule, an internal school, which ~'~r:~~;:rth~~eeds of an individual community and taught the boys and young men of the house at least t~e elements of what a monk needed to know: how to read Latm competently and to sustain his part in the liturgical round. Such a school was unlikely to achieve much eminence unless it happened to have a master of exceptional ability. The schools at Fecamp and at Holy Trinity, Rouen, had brief periods of importance. For a short time under Lanfranc the school at Bee was famous, and it attracted pupils from the best families, not all of whom intended to become monks.1 When Lanfranc was replaced by St. Anselm the character of the school changed; it produced 'seeming-philosophers' according to one monastic chronicler,2 and there can be no doubt that the training which was to be had there was excellent. But the school ceased to take pupils from outside. When Anselm himself went away, the school lost its distinction. Such schools had only the doubtful continuity of belonging to the same house generation after generation. There_'Y~§''''!!Q..§.!~agY.~teY~!QPrn~!lLQL<l_s.ylJ<lbl,l~<?tst:ggYdW
examination leadingto th~ a~ar$:LQLa__dJ~gr~e..---.sccondfY·,'th'~;~'~w;r~«the cathed~ scho~ls, like the one at Laon or the school ofNotre Dame at Paris or that at Chartres.3
Their chief raison d'etre lay in the Il_e.<:d ()f the ~i?~e~~.s.f()r
1
Vita Herluini, ed. J. Annitage Robinson, Gilbert Crispin, Abbot of West­minster (Cambridge, 1911), p. 97. 2 Orderic Vitalis, His to ria Ecclesiastica, ed. M. Chibnall (Oxford, 1969), II.296, ii.246. .
3 The claim of Chartres to be a school has recently become a somewhat con­tentious issue. See R. W. Southern, Mediaeval Humanism, pp. 61-85; and N. M. Haring, 'Chartres and Paris revisited', Essays in Honour of A. C. Pe~s ~Toronto, 1974); 268-329. See, too, Mediaeval Humanism, p. 163 on the begmnmg of the cathedral schools in England.
The Academic Ambience
c0l!lj>ete}!!,,~<l!!!inistmtQrs.. Here again, much depended upon
good fortune in obtaininga first-rate master who could attract
pupils and raise the standing of the school to the level of his
own reputation. Where a fine master gave a good portion of
his working life to a cathedral school, as another Anselm and
his brother Ralph did at Laon, a cathedral school could
achieve a considerable standing for a time. But its reputation
was likely to dwindle rapidly when it lost the master who had
made it noteworthy.
So great was the attraction a good master possessed that it
was possible for a fam(),~~t,t:<l~p.er to ~t uP._~~c:.h.<?()Lgp:.his
own account, as Peter Abelard did more than once. These
sclio'ols"oFi:h-e-ihird type were often ephemeral. They were
sheltered by no institution and they were dependent for their
continued existence not only on the excellence of their
master, but also upon the sometimes short-lived fashionable­
ness of his opinions. Students who came to hear a famous
master out of curiosity might leave him as easily as they
came.
In Italy a fourth type of school had survived the end of the Roman Empire, to provide a grounding in the liberal arts; it is not easy to establish the continuity of the urban schools, or to be sure what level ofteaching they provided, but Lanfranc and Bruno of Asti, who became Bishop of Segni, got their elementary education and probably a good deal more in such schools. At Pavia, the story goes, Lanfranc so distinguished himself at rhetoric that he could outwit his elders in forensic oratory; Orderic Vitalis relates the tale in Book IV of his Historia Ecclesiastica. But these schools fall a little outside our ambit. They were at no time centres of theological study during the twelfth century, and they played only an incidental part in the process by which the liberal arts and theology became the academic disciplines of the new universities of
northern Europe.

It was in theory perfectly possible for a scholar to move from one milieu to another in the eleventh and early twelfth century. Abelard did so whenever he felt that circumstances justified it -when he wanted to tum from dialectic to theology he went to Laon;when he found himself unwelcome there because he was taking away the pupils of Anselm of

The Academic Ambience

subject-matter of study and was expanded and the problem of organization grew steadily more complex. Both the phenomenon and the problem it caused were remarked on by Aquinas as he surveyed the proliferating monographs and textbooks of his own day and saw the need for a single work which would reduce them all to order.6 The public atmosphere of the twelfth-century schools and the early universities had the effect ofa catalyst upon the development of the new categories of thought which took shape in them. Gilbert of Poitiers, John of Salisbury says, claimed with pride that he had spoken openly before the world and said nothing in secret (in scholz's et in ecclesiis palam mundo, et se in occulto dicebat nichil esse locutum).7 In particular he had spoken in scholz's, in the new academic forum, where ideas were made public in a way which had never before been possible in medieval times. But it is also true that the existence of a public forum acted as a check on what Newman describes (in the Preface to his Discourses on the Scope and Nature of University Educatz"on) as 'irresponsible' writing and teaching,
'off-hand', 'ambitious', 'changeable', and obedient only to the popularity of the moment.
These conditions were not present in monastic schools if only because they were smaller and because exchanges between them were so much more limited. Otloh of St. Emmeram describes his own experience as an able pupil in such a school in the eleventh century, where he himself set the pace and where he received little stimulus from his fellow­pupils.8 The strongest formative influence on a young man's mind in such circumstances was likely to come from an older monk, as it did in the case of another eleventh-century monastic scholar, Guibert of Nogent. He praises Anselm of Bec for the care he took in giving him guidance on his visits to the monastery at Fly.9 There was, despite the practical difficulties involved, a good deal of intercourse between monastic scholars, who sent one another copies of their works and prompted one another to write new books. But
6 Summa Theologica, Prologue.
7 His to ria Pontificalis, p. 22.
8 PL 146.56, Liber De Tentationibus Suis.
9 Guibert of Nogent, De Vita Sua, ed. G. Bourgin (Paris, 1907), I.17.

The Academic Ambience
these exchanges were mainly of a friendly character and they
seem to have lacked, for the most part, that abrasiveness and
challenge which the universities eventually provided.
Exceptionally, something of the kind Was to be found in the cathedral schools of the late eleventh and early twelfth century. A Roscelin of Compiegne or a Peter Abelard could create an atmosphere of debate among the shifting popula­tion of masters and students to be found at Laon or at Chartres or at Paris. But their irritant effect is a rather different matter from the steady pressure exerted by the sheer numbers of students and masters who were assembled in these and other schools by the end of the twelfth century. It was the existence of a growing public and the need to find a means of organizing teaching on a large scale which pro­vided the stimulus to which Aquinas responded in trying to provide a comprehensive textbook, a Summa Theologica, for use by students of theology as an academic discipline.
This is not the place to enter into the question of the process of development by which the schools of the twelfth century became the universities of the thirteenth, or to attempt an estimate of the numbers of students and masters who worked in them. That would bring us into another area of enquiry altogether) 0 But in a number of twelfth-century schools what R. W. Southern calls 'a consistent tradition of academic teaching' was maintained, 'where there were many students, a plentiful supply of lodgings and food, a permanent body of masters, and a general environment favourable to scholastic growth'.11 A quantitative as well as a qualitative change was taking place which eventually gave these schools an institutional character and which made them environments we may describe without undue qualification, as 'academic' in a recognizably modern sense. In them, courses were run and degrees awarded. The whole process required organiza­tion, if the disciplines involved were to be reduced to order and made subject to systematic instruction and examination. This was not merely the result of expansion and development
10 On the question of the meaning of schola and the process by which the schools became institutions, see Mediaeval Humanism and Pegis, op. cit. 11 R. W. Southern 'Master Vacarius', Mediaeval Learning and Literature: Essays Presented to Richard William Hunt (Oxford, 1976), p. 269.

in the framework of the schpols themselves. It was also a response to the pressures created when a large number of questions were asked by masters and scholars.
This working together of practical and administrative change and the pressures of an inward intellectual dissatis­faction among teachers and pupils helped to generate the air of constructive intellectual excitement which animates the most characteristic writings of the twelfth century. A new vision of the potential complexity and variety of intellectual exercise was abroad. The greatly extended opportunities for scholarly intercourse kept enthusiasm high. If we can speak of the new academic disciplines as 'academic' because of the schools which produced them, we may call them 'disciplines' because of the passionate commitment and the hard clear thinking which went into their reduction to a system of study.
To suggest that it was the achievement of the scholars of the early and middle twelfth century to bring to light the principles which were to direct the academic study of theology and the arts for several generations at least, seems on the face of it a large claim to make for the work of a comparatively few thinkers, who were not in most cases outstanding figures in the history of thought in their own right. What they did amounted in itself to no more than a readjustment of emphasis, a more precise definition of terms, the fuller development of an existing methodology. However, a significant change of direction may come about as the result of a very small first move. In this case, the alterations which were made were adjustments to slight but progressive changes in the habits of thought of a generation. These scholars deserve credit principally for making an effort to meet a need which they themselves felt rather than recognized. The work of the earliest twelfth-century scholars consists in large measure of an experimental shifting of ground in an attempt to relieve .the pressure under which they now found them­selves. Their work has something of the quality of Godwin's, as William Hazlitt describes it: 'Mr. Godwin's faculties have kept at home, and plied their task in the workshop of the brain, diligently and effectually. [When] Mr. Godwin is intent on a subject ... he works it out as a matter of duty, and discards from his mind whatever does not forward his
The Academic Ambience 15

main object as impertinent and vain.,12 The majority of these scholars were men of limited vision and painstaking mind, but by industrious effort they 'leave more than one monu­ment of a powerful intellect behind'.
2. The Old Disciplines
i. Trees ofKnowledge
philosophia
,
I I I

theorica practica mechanica logica (speculativa) (activa (adulterina) (sermocinalis) ethica
I I [
grammatic a ratio disserendi moralis)
. I I I I
solitaria privata publica
(privata, ( economica, (civilis)

moralis) dispensativa)


theologia mathematica physic a (intellectibilis) (intelligibilis) (naturalis)
I I
I I
I. I

intelligibilis intelle'ctibilis prima causa secunda causa
arith4'e-ti-ca--m-us'lic-a----'-g-eo-m-Iret-ri-a--as-t-ro'~omia

A modification:
aliquando physica large accipitur aequipollens theoricae
philosophia
I II I
physica ethica logica


Hugh of St. Victor: Didascalicon, Epitome Dindimi in Philosophiam
Several twelfth-century scholars tried to set out a complete conspectus of learning in diagram form. Some of the results may be seen here. l Although there is a substantial measure of agreement among them, theyare not identical. But they are suf­
12 William Hazlitt, 'Coleridge', The Spirit of the Age, ed. G. Richards (Oxford, 1911).
I They may be reconstructed from Hugh of St. Victor's Didascalicon, ed. C. Buttimer (Washington, 1939), and his Epitome Dindimi in Philosophiam, ed. R. Baron, Opera Propaedeutica (Notre Dame, 1965); from the Ysagoge in Theologiam,

scientia
I 1 I
I
sapientia tiO
clOqr"Jrn :~:dia ,"';d;Om""onko
I I I grammatic a dialectica rhetorica mathesis
lanificium architectona navigatio venatio agricultura
theorica practica
I
I
I
ethica ,economica politica (solitaria) (privata) (communis)
theologia phisica mathesis ~I-------rl.-------.I--------'I arithmetica mUSlca geometria astronomia
Ut v.ero predictas particiones facilius recolligas subiectam intuere formulam
(p. 72.28-9).
Ysagoge in Theologiam
scientia
I I I I
rationalis naturalis moralis philos1ophia

I . II"
I I
.
grammatIca rhetorica logica yconomia monastlca ~______~L-,-----~
metaphysica(theologia) matematica phisica
I
r I. 1 .
astronomia
arithmetica muslcl,.a___..:..ge...,ometra
1r---L1-0,,-___,,________,' I-L-----TI-----.~I
numerus numerus numerus numerus longum latum spissum
per se relatus geometricus proportionalis
consideratus

instrumentalis

Dialectica Monacensis
ficently alike to suggest that they represent a remarkably close general consensus of opinion on the range of studies which comprehended all human knowledge. They tell us something
,ed. R. Martin, Ecrits theologiques de l'ecole d'Abelar41 SS Lov. 14 (1934), where an actual, diagram is given, p. 73; and from LM 1I1I, pp. 459-60. A fuller tree of knowledge for Hugh's and Abelard's 'schools' is given in R. W. Southern, Mediaeval Humanism, charts I and II, but the versions given here are those which deal with the academic and related disciplines only, and which are to be found in
toto in the texts cited.
The Academic Ambience
else, too: the a_gld~!!!!c SCene was evidently being surveyed as a whole, wItha view~()~!~~.ij.l?i~g~I~~r~i~!I~-P2ift!QIUm.d stalldinifonne"fraditional disciplines. ~-'Hugliof'SI;'vtctOrwas-aJjl~' to give a little general guidance on most of them in his Didascalicon, in the form of short encyclopaedia articles. But we should not be misled into thinking that all these subjects could be studied in the schools. Had anyone wanted to take his study of practz'ca
(mechanica) further, he would have found that the branches of learning were not all equally adequately catered for in the schools.2 The greatest interest and value of these schemata for our purposes perhaps lies in this: they tell us where the liberal arts were felt to stand in relation to the whole scheme
of learning.
Hugh himself acknowledges in the summary he made for 'Dindimus' that the seven liberal arts are supreme: 'Of these we call arts, the diligence of the ancients discerned seven, in which studies the tools of all philosophy might be learned'.3 Only these seven had textbooks and a long tradition of study in the schoolroom, and even of these, not all were equally well equipped to make the transition into the new schools because several of them had been badly neglected for centuries. One significant difference between the trivium and quadrivium subjects emerges. The mathematical subjects of the quadrivium are regarded as 'theoretical' or 'speculative'. The trivium subjects of grammar, logic, and rhetoric are seen as 'arts of language'.
These disciplines are still, in some cases, studied as academic subjects, though some have changed their names. Others grouped together here have moved apart. The art of econo­mica, or the running of a household, has little in common now with the formal study of personal morality on the one hand (solitaria or moralis) or the study of government and public administration on the other (publz'ca or cz'vilz's). We should not readily list these three and only these three under. the heading of 'practical' studies. To the list of mechanical arts it would now be necessary to make a number of changes.
• See Theological Tractates, pp. 4-8, for Boethius' division of philosophy in the De Trinitate. Nine arts were distinguished by Varro, but the seven medieval liberal arts were selected by Cassiodorus and Isidore.
3 Epitome Dindimi in Philosophiam, p. 204.435.

The Academ£c Amb£ence

18
These are no longer studies of the same general type. Working with wool (lan£f£c£um) would have to be expanded to take in the work of all the textile industries. Nav£gat£o would have to include the piloting of aeroplanes and perhaps driving of trains and public service vehicles, as well as the navigation of ships. Hunting has become a sport (venatio) and armamenta (armaments), the business of governments and industries, \
rarely of craftsmen. Some lines of descent may be traced from ancient to modern disciplines. From grammar has come the study of linguistics and of languages. First Greek was added to Latin in the sixteenth century, then modern and other ancient languages much more recently. The old grammarians who taught parsing from the classical poets began a tradition which led to the study of the literatures of all ancient and modern languages. Poes£s, the writing of poetry and plays, of 'literature' in general, is now the work of creative artists, and only occasionally treated as an academic discipline, but the study of existing poetry and plays has fallen under the umbrella of literary criticism. Out of rhetoric has come the study of law, and the arts of composition (for which manuals existed in the twelfth century for letter-writing, poetry­writing, and the composition of sermons). Logic has lost its medieval pre-eminence, and become part of philosophy; it is no longer a subject with which every schoolboy is familiar. Of the mathematical arts, music and astronomy have become quite different kinds of study, in which mathematics
plays only a limited part. Arithmetic and geometry are still
staple ingredients of mathematics, but they form only two
branches of the syllabus, and it would seem absurd to divide

geometry into the study of length, breadth, and depth as the
author of the D£alect£ca Monacensis. does.

These changes are of more than curiosity interest because
the processes by which they have taken place reflect greatly
altered social requirements and cultural attitudes since the
twelfth century. The most rapid and dramatic changes are the
most recent. By stretching it considerably the old scheme
can still be made to fit. Physics, chemistry, and biology might
go into phzsica, natural science, and liistory into poes£s,
engineering under mechan£ca, sociology under publica

The Academ£c Ambience
perhaps, but it would be absurd to suggest that the founders
of these new disciplines looked back to their remote
ancestors for detailed help in deciding upon the boundaries
of their subject-matter and the methods which would be
appropriate for the study of the new subject.
What began in the twelfth century was an open-ended pro­
cess. A few simple principles were established in an effort to
make the traditional disciplines suitable for study in the
schools, to make them, for the first time, recognizably
academic disciplines. But these were the cardinal principles
and they have worn well. They lasted unaltered for several
centuries and they are still important because the continuity
of development has never been broken.
i£. Textbooks

\John Henry Newman prefaced his Discourses on the Scope 1 a-na-Nature o!'Urfz"vers£ty Educatz"on with a definition of a university. It is, he says, 'a place of teaching universal know­/ ledge'. He thus suggests 'that its object is, on the one hand, intellectual, not moral; and on the other, that it is the diffusion and extension of knowledge, rather than the advancement'. Newman's immediate concern was to re­establish the proper relation of what he calls the 'the Church's assistance' to the work of a university, and the place of both religious training and the academic study of theology in a university. These matters did not have the same urgency for medieval scholars, or at least, not in the same way. But the preliminary definition he gives is intended to convey the very 'essence' of a university, 'independently of its relation to the Church'. These 'essential' elements were already present in the twelfth century, before we can properly speak of the schools as universities at all. Schools were becoming 'places', not mere meetings of masters and pupils; and certainly their primary function was to teach. Bernard of Chartres wrote almost nothing (or almost nothing which has survived). Much twelfth-century writing, like the commentaries on Boethius' theological tractates with which we shall be much concerned, consisted of textbooks for teaching purposes. Most masters gave up the greater part of their time to imparting existing knowledge rather than to composing original works. A

The Academt'c Ambt'ence

twelfth-century school was already a 'place of teaching' chiefly given up to 'the diffusion and extension of knowledge'.
Such schools were also concerned with what Newman calls 'universal knowledge'. An academic discipline must be of general interest; it must go beyond local concerns and have an international, if not a universal appeal. This is precisely what the study of the liberal arts provided from the first in the twelfth century. This international and universal character could be preserved in practice only because masters everywhere relied heavily upon the same textbooks. They provided a common core for the work of all the schools. Existing knowledge expanded, certainly, as the texts were glossed, and enlarged commentaries were written, but in none of the liberal arts did the new work lose contact with the old, and there is ample evidence that a common community of thought was maintained as one master's views were compared with another's. Thanks to the renewed interest in the text­
books, students began to gain much more than the smattering
of their subject which was to be had from the encyclopedias of
Isidore or Cassiodorus or the Carolingians. Two further
requirements of an academic discipline were thus fulfilled:
the common subject-matter proved capable of development,
and it proved teachable to generations ofpupils.
As to Newman's emphasis on the intellectual character of

the work of the universities: the liberal arts had always been
disciplines of the mind. This was perhaps a legacy of the
Hellenistic preference for the intellectual aspects of educa­
tion; it still comes more naturally to think of academic work

as an activity of the mind rather than of the body. It is
primarily book-work.
By the fourteenth century the university syllabus listed set
texts to be covered by every student in preparation for the
degree of bachelor or master of arts. He had to hear a fixed
number of lectures on each. A glance at the t'ndex auctorum
of a good modem edition of the work of a twelfth-century
author will show how comparatively limited was the range of
sources on which he was ableJto draw. But the instinct to
found the syllabus on close detailed study of set texts was
there already; it resulted in immensely detailed, if sometimes
not very perceptive, examination of the words of the
The Academt'c Ambt'ence
authority, line by line. Newman does not emphasize the importance of textbooks because it was so integral a part of his own training to study set books that it seems scarcely worth mentioning. Methods of studying set books change from age to age. Their role in preserving academic continuity does not. .
In the first half of the twelfth century additions to the range of textbooks which had been available to scholars of the earlier Middle Ages were few: chiefly some of the 'new logic' of Aristotle.4 But textbooks which had been available earlier and which did not await the efforts of an Adelard of Bath or a Hermann of Carinthia to bring them to the West from the Arab world, now suddenly came to notice after being neglected by all but a few scholars who had a specialist interest. Boethius' Arithmett'ca is a case in point, as is Chalcidius' Commentary on the Tz'maeus. For the formation of the new theological discipline, Boethius' 'theological treatises' were of the first importance. The influence these newly rediscovered textbooks exerted has tended to be obscured by the more dramatic effects of the introduction of fresh works in translation from the Arabic and the Greek in the twelfth and thirteenth century. But it was the old Latin works which provided the foundation for the comprehensive re-establishment of the disciplines of the liberal arts.
The first stage in finding a place for a discipline in the schoolroom is to devise a means of teaching it effectively. The first sign of the active use of textbooks in the schools is the proliferation of copies accompanied by glosses or com­mentaries, and of glosses and commentaries written out on their own for use in conjunction with plain texts. The most substantial and common 'textbooks' of all were the Bible and the Fathers. But before we consider their place in the new academic discipline of theology we must look at the text­books of the arts.
Donatus in the fourth century and Priscian in the sixth
4 On the transmission of these textbooks, see A. van de Vyver 'Les etappes du developpement philosophique du haut moyen age', Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire 8 (1929), 425-52. See Abelard, Dialectica, pp. xvi-xix on the likeli­hood that Peter Abelard knew something of the new logic. For English scholars who we.re responsible for bringing Arabic science back from Spain, see Mediaeval Humamsm, pp. 170-1.

provided the basic textbooks on which grammatical studies were founded for centuries. A number of later writers attempted to compose manuals along the same lines. In the eleventh century the glosses on Priscian began to show a response to the needs of a new kind of schoolroom. Between 1050 and 1150 formal glosule came into being. The old discipline was made newly academic by Manegold of Lauten­bach and Anselm of Laon and other masters, who worked through the text patiently furnishing explanations of difficult terms and paraphrases of the rules, and their work was used in several schools. This kind of composite, if not co-ordinated, creation of a commentary upon a textbook by a series of masters was something new. The reading of the poets, which had formed the backbone of the teaching of grammar in monastic schools became increasingly distinct from the new concern with the theory of the subject.s
The same interest in theory animates the new work on the dialectical textbooks. Here the position was a little different. For the old logic, the beginner's books, the Isagoge of Porphyry, Aristotle's Categories and the De Interpretatione, were covered by Boethius' commentaries; Cicero's Topics and Boethius' commentary, together with Boethius' monograph De Differentiis Topicis were also known. Much of the new work of the twelfth century consisted in the writing of short manuals which were designed to turn Boethius' reflections into manageable handbooks for the schoolroom. Adam of Balsam, Peter Abelard, the elusive Garlandus, and the authprs of a number of anonymous manuals, all tried to supply this need.6 As to the new logic: during the middle years of (the century the Sophistici Elenchi appeared in the schools,7 and
5 The classical study of 'The Studies on Priscian in the ~leventh and twflfth centuries' is still R. W. Hunt, MARS i (1941-3), 194-231 and ii (1950), ~-56. See, too, K. M. Fredborg, 'The dependence of Petrus Helias' Summa isuper Priscianum on William of Conches' Close super Priscianum', Cahiers, 11 (1973), 1-57, 'Tractatus glosarum Prisciani in MS. Vat. lat. 1486', Cahiers, 21 (1977), 21-44; see too, Lanfranc of Bee, pp. 46-7. The Roman grammarians and their followers are collected in H. Keil, Grammatici Latini (Leipzig, 1855-80), 8 vols.
6 Garlandus' treatise, the Dialectica, is edited by L. M. de Rijk(Assen,1959); see, too Abelard, Dialectica and the Logica Modernorum, ed. L. M.deRijk (Ass en, 1967), 2 vols.; Adam of Balsam, Ars Disserendi, ed. L. Minio-Paluello (Rome, 1956).
7 S. Ebbesen, 'Jacobus Veneticus on the Posterior Analystics and some Early

13th Century Oxford Masters on the Elenchi', Cahiers, 21 (1977), 1-9.
The Academic Ambience
before 1200 the Aristotelian Topics and the Prior and Poster­
ior Analytics were available. The study of dialectic therefore
had to encompass a larger body of texts than that of
grammar. It also had to accommodate new textbooks within
the syllabus.

Masters who taught dialectic had, in addition, to find ways of explaining to their pupils the difference between the grammarians' approach to language and that of the dialectic] ian. As we shall see, there was a considerable area of overlap between the two disciplines in their technical vocabulary and in their common concern with the theory of language. Amidst all these additional difficulties the textbooks provided a reassuring certainty, a solid core of subject-matter which gave the discipline stability under pressure.
Rhetoric was still the most neglected of the trivial arts; where it was studied it was taught from Cicero's De Inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium. Both these textbooks were designed in the first place to be school manuals, and they suited twelfth-century purposes admirably in their relatively mechanical treatment of the branches of the subject. Quintilian's Institutz'o Oratoria was little known, and it was in circulation only in a very truncated form.8 The new 'rhetor­ical arts' of letter-writing, the writing of poetry and -in the thirteenth century -of preaching, had no place in the teach­ing of rhetoric as a theoretical discipline.9 The emphasis of the eleventh-and twelfth-century commentators on the two 'Ciceronian rhetorics' was upon the skills of argumentation they taught. In many respects rhetoric was taught as though it were a branch of dialectic. 1 0 This is not surprising in view of the concentrated effort which was being put into the teaching of dialectic, and into the reconciliation of all the disparate elements it was found to contain when the corpus
8 On Quintilian, see P. Boskoff, 'Quintilian in the Late Middle Ages', Speculum, 27 (1952), 71-8. 9 M. Dickey, 'Some commentaries on the De Inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium of the eleventh and twelfth centuries', MARS vi (1968), 1-41. K. Fredborg, 'The commentary of Thierry of Chartres on Cicero's De Inventione'
Cahiers, 7 (1971), 1-36; 'Petrus Helias on Rhetoric', Cahiers, 13 (1974),31-41; 'The commentaries on Cicero's De Inventione and the Rhetorica ad Herennium by William of Champeaux', Cahiers, 17 (1976), 1-39.
10 M. Dickey makes this point, op. cit.

of material about argument in the rhetorical and dialectical textbooks was systematically examined in the schools.
There is some evidence that Boethius' Arithmetica was coming to be more widely known in the first half of the twelfth century. Its general influence appears to have been confined to the first chapters and to a few definitions and principles which were thought to have a theological applica­tion. II Euclid's Elements were available in a Latin text -in fact in more than one versionI2 -and music could be learned from Boethius' Musica. For astronomy there was Macrobius on The Dream of Sdpio, and Chalcidius on the Timaeus. But it would be misleading to suggest that any of the quadrivium subjects had the popularity of grammar and dialectic, or even of rhetoric. The use that was made of these textbooks was eclectic. These subjects were rarely studied in any depth in their own right, and they were fully-fledged academic disciplines only by courtesy, because they held a traditional place in the scheme of the seven liberal arts. But they, too, owed their academic respectability to the textbooks on which they were based.
Boethius' opuscula sacra occupy a somewhat anomalous position; although they came to be studied as textbooks in the schools with increasing interest in the middle of the twelfth century, they never found a place in the syllabus of the traditional academic disciplines. This must be put down to their subject-matter. The De Trinitate is, as Boethius him­self acknowledges,an attempt to take a little further what Augustine had said in his own book on the Trinity. The De Hebdomadibus is about the relation of individual goods to the highest good. The Contra Eutychen deals with the heresies of Eutyches and Nestorius concerning the Person and Nature of Christ. Their subject-matter is therefore theological, although much of the content requires a considerable know­ledge of the liberal arts to make it comprehensible. They were of enormous importance in bringing about the new perceptions of the purposes and scope of theology which
11 See my article 'Introductions to Boethius's Arithmetica of the tenth and the fourteenth century', History ofScience, xvi (1978), 22-41.
12 M. Clagett, 'The mediaeval translations from the Arabic of the Elements of Euclid, with special emphasis on the versions of Adelard of Bath', Isis, 44 (1953), 16-43.
The Academic Ambz'ence
made it an academic discipline. They helped in significant ways to. bridge the gap between the liberal arts and speculative .!~eol2.gy.13 They were soon overshadowed by the-rang~-~f texts of Aristotle newly available in the thirteenth century; but for the twelfth century their influence was indispensable in encouraging scholars to see more clearly the size of the questions with which they were dealing.

A further anomaly was presented by the presence of dis­ciplines for which no ancient textbooks were available, in the traditional schemata of subjects for study. Hugh of St. Victor gives a list of the authorities on each of the secular arts in his Didascal£con. He borrows the greater part of it from Isidore and makes no commont on the availability of the books they wrote in his own day. His intention is rather to give a histor­ical account of the discovery and transmission of each art. Arithmetic, for example, was discovered by Pythagoras; Nicomachus wrote about it in Greek, and first Apuleius and then Boethius translated his work into Latin. Ham, son of Noah, is credited with the invention of astrology, which was first taught by the Chaldeans;Josephus, we are told, says that Abraham first learned astrology among the Egyptians. Two areas of study in particular were poorly served by traditional textbooks of the kind which lent themselves to study in the context of a school syllabus. One of the ancient divisions of human knowledge distinguishes log£ca, physica, and ethica. Only logica is adequately catered for. Hugh identifies Thales of Miletus and Pliny as the principal authors on physica. Socrates is the inventor of ethics. The best Hugh can do for a textbook here is to say that Plato wrote about the nature of
justice in his Republic and that Cicero wrote a Republ£ca in Latin His account certainly does not yield a set of working textbooks for the study of these two major subjects. The books Hugh mentions were rare or unobtainable in Latin as yet, and he omits others, such as Chalcidius on the Tz"maeus which were being read in the schools of his own day. In th~ absence of standard textbooks for commentary the study of 'ethics' and 'physics' developed in a curiously piecemeal fashion in the schools of the twelfth century, sometimes
13 Theological Tractates.

i· i
making great strides where an individual scholar wrote a book of his own, as Abelard did in his ethics, the SC£to Teipsum. Sometimes physica touched on the subject-matter of theology, as we shall see, and here, too, advances were made. But for the most part, the unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to the textbooks acted as a disincentive to scholars to develop these subjects as formal academic disciplines. 14
There appear to have been at least the beginnings of a notion of academic respectability in Hugh's mind. His inten­tion is to describe the subjects which are worthy of study, the authors who have written on them and some of their books. He is careful to exclude explicitly anything which might be a source of spiritual or intellectual peril to the reader. He is animated perhaps by rather the same desire to separate canonical from uncanonical, authentica from apo­crypha, which had encouraged Cassidorus and Isidore and some of Hugh's own contemporaries to make lists of Christ­ian writings which may be regarded as reliable. When he comes to do the same for secular authors he perceives a special danger in magical and astrological studies. These were beginning to revive with the increasing interest of the day in the more respectable mathematical and a scientific subjects. Hugh explains carefully the difference between the mathe­matics of the quadrivium and the mathematica which is another name for astrology. He keeps these comments apart from his treatment of the traditional disciplines. Undoubtedly his strongest motive in all this is his concern for the spiritual welfare of the reader. Magic is dangerous and evil. But it is also, to the twelfth-century eye, academically unsound and unscientific,1 5 and that is something new.
14 Didascalicon, III, 2 PL 176.765-6, ed. C. Buttimer (Washington, 1939) pp. 49-52. Peter Abelard's Ethics, ed. D. Luscombe (Oxford, 1971).
15 Didascalicon, VI, 15, PL 176.810; Buttimer, pp. 132-3. L. Thorndike, A History of Magic and Experimental Science (New York, 1929),11.13-14 makes the point that magic 'is treated by itself' by Hugh partly at least because he sees it as a subject which should not be 'included in philosophy'. The revival ofinterest in astrology and magic in connection with the new enthusiasm for mathematics proper is attested by M. L. M. Laistner, 'The Western Church and Astrology, Harvard Theological Review, 34 (1941), 251-75. On the twelfth-century Bernardus Silvestris on astrology, see C. S. F. Burnett, 'What is the Experimentar­ius of Bernardus Silvestris? A Preliminary Survey of the Material' AHDLMA xliv (1977),79-125.
The Academic Ambience
3. The New Discipline
i. Theolog£a
Cassidorus and Isidore and the Carolingian encyclopedists had helped to make the terms used to describe the liberal arts so familiar that no twelfth-century scholar could be in any doubt as to what to call the subject in which he was engaged when he was studying grammar or arithmetic. But fur.-the
studie~~~d_~_~~_~ouP~l1<:!~!'tl}~_h<:;~<:liE:K9.f~t~'
t~~~__~(l~__~~yet no ~el1~f~1!Y<l:c(;ep!~9 t~_~~: The student of malectic mlghib~e-forgiven for being confused about the area of study in which he was engaged when he found this questio gravis: 'Was the Virgin made free from original sin at the point when she herself was conceived, or when she conceived Christ?'} among a series of purely logical problems in a set of school exercises. When Lanfranc and Berengar had explored the application of dialectic to theology they had kept chiefly to problems concerning the sacraments.2 In Anselm's day the range was much wider, and by the twelfth century no topic of modem academic theology had been left unexplored by the dialecticians, as if its subject-matter properly fell within the scope of an academic discipline.

. -Th<:!:~_ a~~_strg.!J.g.jQdl<:~0ns_J~~2IQgy}:~,!ci ~._p.l!tC;~_.Qf --lt~__~,:,,~ .amoIl~..th~...(l<:(l~(!irli~.~vi~~~I?!i~~.Lb~the"end.,QLt):J._e
~ry. In a twelfth-or early tnirteenth-century text, the
Log£ca cum sit nostra, one of the first points to be discussed
is how, if 'dialectic is the art of arts and the science of
sciences', theology, too, may be called ~the science of
sciences.'3 One m~ster of dialectic provides this definition of
an academic discipline when he tries to explain in what the
art of dialectic consists:
There are, he says, two kinds of practitioner of this art: Who are they?
There is one who perfonns according to the art, who disputes by the
rules and precepts of the art; he is called a dialectician, that is, a 'dis­
puter'. He whose work concerns the art is he who teaches the art and
expounds the rules and precepts of the art. He is called a master or
'demonstrator'... , What is his purpose? To teach the art. What is his
task? To expound the rules and precepts of the art and to add new
I LM llii, pp. 735-48 Quaestiones Victorinae. 2 M. Gibson, Lanfranc ofBec, p. 102. 3 LM lIii, p. 417.24-7, Logica cum sit nostra.

The Academic Ambience

ones, if they can be appropriately added.4 • • He thus distinguishes between the teachmg of .the art, WhICh is the academic's first concern, and the practIce of the art, which, although it should never be entirely separated from
the teaching, is something quite different.
On this view of things, the master's first duty as an academic is to teach it to others, to study logic rather than to. argue, to study poetry rather than to write poems, to read and write about history rather than to make history. Yet: 'In every art is taught that which it is the art itself to do' ;(in Omni arte docetur id quod fadendi ipsa est ars)5 and 'Every art exists for the purpose of making it easy to do tha~ whi~h it is the art itself to do' (omnis ars est ad id ut ex ea stt factle
\ fd quod fadendi ipsa est ars).6 .
It is important then that the academIc study should not become dissociated from the practice of the skill or art itself; but it must remain teachable, and it is teachable only in so far as it can be reduced to a system of rules. 'An art is a collection of many principles directed to the same end.'7 'An art is, as it were, a finite compendium of something infinite ... if you consider it you will find it small in size, but if you apply yourself to its contents you will find it full of force.'8 Theology was never to become merely one of the arts, a study equivalent in scope and standing to dialectic or g~amm~r. But it was to borrow from the arts the preoccupatIOn wIth what can be taught by rule, and with what can be reduced to a manageable compass, which distinguishes the traditional disciplines and which makes them suitable for the school­
room. There was nothing new in regarding the study of God as something which might be appro;ched by t~e conv~n.tion~ procedures of learning. Augustine s De Doctrzna C,hrtsttana IS about the way in which the arts of language of hIS own day might be used by Christians in studying the B~ble and i~ teaching others. He finds it necessary to emphasIze that hIS
4 LM nii, p. 77.11-25, Abbreviatio Montana.
5 LM nii, p. 147.17-18, Ars Emmeralia.
6 LM nH, p. 147.21-2.
7 LM nii, p. 417.9-13, Logica cum sit nostra.
8 Ibid.

The Academic Ambience

reader is not to expect an advanced academic treatment from him, just because he is known to have been a teacher of rhetoric himself.9 Augustine does not want to make theology an academic discipline like rhetoric. His work is especially concerned with the position of the Christian who is not highly educated and who cannot make use of the rhetorician's skills. He outlines a programme of 'Christian learning' which everyone may use.
This deliberate subordination of the scholarly and technical to the needs of the general reader continued within the monastic tradition into the medieval period. Early in the twelfth century Rupert of DeutZ' speaks of sacrum studium with a double sense of '~~!YJ~...'lr~ing' and '!l:~~}'~,~~al'.To-rrhe expression ~-!.-.~r1:!.!iO is also 'found. But the 'learning' involved, although £1: may take place in part in a monastic or cathedral schoolroom, and although it may have a formal character lacks the comprehensive, systematic organization and the established and extended syllabus of an academic discipline.
If we are to argue that twelfth-century scholars perceived for the first time that it might be possible to treat theology as an academic discipline (for limited purposes) we should expect to find a first indication in their discussion of the name by which they are to call it. The term tlteo1ogja only ,i'v c~ gradually came to have the universality as a title for an " academic discipline which grammatica or rhetorica had en­joyed at least since Roman times. Even for Aquinas the expression sacra doctrina still comes naturally to mind; although Riviere contends that theologia was 'I'usage normal de son temps,.ll
It is not difficult to see why this should have been so. Twelfth-century scholars were looking for a single term which would embrace aspects of a study which was already immensely rich and varied, and which there was no precedent for regarding as a unified body. The syllabus of study of grammar or of dialectic had developed under an existing heading and had therefore retained a certain homogeneity of
9 De Doctrina Christiana, CCSL 32 (1962), IV.i.2.
10 See p. 61 for a discussion of the context of this expression.
11 J. Riviere, 'Theologia: Revue des sciences religieuses, xvi (1936),47.


30
labelling at least. The masters of theology of the twelfth century were trying to settle on a name for two distinct and not easily reconciled existing approaches to the subject­matter -that of the study of the Bible and that of speculative theology (where Scriptural passages serve principally to pose problems or to furnish proofs for use in problem-s~lving)., ReHg£o will not do. When Anselm of Havelberg cnes that churchmen are confronted by a nova reHg£o because there are so many innovations in the Church of God (tot nov£tates £n Eccles£a De£)12 he sees reHg£o as something altogether broader in its scope than academic theology, embracing the work of the Church at large. Expressions such as sacra pagj.:r!:f!:!.__cJ.ivi1(ta pag£na, stud£um ~a(!~qf!.. ~c.!/P tu~'!.e, re~~E~~<!J~~~rE~.!i.ly~-w--the ~!l:lAY"QCHie-Bibie, although:!auJc:e:'de m£eux, they are often used for specuIative exercises, too. Anselm's three treatises 'pertaining to the study of Scripture',13 are about truth, freedom of will, and the fall of Satan respectively. Peter
Lombard relates sacra pag£na to doctrina and discusses its
contribution to 'all learning'.14 Sometimes d£vin£tas is tried
as an alternative general term. The author o~sagoge £n
Theolog£am describes his work as a divinorum summa,15 a
complete handbook to divine matters.
Out of a period of relative confusion about terminology in
the first half of the twelfth century, theolog£a can be seen to
be gradually making its way to its ultimate position as 'l'usage
normal' to describe the study of theology as an academic
discipline. The discipline it covered was very different in its
scope and conception from that which the ancient Greeks
would have recognized (if we can speak of theolog£a in such
terms at all among the Greeks).16 But the Greeks left the
legacy of the word itself, along with terms for the theologian
himself (Latinized as theologus) and the verb 'to theologize'
to describe the activity of doing theology.17
12 PL 188.1141-3, Book I of Anselm's Dialogus is edited by G. Salet (Paris, 1966). 13 Anselmi Opera Omnia, I.173.2. 14 Petrus' Lombardus, Sententiae, Spicilegium Bonaven.turianum, IV (Rome,
1971), p. 55, Book I, Dist. i, Ch. i, para. i.
15 Ysagoge in Theologiam, p. 64.18. V 16 F. Kattenbusch, 'Die Enstehung einer Christlichen Theologie', Zeitschrift I fur theologie und Kirche, ix (1930), 161, 169.
17 8eoAO,¥La, 8eoAo,¥eiv, 8eoAo'¥os.
The Academic Amb£ence

Riviere has suggested that Peter Abelard was the principal scholar to give a lead here, chiefly perhaps because of the title he gave his Theolog£a Christz'ana. 18 Certainly St. Bernard described Abelard as theologus as though he thought he had set himself up as a master in a new discipline Habemus in Francia novum de veteri mag£stro theologum 19 ('we have in France an old master turned new theologian'); he mockingly calls him: theologus noster. But Pseudo-Dionysius is referred to as theologus by some of Abelard's contemporaries,2o and the term was certainly not confined to Abelard.
We shall come closer to the origins of the new approach and the new sense of theology as an academic discipline if we look, not at Abelard, but at a group of commentaries edited (since Riviere wrote) by Father Haring: the work of Gilbert of Poitiers, Thierry of Chartres, Clarenbald of Arras, and
21

others on Boethius' opuscula sacra. Abelard himself was not, it appears, one of the scholars who took a special interest in these works, and they remained, during his life­time, something of a specialist study. Nevertheless, Thierry of Chartres and Gilbert of Poitiers did a great deal to popular­ize them as suitable for commentary in the schoolroom, although they continued to be regarded, with some justifica­tion, as obscure and difficult; they certainly lent themselves best to the close, patient study of the text in which these masters excelled. This method helped to focus attention on specific words, and particularly terms which seemed to refer to important notions and which had, at the same time, a certain novelty.
The textbook which confronted the problem of the

definition of an academic theolog£a most directly was "~h!.s' De Trinitate. In his Prologue he refers to the inner­m~st disciRline of philosop?y: int!~aP~£l.!!.~~'P-h£ae q,isCJ:'1JHna. 22 ThIS falls mto three: ethzca, speculafzva and rationaliS:J:3 In
_____J~.O'-~~-r'.e..-~_,~--o--'o'= ._~~~.~.",.~,._._·,""'C_~,,",~·~"""'_~~-""--"
18 Riviere, op. cit., p. 50; 19 PL 182.1055.
20 Thierry of Chartres, p. 246.63.
21 Gilbert of Poitiers, Clarenbald ofArras, and Thierry ofChartres.
22 Theological Tractates, p. 4. Boethius is not the originator of these classifica­


tions; something similar is to be found in Proclus' commentary on the first book of Euclid'& Elements, and elsewhere in Neoplatonic writings. See, too, Thierry of Chartres, p. 125.26-9, Aristotle Met. VI, 1025b-l026a. Zeno divided philosophy into logic, ethics, and physics. 23 Theological Tractates, p. 4.

32
Chapter II he explains that s~may be divid~d into three branches, naturalis or natural science, n:i(l}h,f!11}aty;a and theo!qgi(J,' 24 Theol~gythus emerges ~s a subdivision ~f ~ne of the-three principal subdivisions of phIlosophy -and, mCIde~t­ally, as a disciplina,25 a subject of acade~mc study at least ~n Boethian terms, if not in quite the way It was to develop m
the twelfth century. . . . . Boethius takes us a little further than thIS mto the defmI­tion of theologia. Having 'placed' the study of theol~gy, h.e describes its scope. It deals not with form and matter m theIr embodiment in moving and corporeal things, as natural science does nor like mathematics, with pure form (which
also has co;pore~l associations), but with the motionless, distinct and incorporeal divine substan~e', for ~he sub.st~~ce of God lacks matter and motion'.26 ThIs workmg defmItIOn did very well for those branches of theology with w~ich Boethius is concerned, and to which Abelard largely restncts himself in the Theologt'a Christiana -the study of the Divine Nature and the Trinity. It was another matter to extend the term to include the theology of redemption, sacramentolo~, and the many other matters which Honorius Augustodun~nsIs brings together in his comprehensive handb~ok, t?e Eluczdar­ium, early in the twelfth century. Hono~lUs ~Id not yet, perhaps, see theology as a whole. He has wntten m answer t.o 'certain little questions' (quaedam quaestiuncula),27 and hIS chief concession to the demands of the schoolroom has been to arrange them in an orderly fashion. Yet Honorius .was much-travelled and a great eclectic. He knew what questIO~s were being asked among h~s conteml?~ra?es. W~en we set h~s work, for all its comparatIve superfIcIalIty, beSIde Abelard s it is clear that Boethius' definition of theology had to be greatly stretched if it was to meet the needs of the twelfth­century schools. The new theology had to include the study of the Bible, with which Boethius is not at all concerned, as well as a great many matters of doctrine and practice, some of central importance, some peripheral, but all of them
24 Ibid., p. 8. 25 Thierry of Chartres, p. 130.92-5. 26 Theological Tractates, p. 8. , , , 27 L'Eucidarium et les lucidaires, ed. Y. Lefevre, Bibliotheque des ecoles francaises d'Athenes et de Rome, clxxx (1954).
The Academic Ambience

demanding a place in a complete syllabus of theological studies by the twelfth century.
Abelard himselCQJ.'{!"Y~ Au~ein forming his con­ception of theologia;2 8 here he had access to a tradition which took an altogether larger view of the scope of theology, but which had disadvantages to equal those of Boethius' definition, if of an exactly opposite kind. Where Boethius' definition was too narrow for twelfth-century purposes, Augustine's was too broad. Augustine grew up in the late­classical world. He knew that the pagan idea of theology included the study of myths, the stuff of the ancient poets. The pagans recognized a political role for theology -the proper conduct of public worship was regarded as an important contributing factor in maintaining the strength and stability of the state. Moreover, since some thinkers have regarded the world itself as divine, the study of the natural world may itself constitute a form of theology.29 Tertullian describes the three branches of theology like this (after Varro): 'One branch is physics, with which the philosophers deal, another myth, which is the concern of poets, the third rational which each people chooses for itself'. 30 Some of these notions had a place in the pagan world for which there was no exact parallel in the twelfth century;it was not perhaps difficult for medieval thinkers to set aside what Augustine had to say about 'poetic' and 'civil' theology. Naturalis theo­logia, however, posed special problems for them because it touched on the subject-matter of their own secular arts and philosophy,31 and because the questions it raised were of pressing contemporary interest.
Augustine provided Abelard with a good deal of help on the specific problem of deciding the relation between philo­sophy and theology.32 This twelfth-century scholars saw as
28 Compare Augustine, De Civitate Dei, VIII, 2, and Theologia Christiana, p.

148.541.
29 See Kattenbusch, op. cit.; P. Batiffol, 'Theologia, theologi' Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis, V (1928), 205-20; A. H. Armstrong, St. Augustine and Christian Platonism (Villanova, 1967).
30 Tertullian, Ad Nationes, II. 1. 31 De Civitate Dei, VIII contains Augustine's most extended thoughts on these matters. 32 Theologia Christiana, II, passim, where the emphasis is principally on matters of ethics.
the main issue, without some resolution of which theology could not take its place among the accepted disciplines of the schools. It is possible, says Augustine, to be a philosopher who takes no account of the idea of God, but he argues that the highest philosophies are those which have attempted to be theologies, too. Natural theology in particular he regards as the attempt of pagan philosophers to think about God by the light of natural reason. He proposes to examine how far philosophy can go by such means, and to test the effective­ness of philosophical methods for the theologian's purpose. In order to do so, he leaves out of consideration a good many philosophical topics which he feels to be irrelevant because they have nothing to do with theology. He does not try to oppose or compare the two disciplines point by point or to maintain that there is any full-scale correspondence in their differences. But for Augustine theologt'a is far from being a mere subdivision of ph£losophz'a. It is the measure against which philosophy's highest achievements are to be tested. It is a study of an intrinsically hi~her order than philosophy, as it was for Philo of Alexandria 3 (who would probably have
found himself in some sympathy with Hugh of St. Victor's statement that the 'lower wisdom' of secular studies, rightly ordered: recte ord£nata, leads to higher wisdom (ad superiorem conducit)).34 Hugh of St. Victor saw the human sciences which made use of reasoning and which were primarily con­cerned with the things of the natural world, as disciplines of a more lowly kind, whose purpose was to serve as a means of approach to a higher understanding of the divine. William of Conches, with a similar sense that the human sciences are straightforwardly serviceable for the purpose, describes theology as a !!!:1i!L.d&.Jiiuinis, reasoning applied to the divine35 (Theos enim est_de_'U:~~J2g!)5..1Jl.tiQ).36
'-Bul'Side<-by~side with the new sense of the magnificence of theological knowledge in comparison with the knowledge attainable by philosophy alone, the Boethian scheme is still to .be found. In his commentary on the Timaeus William of
33 See H. Chadwick, Philo of Alexandria, Cambridge History of Later Greek
and Early Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1967).
34 De Sacramentis Ecclesiae, Book I, pro!. i, PL 176.185.
35 William of Conches, op. cit., p. 61.2, the Accessus in Timaeum.
36 Ibid., cf. Thierry ofChartres, p. 70.86-7.

The Academic Ambience
Conches speaks of the parts of philosophy, among them theologt'a. 37 It was still the usual practice of the day for a schoolmaster to introduce his pupils to the study of a new book by means of an accessus, a list of standard explanations of such matters as the authorship, the title, the author's purpose in writing the work, its value, and the place it occupied in the scheme ofstudies, that is 'under what division of philosophy it falls' (cui parte philosophiae supponatur). Philosophz'a retained its meaning as a term to describe the carapace under which all learning was gathered.
The keynote of all these early attempts to define the scope of the discipline of theology, however, is an emphasis on its concern with the search for knowledge about God. Peter Abel~rd says that an enlightened pagan philosopher, a lover of WIsdom not human but divine, is admirable in so far as he turns his thoughts towards God.38 A philosopher may try to acquire any kind of knowledge and be rated a lover of wis­dom, although the highest sapientia is a knowledge of God. But a theologian must by definition want to know about God. It is in accordance with this principle that Augustine looked at the schools of philosophers he knew and grouped them by their beliefs. Broadly, he says, there are two views of the divine to be found among them. Some men believe that the universe itself is divine39 -a view which is given some house-room in the Timaeus. Others have moved beyond to th~ idea that the divine must transcend all things in the m~tenal world, ~nd that the world is a creation of a higher bemg. He sets aSIde all those who hold the former view and considers the others, because they come closer to the Christian position in their idea of God.
He points out that among the Platonists three views are to be found which bring them nearer to the Christian position than any other pagan philosophers.4o These are the idea that God is the first cause of everything which exists. The 'natural philosophers' have made this discovery. Secondly, God is the
37 William of Conches, op. cit., p. 62, para. VI.
38 Theologia Christiana, p. 147.538.

• 39 ~ugustine De Civitate Dei, VIII, 5. The study of the Timaeus became popular
m certam schools about the same time as that of Boethius' theological tractes. 40 De Civitate Dei, VIII, 5.


principle of reason and the source of all rational thought. This is the discovery of 'rational philosophy' or logic. Thirdly, the notion that God makes the rules of right living underlies 'moral philosophy' or ethics.41 His purpose is to find a place for philosophical studies in Christian thought; if those philo­sophers who lived before Christian times lived now, they would have found their system of thought completed and perfected by Christian teaching. If philosophy has a place lower than theology, in its higher forms it is in general sympathy with its aims, and indeed the two might be said to become one. The tenor of Augustine's account is optimistic. In so far as a philosopher seeks to know God he is studying theology and Augustine makes no distinction between the methods of thought involved at this level; in this sense, theology is philosophy for Augustine.
It is not possible for his twelfth-century successors to take so bold a view, or indeed so simple a view, because the tendency of their scholarship was to subdivide, to look for differences of method and content. They discovered a great many specific points on which the views of the philosophi proved difficult or even impossible to reconcile with Christian teaching.42 Contemporary thinkers found that the philosophi were still very much with them, in the persons of scholars who found their opinions forceful; philosophi dicunt has a certain immediacy about it in twelfth-century writings.43 Augustine's attempt to find common ground between theology and philosophy raised at least as many questions as it settled for medieval thinkers. Where Augustine saw con­sensus among the most able of pagan philosophers they began to find what Calvin calls a 'shameful diversity' among thinkers who tried to learn about God through reason and the human sciences alone.44
In his discussions of natural and civil theology and mythical or poetical theology Augustine suggests that there may be more than one kind of theologia. Pseudo-Dionysius had
41 On Augustine'S Christian philosophy in general, see R. Holte Beatitude et sagesse {Paris, 1962}. This study is primarily concerned with the teleological aspects of the thought of Augustine and the philosophers on whom he draws.
42 William of Conches op. cit., p. 62, para VI.
43 Cf. Gilbert of Poitiers, p. 127.52, p. 128.80.
44 Calvin, Institutes, 1. v. 12.

The Academic Ambience 37
implied something rather different in his teaching about the many theologies to which Thierry of Chartres refers.45 He had suggested that there might be a theology of God himself, a theology of created spirits and a pagan theology (which must be treated with contempt).46 The mid-twelfth-century Ysagoge in Theologz'am teaches that the first elements of theology have to do with the human nature (natura humana) the more advanced aspects with angelic beings (provectus in a~gelz'ca) a?~ only the consummation of the study of theology wIth the dIvme nature (consummatio autem in divina).47 The lower theologies are all theologies in the Boethian sense because they deal with spiritual beings and thus with incor­poreal things;48 but they are not all theologies in the sense common to Augustine and Boethius, that they are directed towards knowing God. Also from Pseudo-Dionysius comes the idea that theology may be either affirmative or negative tliat irm~ay-trVto--felri.is-what God. isorbe'ahie"to~sayonl; what he is not. 'The theology of negation denies that any word can apply to God.,49 Affirmative theology concedes that some things may properly be said of him.5o Almost as soon, then, as the term theologz'a came into use in the schools as a relatively technical term to describe an academic study, its reference was being further subdivided in the cause of still greater precision of usage. A great deal more might be said .about the implications of the 'many theologies', but for our Immediate purposes the importance of this development is plain enough: it is a sign that the word theologz'a was being employed by scholars who wanted to give it an academically acceptable frame of reference and to make it a more exact technical term. A determination to avoid confusion and blur~ed meaning is evident; this is perhaps an inevitable con­comItant of the attempt to impose a single label on a study at once so vast and complex and so ancient in its various
traditions.
45 Thierry afChartres, p. 246.55. 46 Ibid. 47 Ysagoge in Theologiam, p. 64.3. 48 Thierry of Chartres, p. 126.33-4. 49 Thierry of Chartres, p. 309.23. 50 Thierry of Chartres, p. 502.68-9.
\

The Academic Ambience

ii. Theology and the Three Traditions
The study of the Bible; a speculative theology which was dependent to a considerable extent upon the secular phz'lo­sophia and in particular upon the liberal arts;5 1 and a polemical or missionary theology designed to refute the views of unbelievers. These were the ingredients of the new academic theology. They are in many ways significantly different in their purposes and in the methods appropriate to them, as theologians have always found. For twelfth-century thinkers the most urgent task was to decide the ways in which these branches of theology could legitimately52 throw light upon one another and, accordingly, to superimpose a working organization of material upon them, so that they could be systematically studied. The urge to find a principle of organization was present in Hugh of St. Victor when he wrote the De Sacramentis Ecclesiae, in Rupert of Deutz and Peter Lombard and Alan of Lille and a dozen other scholars who attempted to write comprehensive theological textbooks of one kind or another. These books are so very different in form and structure that their variety alone would tell us that this was a period of experiment. But they all have in common the intention of making the study of theology orderly, and each of these authors has some concept of theology as a
distinct discipline. The Bible was the great central textbook here, but the writings of the Fathers ran it close in importance and interest in t~~ schools. ~far the 1~!K~~!~_~~__~<?~_t,,~~.!i,~Lof.!~.~_,.!hree tradlt::~~~,.~3l:~_ ~hat. of~~h.~_~!~"~Y,,~!!E~!.~.~Edp,,~!E'a. Aquinas
sets out ten pOlnts·-a:Cthe very beginning of the first book of the Sumwa Theologica, where he considers the scope and purpose of the discipline. The first nine lead up to what he sees as the principal consideration: how are we to expound Holy Scripture? The study of the Bible and the Fathers never lost its pre-eminence in the process of organization of the subject-matter of theology which went on throughout the twelfth century. The tradition was far too strong for that, and also perhaps too bulky in the sheer quantity of material
51 Rupert of Deutz. CCCM XXIV (1972). p. 2041. 52 Ibid.• p. 2040-1.
The Academic Ambience
which was available to students of Scripture from patristic times and later. For the Fathers themselves and the early medieval.scholars who came after them, th~o}Q&Y__was <;:.Qn­cer.ned ~I.tl1__.!!J.~._stl!gY.9[ the Bibl~~l1:c:ltllere was no topicof ?-~~a_t~c_~,~hI(;h_~ould not be subsum~d under t:h~th~~d­mg. There was httle need to accommodate a further tracli­'tion of speculative theology as twelfth-century scholars found it necessary to do. .
Aquinas did not find it possible to construct an order of study .which would be helpful to beginners and which, at the sa~e tIme, followed the sequence of the Bible itself. He begins WIth a treatise on the existence and nature of God, and goes ~n to look at the Trinity, creation, angels, the work of the SIX. days of creatio~, man, and the divine ordering of the UnIverse, before passmg on to other matters. This pattern of study conforms m part to the sequence of events in Genesis but it.canno~ be made to do so altogether if it is to keep t~ the hIerarchIcal arrangement of the material which seems a~propriate. to Aquinas. Systematic commentary, beginn~ng WIth G~nesIs, cannot be adjusted easily to the needs of a specu!atlVe theology which is concerned with topics of doctrn~al theory, and where the order of treatment is dictated by lOgiC rather than by the Bible. Twelfth-century scholars p.roduced a number of alternative schemes, some more con­sisten;4than others, and some quite disorderly in their treat­ment,. but all prompted by an attempt to find a way round t~e dIscrepancy between Scriptural order and the order dIctated by the demands of the classroom for a means of teaching methodically.
This discrepancy at first. resulted in some relatively piece­meal attempts to deal With one question at a time: the Senten.ces of. the S.chool of Laon, for example, or the q~aestzon:es WIth WhICh Abelard interrupts the sequences of hIS Commentary on Romans. 55 But as they increased in
53. On the notion of 'Biblical theology' see Ebeling. Wort und Glaube Vol. I
(Tubmgen 1963) p. 79 ff -----.--.... , ...., .... , "..................,... -.......5r....-~;--...~~~.-,.v.~,-~ ,t, ,.-.-,.~, .."'-""-..; • . With Ho.norius· Elucidarium. which has already been mentioned as an early at~empt .to brmg all theology together. might be compared Simon of Tournai's Dts~~tatlOnes, ed. J. Warichez. SSLov. 12 (1932). . On these developments. see B. Smalley. The Study of the Bible in the Middle Age: (Oxford 19~2). On Anselm of Laon, and the Sentences of the school. see O. Lottm. Psychologle et morale aux xiie et xiiie siecles. V (Gembloux. 1959).

number these questions came to be considered collectively and not individually, and attempts were made to arrange them systematically. The need for organization which marks the early development of an academic discipline begins to be apparent.
At the same time, scriptural commentators, too, were beginning to look at their task as a whole. Side by side with explorations of the possibility of constructing a sensible topical arrangement of issues of dogmatics went a new systematic approach to Bible study.· Hugh of St. Victor went about this by making use of secular studies as an aid. His DidascaHcon is in tended to make the reader a more competent student of Holy Scripture by giving him a training in the liberal arts; it is designed to teach him systematically all that he needs to know if he is to avoid elementary misunderstand­ings and develop sound habits of working when he reads the Bible. In his De Sacramentis Ecclesiae Hugh composed a work which comes close to being a theological summa, but it is not like Aquinas' Summa Theologt"ca; there is no question of its being anything but complementary to the study of the Bible.56
Perhaps no one tried to review the study of the Bible as a whole from so original a standpoint as Rupert of Deutz. This monastic scholar of the early twelfth century divided the subject-matter of the Bible into three, so that each section represents the work of one of the Persons of the Trinity. The conception is historical, or at least chronological, in that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are envisaged as presiding over successive ages.5 7 Rupert's arrangement does not in fact simply follow the books of the Bible in order. It may be that he originally intended that it should, since he follows such an arrangement closely throughout until he reaches the work of the Holy Spirit in Book 34. Then, having concluded his brief study of the Gospels, he is obliged to mingle material from Old and New Testament books, making special use of
56 He intends both approaches to work together at the level of close reading and detailed solution of specific difficulties.
57 Rupert of Deutz, De Trinitate et Operibus Eius, ed. R. Haacke, CCCM XXI­XXIV, XXI, p. 122. On Rupert's life and work, see D. M. MagrassiTeologia e storia nel pensiero di Ruperto di Deutz (Rome, 1959).
The Academic Ambience
Romans (Book 37) in order to finish his plan. Even if the scheme as he originally conceived it could not be worked out with the elegance and simplicity he might have wished, it is, in its essence, very straightforward. He has made the experiment of providing an organizing principle which will be readily understood by any reader, which is workable and flexible for the author himself, and which has the additional merit of accommodating both what the Bible says about the nature of God and what it teaches about him through historical events. Thus Rupert includes a study of the doctrine of the Trinity and an enquiry into God's actions in the world in a sequence of Bible-study. This cannot be called an academic theology in any sense Aquinas would have recognized, though it had some following in the work of the succeeding centuries.58 But Rupert's attempt to bring every­thing the Bible says about God to order, to organize and sub­divide his material, has been prompted by that urge to arrange large bodies of material for study which was soon to show itself as the characteristic pattern of development in the schools of the twelfth century. One of the first requirements of an academic study is that its subject-matter shall be looked at as a whole by those engaged in it, with a view to its re­duction to some sort of order. In that sense, Rupert of Deutz must be rated one of these early forerunners, a man of grand vision, who did not yet perhaps see what kind of a study theology was to become, but who felt the first pressure of the need to make it an integrated discipline and tried to meet it.
Rupert seems undaunted by the size of such an under­taking. The desire to achieve a broad view of the whole has provided the motive force for a very ambitious exercise. PeJ~r Lombard, too, possessed the ability to organize his material, fogeiher: with the desire to provide a book which will be all­embracing, which such an undertaking requires. At the begin­ning of his Sentences he says that he has put together the opinions of the Fathers in a short book (brevi volumine com­plicans Patrum sententias) so that it will not be necessary for his readers to search through many volumes. He hopes to
58 On Rupert's immediate influence, see H. Lubac EJCJrgese.m.ediev.allL(Aubier,
1961 ) ,-2vols~;-il1-P:-227~ _.._. ---......... _---..-..-.--­

save them labour.59 But he has done more. He has arranged
1,)" the sententz'ae in an order which is independent of that of the books of the Bible and he has tried to provide easily­grasped principles of arrangement to make them accessible. He points out that every study has to do with things them­selves or with symbols of things (de rebus vel de sz'gnz's) and that the Bible is concerned with both. It furnishes a complete doctrz'na or body of learning in itself.60 The thinking of the theologians (theologorum speculatz'o) has therefore only to keep to the rules indicated in Holy Scripture to arrive at the truth.61 His scheme was so successful in making itself accept­able to succeeding generations that in Aquinas' youth the Sentences constituted the chief textbook on theology, after the Bible itself. That may be put down in part to the way in which Peter Lombard had (as he had intended to do) made it unnecessary for most students to read the Fathers for themselves at all. His textbook had the appeal of a convenient reference-book to works which would otherwise have been important reading matter in themselves. He cannot be said to have written a summa of theology in Aquinas' sense. But side by side with the development of the glossa ordz'narz'a, the standard school commentary on the Bible which he himself helped to fix in its twelfth-century form,62 the handbook of Sentences kept the study of Scripture in the central position it had always occupied and encouraged the taking of a grand view of the whole of the Bible rather than a concentration upon individual books. St. Bernard speaks of the definition of faith as the first threshold of theology (the prz'mum Hmen),63 as several of his contemporaries do; this was the ppint of de­parture for a study of dogmatics in which numerous questions and answers of varying degrees of importance had to be dealt with systematically. It is exactly this phenomenon which Aquinas says has made him feel so strongly the need for a unified treatment.64 Peter Lombard was trying to meet a
59 Petrus Lombardus, Sententiae, Prologue, para. 5.
60 Ibid., Book I, Dist. i, ch. i, para. i. 61 Ibid., Book I, Dist. i, ch. i. para. ii.
62 See B. Smalley, op. cit., p. 64. 63 PL 182.1061.
64 Summa Theologica, Prologue.
The Academz'c Ambz'ence
need which had become clear to him as he taught -the need of a student in a busy school for a convenient work of refer­ence. Rupert's monastic readers did not have to contend with the pressure of an ever-growing syllabus of studies. He could allow himself a leisureliness of treatment denied to Peter Lombard and his pupils.
Rupert's very different conception of the purpose of 'doing theology' is made. plain in the letter he addressed to Bishop Thietmar with his commentary on the Song of Songs. He sees exposition of the Bible as a form of preaching 'The bells of the divine words are golden', he says (Nam verba dz'vz'na tz'ntz'nabula sunt aurea).65 By commenting on Scripture Rupert is making its sound ring out. He hopes the sound is pleasing.66 He is engaged in the first of the three forms of exegesis which St. Jerome had distinguished: the homily, the commentary, and the schoHa (or detailed notes on especially difficult passages). This desire to preach was the inspiration of Augustine's homiletic scriptural commentaries and of Gregory the Great's MoraHa on the book ofJob. The spirit of Rupert's grand new view of Scriptural commentary as a whole is still close to the monastic tradition of lectz'o dz'vz'na from which it proceeds, and which is founded on patristic exegesis. He praises Thietmar for being studz'osus et z'ntentus ... lectz'onz' dz'vz'na,67 zealous and industrious in holy reading.
There was an element of the devotional in the monastic study of the Bible which is far less in evidence in the academic study of Scripture in the schools. 'The faithful mind', says Rupert, 'dwells on the word of God.'68 There 'ought to be a great fervour' in the work.69 For monastic scholars the studz'um sacrae scrz'pturae continued to be a 'zeal' as well as a 'study', a passion as well as an investigation. There is every reason to suppose that some of the academic theologians of the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries saw it in this light still, yet the element of fervour necessarily became a mere
65 Rupert of Deutz, Commentary on the Song of Songs, ed. R. Haacke, CCCM XXVI, p. 3.10-11. 66 Ibid., p. 4.57. :' Ibid., p. 3.9. 68 Prologue, ibid., p. 5.18. 9 Prologue, De Victoria Verbi Dei, cd. R. Haacke, MGH, Quellen, V (1970),
p.4.5.

The Academz"c Ambz"ence

adjunct to a syllabus which dealt with what can be known and learnt by the rational methods which lend themselves to systematic teaching. Mystical and devotional writing increas­ingly became the province of monastic scholarship and the clarifying and fresh organization of the subject-matter of Holy Scripture for study in the schools involved some loss of an element indispensable to the purposes of lectz"o dz"vz"na.
For the strongest influence in forming the new conception of orderliness and rational method in the treatment of Scripture and dogmatics we must look to the liberal arts. The author of the Ysagoge z"n Theolog£am emphasizes that the scz"entz"arum z"nstrumen'ta, the instruments of the sciences, are definition, division, and argumentation or comparison.7o With the aid of this scientific method it is possible to arrange and work upon the subject-matter (subz"ectam artare materiam) of any discipline. It is proposed that the same instruments should be used in theolog£a, that they shall be borrowed for use in what is already being treated as another academic discipline. By this means, argues our author, an orderly treatment of Holy Scripture and all the questions it raises may be attempted, and a clear explanation provided.7 1
The use of the artes was by no means as uncontroversial as

it ·is···madE··lo·appear ··here:··Beinar~·write;i·in··i:CTeher to
Cardinal Stephen that Peter Abelard had been introducing
beginners in dialectic who can barely grasp the first elements
of the faith (quz" . . . prz"ma jZ"dez" elementa vix sustinere
possunt)72 to the mystery of the Holy Trinity. Abelard him­
self, he claims elsewhere, is an old master of the arts turned
new theologian (novum de veterz" magz"stro theologum ),73
himself a rank beginner in the higher study, who presumes to
teach what he does not yet understand. Bernard's objection is
not principally to Abelard's conception of the scope of the
subject or of the way in which it may be organized, but to
the specific errors into which he is led when he applies the
techniques of the artes to the study of Holy Scripture. Had
.the_!l!'t!"! d~~<: no more_lhar:!_suggest methods of arrimging
a!-HLdivii:IinKlh.:_~~!n}!terial.J.oLc.QQ._~!.aetat16n-Hiere-might-have
------.--~.--..---~-.,--.--~--.~.--.-~-..
70 Ysagoge in Theologiam, p. 64.7-11. 71 Ibid., p. 64.25. 72 PL 182.537,Letter331. 73 PL 182.1055, Letter 190.
The Academz"c Ambz"ence
~_~~~ less ~ty. But the~!:!g!l.L!>cholars to argue, and Bernaro's particular objectron is that they provided-a ready but specious facility in handling deep questions. Without a solid foundation of years of reflective study of Holy Scripture Peter Abelard merely 'raves' about the Bible (nunc in Scrz"pturz"s sanctz"s insanz"t).74 The two methods of approach, the tradition of slow absorption through lectio divina, and that of rapid over-all mastery through the study of the artes, ground against one another with increasing force as the detailed implications of their differences became apparent. The study of the artes provided not only a stimulus to order­liness but also a good deal of contradiction of purpose.
The emotional energy which was generated in this way makes itself felt in the Prologue to Peter Lombard's Sentences. The work was, he says, conceived as a defensive exercise against propounders of false doctrine,75 as much as a con­venient. r~feren.c~ book for students with a limited knowledge of patnstIc wntmgs. The 'unbelievers' or dialectici haeretici of !~esch()()ls causea'li:s-rJiuch-a:nxiety'asthc'self-confessed
h-···· d Ii-' Id,~"" .f . .. .. ................ -. '" ... " .............................

eret~~~.._~~_.~.g..._ex~.Q....Qtb,~r.J<iYJfis.Jo whom most of the better-known scholars of the day addressed themselves in at least one treatise. The opposition to orthodox teaching on all fronts posed a threat to the survival of a tradition of sound doctrine which it is difficult for us now to assess. It was not perhaps as great .as that which faced the Christians of the first centuries whose task was to lay down the lines of that tradition. The task of the twelfth-century scholar was to maintain it, and to find means of accommodating newly­perceived difficulties in the general scheme. But it is not necessarily easier to keep to a road than to find it in the first place, and dialecticians had a way of altering the signposts of thought which made it difficult for many of their pupils to lay hold on a reassuring sense of direction.
The academic theologians of the twelfth century developed their academic methods in the face of a strongly-felt threat to orthodoxy. Yet the effect of the existence of unbelievers was far from being a negative one. We are dealing with a
74 Ibid. 75 Prologue, p. 4.

polemical or missionary rather than an apologetic theology. Perhaps the most positive result of the abrasive contact of the three branches of theology with one another was the way in which it encouraged the development of the clear thinking and precision of language which traditionally identify the academic discipline -and which are, indeed, what make it a
discipline.
4. Method
It was said that Gilbert of Poitier's teaching was difficult for beginners to understand (novis obscurior) but that to more advanced students he seemed to give a full and sound treat­ment (sed provectis compendiosior et solidior videbatur).l This was worthy ofremark because few of his contemporaries made the same difficulties for the beginners among their pupils. A great deal of effort went into making the subject­matter of the arts clear and straightforward. Above all that meant being methodical. This presented no special difficulty to the master who lectured on the textbooks of the liberal arts if he confined himself to the rather limited procedure of following the text and explaining each obscure point and un­familiar word as it arose. The Scriptural commentator could do much the same for Scripture. But these relatively straight­forward procedures appeared less satisfactory at the begin­ning of the twelfth century than they had done a hundred years earlier, because questions were now being raised ­even in the elementary schoolroom it seems2 -which could not be settled quickly and without reference to other texts
and other masters' opinions. One response to this was to pause long enough in the exposition to treat each problem separately as a question or quaest£o.3 But what was involved was something more than a mechanical difficulty which made it necessary to interrupt the flow of exposition.
It was also a methodological difficulty increasingly often
I Historia Pontificalis, p. 27.
2 Abelard gives an example from his own days as a pupil, Abelard, Dialectica,

p. 59. -----.:..-­
<--~-3'-Abelard's Commentary on Romans in interrupted by a series of quaestiones of this kind. On the development of the gloss and the quaestio see B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Oxford, 1952), Chapter 2.
The Academic Ambience

presented by the comparison of one text with another. In the later twelfth century, 'in the Sentences of Peter of Poitiers, for example, it is possible to see the beginnings of the tech­nique the scholastic theologians of the thirteenth century evolved to meet this difficulty. Peter introduces questions with some such expressions as: 'It is asked whether' or: 'It is often asked'. He then gives a set of explanations to show that a given view 'seems to hold' or 'does not seem to hold' (quod vide tu r, quod non videtur).4 This is not as yet systematically done, but it was becoming urgently necessary to devise a method which would allow comparisons to be made between the viewpoints of different authorities, or between the rules and principles of the different arts, or between the principles of secular studies and the study of the Bible.
Descartes wrote a Discourse sur la Methode, a treatise on the method. When it becomes clear that a problem of method exists, the first need is to determine whether a universal method may be applicable to all kinds of study or whether each has its own peculiar rules. At the beginning of the De Hebdomadibus Boethius tries to define the nature of an axiom. It is, he says, the self-evident notion which everyone understands and accepts as soon as he hears it. These are, he suggests, 'common'; they are communes animi conceptiones.5 But there are two kinds of axiom, those which are mere commonplaces, and those which seem axiomatic only to educated people who understand how they have been derived from the fundamental axioms which are obvious to everyone. Gilbert of Poitiers is quick to identify these more advanced axioms with the rules or principles of the liberal arts. Each art, he suggests, has its own kind of axiom: rhetoric has topics or commonplaces, dialectic has major premisses, geo­metry has theorems, and so on.6 These self-evident notions are not dead statements; they do not constitute an end in themselves, rather they are useful instruments for the student of the art in question. Out of them the peculiar methodology of each art develops. They are, in other words, the rules of the arts, the laws which distinguish them from one another,
4 Sententie Petri Pictavensis, ed. P. S. Moore, M. Dulong (Notre Dame, Indiana, 1943), I. xv, and see p. xix on regulae.
5 Theological Tractates, p. 40. 6 Gilbert ofPoitiers, p. 189.67-p. 190.75.


and which are not transferable without qualification or modification. Alan of Lille took Gilbert's account a little further in his Regulae Theologicae, in order to show how the same view of the distinctiveness of different methods may help to place theology among the traditional disciplines. Theology too has its rules. These are pre-eminent over all others in their difficulty and subtlety (sui obscuritate et subtilz"tate caeteris preeminentes).7 They are essentially more difficult rules, of another order than the rules of the secular arts and pagan philosophy. Indeed they carry a categorical necessity which is even greater than the obviousness of other axioms
(necessitas theologiarum maximarum absoluta est et irre­frag£bilis),8 both in se and quoad nos. Like the laws of other disciplines they are instruments of argument. Cicero defines an argument as that which creates belief,9 and Alan emphasizes that this is exactly the function of theological laws (fidem faciunt).10 The beliefs they create are not open to modification by deed or action or by anything in nature. Therefore theological method carries more weight of con­
viction than any other.
But while the rules of the liberal arts are not difficult to
discover from the traditional textbooks, the laws of theology
are not so easily found. Alan has had to formulate them him­
self, restating principles he has borrowed from the arts for
the purpose, and arguably he has not entirely succeeded in
fulfilling the promise of his high claims for them. Before he
begins, he concedes that theological axioms are mysterious;
they are paradoxae, aenigmata, emblemata, grasped, in so far
as they are grasped at all, by the most refined acuteness of the
mind (puriore mentis acumine comprehenduntur). They are
self-evident only to the deepest levels of the mind (intus £n
mente latentia).ll The theory of distinctiveness of method
serves well enough to locate theology among the other dis­
ciplines in a general way, but only Alan attempted to work
out its implications in a comprehensive theory in the twelfth
8 Ibid.
7 PL 210.621-2.
PL 210.622. 11 Ibid.
• Cicero, Topics, 11.8. 10
The Academic Ambience
century, and he found that immense practical difficulties stood in his way.
Gilbert of Poitiers was concerned rather with the particular difficulties which arose when the methods of one discipline were adapted for use in another. John of Salisbury explains that he believed that the disciplines were interrelated (con­nexae) and that they could serve the theologian directly, but he was anxious to confine the rules of each discipline to matters for which they :were appropriate (et cohibebat omnium regulas £nfra proprii genens l£mitem ).12 The authors of a number of school textbooks on logic shared Gilbert's interest in the regulae and prz'ncip£a proper to each discipline. They tell us that a rule (regula) is so-called because it governs or directs the practitioner of an art. A principle (principium) derives its name from the fact that it is the first thing to be learned in the art. A maxim (maxima) is named after the great force of necessity (maxima necessitas) it carries. A pre­cept (preceptum) is so-called because it instructs the practitioner of the art what he is to do. A topic (locus) is a subdivision or 'place' in which a section of the art is con­tained.13 A knowledge of the rules gives the beginner a great sense of security, and as long as the rules proper to each art were confined to it, the new developments in method served exactly the purpose for which they were designed. They made it easier for beginners to learn. But the temptation to tryout the rules of one disciplin.e in another was strong, especially when it became possible to treat theology as an academic discipline.
If we are to argue that a methodical approach is the key­note of the new developmentwe must look for evidence that twelfth-century scholars were seeking a special method for the use of theologians. Thierry of Chartres does so by com­paring theological method not with the methods of individual arts but, more generally, with philosophical method. On some matters, he says, the philosophers agree with Holy Scripture (philosophi cum sane tis scripturz's concordant)· on
14 '
others they do not. Abelard points out that there are false
12 History,:, Ponti/ic,alis, p. 27.
13 LM 1111 p. 357.12-6, lntroductiones Parisienses; p. 379.2-8, Logica ut dicit.
14 Thierry o/Chartres, p. 74.91-4.


The Academic Ambience

philosophers (pseudo-philosophi, w~o may be ~ompa~ed
with the false theologians or heretIcs); they bemg phIlo­
sophical reasons against Christian~ and they can b~ met o?ly
on their own ground, for they wIll accept only phIlosophIcal
reasoning.15 The methods of the two disciplines had t? be se~
side by side for comparison if only because the phzlosophz
were still making their presence felt in contemporary discussions. In Thierry of Chartres's commentaries on Boethius there are a number of references to 'philosophizing' and 'theologiz­ing' which suggest that the techniques appropriate to each were clearly distinguished in Thierry's mind. He accuses the man who 'claims falsely that there are many unities' of 'not philosophizing correctly'.16 Theologians who philosophise about God (theolog?-' qui de Deo philosophantur)17 are hkely to go astray because they are attempting to use .the metho~s of one discipline in the context of another. ThIerry and hIS pupils refer to 'speaking theologically' (theologice loqui),18 . 'thinking theologically' (ita theologice de Trinitate senten­diendum est),19 and, again, 'speaking theologically' (theo­logice dicere).2o The last is of particular interest because Thierry believes that this is what Hilary of Poitiers taught; he does not see the notion of 'speaking theologically' as any­thing new.
In their analyses of Boethius' arguments in the theological tractates Thierry ofS;!t~'!:~.!E~~.(:t9jlber~_?fX<:>i!,i~rs discuss theologicaliiiidphilosophical 'reasons'. Thierry explains at
one point that Boethius is using 'Arguments taken from theological sources [or topics] , that is, he draws his argument.s from theology (sed deinceps utetur ad hoc argumentzs sumptis ex locis theologt'cis, i.e. trahet argumenta ex theo­
· .)21
h I
logic a ). He defends them (secundu~ t eo ogzcas .ratzon~s . The idea that theological, mathematical, and phYSICal ratzones carry different weights in different contexts is frequently put
15 Theologia Christiana, p. 297.1033-7. 16 Thierry of Chartres, p. 90.19.
17 Ibid., p. 543.74. 18 Ibid., p. 224.42. 19 Ibid., p. 224.41.
20 Ibid., p. 501.58; cf. PL 10.51, and Augustine De Trinitate, VI.I0.11.
21 Ibid., p. 137.43-5.
The Academic Ambience

forward to explain an anomaly,22 as is the principle that philosophi and ethici and logici and theologici use words in differen t ways.2 3 Philosophi and theolofJ1:'ci with their modes of~~~<:>~~l!g,~!"e<::orltr~ste~~\Vitll<?!1:e~~tIi~!,~jrec;:tly/4 We
are usually expected to understand the difference without explanation. Although this tendency to assume a knowledge in the reader indicates that the distinction was quite com­monly understood -at least among the pupils of Thierry and Gilbert themselves -it leaves a good deal obscure to the modern reader. Thierry says that he speaks secundum theo­logicas rationes when he says that there are three Persons in the Godhead and yet there is no plurality. He pauses to explain that 'theological reasons' are subject to 'theological considerations' (secundum considerationem theologice), but the nature of theological considerations in general is not made plain. Thierry restricts himself to an account of the differences between the mathematical laws governing plurality and those which operate in the case of the Trinity.25 Thierry, like many of his immediate contemporaries, has far more to tell us about the details of his development of specific pieces of theological method than about its essential differences from philosophical and other methods. The process seems to have been not unlike that which John Bunyan describes in his The Authors Apology before Pilgrim's Progress:
For having now my Method by the end,
Still as I pull'd, it came; and so I penn'd
It down; until at last it came to be,
For length and breadth the bigness which you see.


What is lacking in broad vision is made up for in per­serverance, and Thierry and his fellows were to make it possible for later generations to see the issues involved more largely, and to attach more than a nominal significance to the recognition that theological method is different from philo­sophical method.
In the Dialectica which has traditionally been ascribed to
:: Gi!bert of Poitiers, p. 89.12; p. 294-90. 23 Ibid., p. 243.12. Ibid., p. 194.78-87. 25 Thierry of Chartres, p. 154.19-p. 155.22.


Augustine26 a distinction is made between the facultas d£a­lect£cae and the dialectica disciplina, skill in dIalectic and the formal discipline of dialectic. The author's meaning is made a little clearer by an example. The speeches of Cicero, he says, are examples of rhetorical skill (rhetoricae facultat£s) but they do not directly teach rhetoric (non in his docetur rhetorica}.27 They are not, in other words, manuals of instruction. In Cicero himself facultas seems to have the sense of a natural gift (facultas ab natura profecta). He contrasts it with the gift developed by study and practice, with ars, studium, and exerdtatt'o. 28 (Not until the thirteenth century did facultas come to refer to an academic institution, or to the department of such an institution in which a particular discipline or group of disciplines was studied -the 'faculty of arts' or the 'faculty of theology'.} Twelfth-century usage is much closer to that of earlier writers. When Gilbert of Poitiers says that facultates 'differ according to the kind of
thing with which they are concerned: that is, natural, mathe­matical,. theological, civil, rational',29 he sees the faculties as specialized skills. Thierry of Chartres, too, thought that when Boethius distinguished natural science from mathematics and theology he meant it to be understood that each study required a different skill.30 But these are by no means un­trained native skills; facultas is already something more than plain ability. A discipline is involved.
Moreover, this is a discipline which is taught by rote and rule, not learned by imitation. Twelfth-century students worked from the ancient manuais of rhetoric, rather than from Cicero's orations. The aim of their training was not primarily to make them performers in the discipline concerned, competent in framing arguments, able to make a stirring
26 For a recent study of this work, see J.. Pepin, S. Augustin etla Dialectique (Wetteren, 1976). On facultas see B. Geyer, 'Facultas theologica: eine bedeutings­geschichtliche Untersuchung', Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, 75 (1964),133­
45. 27 PL 32.1411.
. 28 De Inventione, I.i.2. Compare Gerhoch's quite different sense offacultas in his Letter to Pope Hadrian, ed. N. M. Haring (Toronto, 1974), p. 23. The word has a non-technical sense, too, in the twelfth century.
29 Gilbert of Poitiers, p. 115.2-6.
30 Thierry of Chartres, p. 68.15;p. 71.11.

The Academic Ambience

speech, able to write correct Latin (although many of them derived these benefits from it), but to give them a mastery of the theory of the subject. The treatment of method was not, therefore, designed to develop a knowledge or practical methods of putting the subject-matter of the discipline to use. It served chiefly to show what kinds of differences existed between the disciplines at a theoretical level, to suggest what kinds of question might be helpful and what kinds of question were simply irrelevant to the concerns of a particular discipline. The moulding and polishing of a native ability to do something, gave way to the refinement and development of the theory of the way it should be done. Facultas, in its ancient sense, became disciplz'na. And the facult~tes which had been turned into disciplines became, in the thIrteenth century, institutions in their own right. There could scarcely be a more striking illustration of the way in which the built-in laws of the traditional disciplines imposed a structure upon the development of the schools as institu­tions.
The methods proper to each discipline were distinguished; but they were also borrowed and exchanged for one another, in .the hope .of solving the apparently intractable problems whIch arose In those borderline areas where grammar over­lapped with dialectic, dialectic with rhetoric, dialectic with arithmetic. Nomen and verbum are parts of speech yet nouns and verbs are the building-blocks of a dialectical proposition. Arguments by analogy (t'nductz'o, exemplum) are properly the province of the rhetoricians, but they may be used in dialectic, too, and the rhetoricians adapted the formal syllogism for use in the more informal and variable enthy­m~me. 9uantity is one of the dialectical categories, but anthmetic is concerned with quantity, too, with magnitude and multitude, with discrete and continuous quantity. The more deeply the disciplines were studied the more difficult it became to ignore these difficulties and to keep the study of a given subject within bounds. Indeed there was no reason to do so. These are extremely interesting questions of common terminology and borrowed method.
.' Such comparisons and contrasts became more interesting stIll when they were extended to the new discipline of

The Academ£c Amb£ence

theology. Aquinas points out that God is a being who does not belong to a class.31 The study of what can be known about him must therefore contain elements which are quite peculiar to theology and which have a kinship with other studies only by courtesy. But even if the whole of the theologian's work must be carried out by analogy, as some writers have insisted, it must make use of the aids provided by the most highly developed human arts and sciences. Habits of thought are persistent, and a man with a trained mind will not find it easy to approach a new problem in a way which owes nothing to his training. He is more likely to try to modify or adapt his training. to make it applicable to the job in hand. That is what Christian theologians had done from the beginning. The teaching of the Bible had been supplemented from the first by explanations and interpreta­
tions. A complili,_int~J:l!~tLS_QI!~isJ~l!1,_9:()~tE!I!<l:~_~Y~~ was fa~ne_(till th_~.Ji!]_cChri!'!1i~D-__~('!}}j:!!ri~LWitlL!~~_~d of flie most sophis~c:.~trJ:L_$_t':G.l!l~LJ;lisflQ!Lnes:._!!.!~!~..haLfll~':l:ys Deen pliifosoEliy._~l!_ghri~!il;!n._th~()lggy. The experiments of tweTffll':-century scholars were not, therefore, entirely new, and in many respects they were timid and repetitious if they are compared with the boldness of Augustine or Boethius in attempting a reconciliation between secular and holy learn­ing. But cautiously and systematically these scholars set about making so thorough a reconciliation that the secular arts could be applied to theological problems at every point where there was a natural or traditional point of contact, not by pioneers in the history of thought only, but bY'pupils who were still almost beginners -as Aquinas' readers of the Summa Theolog£a were. They reduced great problems to manageable dimensions, subjected them to simple procedures and wrought out of a vast complex of discussion something which is recognizably a body of academic disciplines.
Peter Abelard opens his commentary on Romans with the statement that 'every divine scripture is designed, like a rhetorical oration, to teach or to move' (omn£s scr£ptura d£v£na more orat£on£s rhetoricae aut docere £ntend£t aut movere).32
31 Aquinas, Summa Theologica. I, Q.3, Art.5.
32 Abelard, Comm. Rom., p. 41.5-6; cf. Augustine De Doctrina Christiana, IV.

xvii. 34; Cicero, Orator, 21.69.
The Academ£c Amb£ence
He has asked himself why the Epistle to the Romans was written and what kind of commentary may be appropriate to it. His Prologue takes the form of a much extended accessus,33 or formal introduction, in which he considers the £ntent£o and the modus tractand£, the purpose and method of treatment of the writers of Scripture, just as he would have done if he had been examining a work of one of the ph£losoph£. In trying the place the Epistle according to principles established by Augustine in the De Doctrina Chr£st£ana and to relate it to the more ancient tradition of classical rhetoric, he has attempted to show the place it holds in an academic tradition, and to match his own com­mentary to it. This is an indication of a newly emerging awareness that different kinds of study require different approaches.
'Theology has two modes of treatment proper to it, for sometimes in reasoning about the divine a man employs examples sought in external evidence, but sometimes he per­ceives the divine Being devoutly, without the help of created matter.,34 In his commentary on Boethius' De Tr£n£tate, written in the middle of the twelfth century, Clarenbald of Arras feels his way towards a distinction between the method of the academic theologian, who must learn to weigh external evidence, and the approach to God of the contemplative, who experiences God directly within himself in ways which are, of their nature, inaccessible to others. He and his con­temporaries were beginning to see that theology may, in a strictly defined sense, constitute an academic discipline, and that in so far as it does so, it must be treated in ways proper to other academic disciplines, where the rules ofargument and the laws of evidence and organization . of material provide the guarantees of soundness of procedure. Clarenbald atte~pts to define the relation the academic disciplines of his day bear to one another in the hope of deciding the proper place for theology among them. He is prompted by Boethius to see the problem as one which turns on the difference between theology and philosophy, but even though he draws upon traditional definitions, he finds it difficult to arrive at a
33 On the accessus, see R. B. C. Huygens, Accessus ad Auctores (Leiden 1970). 34 Clarenbald of Arras, p. 70, para. 14. '

The Academz'c Ambz'ence

satisfactory solution. This was largely because the use of the term theologia to describe an academic discipline was new, and it was not yet quite clear what the subje.ct-matter .and methods of that discipline comprised, although It was ObVIOUS that it involved rather more than Boethius had envisaged in
the De Trinz'tate.
Etienne Gilson has argued that it was only with the coming of the full tide of the influence of Arabic science and philos­ophy in the thirteenth century that the problem of defi~ing the respective kinds of knowledge proper to secular learnmg ~nd philosophy and to theology came to be acutely felt. He CItes Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, as examples of scholars who for the first time 'conceived the work of the theologian in a way distinctly recognisable'. 35. !hey h~d! he says, 'a clear awareness' that 'theology was speCIfIcally dIS~I~ct from philosophy and that faith was a mode of cognItIOn
,36 C . I ..

specifically other than natural reason. ertam y It IS true that these principles (:ould be stated in the thirteenth century with a clarity which was not yet possible in the twelfth. But Clarenbald of Arras saw the difference, and a number of his contemporaries felt the need to make the distinction.
35 E. Gilson, Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (London, 1955), p. 275. 36 Ibid., pp. 277-8.


II The Study of the Bible and the Liberal Arts
1. The Middle Way
In two of the most noisy and notorious conflicts between academics and the Church authorities in the twelfth century, Peter Abelard and Gilbert of Poitiers in tum faced Bernard of
CIairvaux~Cliuicll's-app-ointe{Cdefe'n-d-;;rorthefaTth~--ln
puDllcliial. John of Salisbury's account of Gilbert's trial has the impartiality and fair-mindedness which are characteristic of his historical writing at its best, but in the cause of balance, he perhaps oversimplifies the difference between the old scholarship and the new. Both Gilbert and Bernard, he says, 'were most learned and eloquent, but in different branches of study' (Erant tamen ambo optz'me lit tera ti et admodum eloquentes, sed dissimiHbus studiis ).1 Bernard was an out­standing preacher whose knowledge of Holy Scripture was so thorough that he was almost incapable of speaking in any words but those of the Bible. (It is plain from Bernard's surviving sermons thatJohn is not exaggerating.) But Bernard, he says, knew much less about secular learning (seculares Htterae). This was an area in which no one could compete with the Bishop of Poitiers. Gilbert, on the other hand, did not have so ready a command of Scripture. His strength lay in his knowledge of the Fathers and the secular authors.2 We will let Bernard speak for himself on his knowledge of the arts a little later. For the moment the importance of the contrast lies in John of Salisbury's recognition that there are two distinct ways of being learned.
John of Salisbury is careful to present the facts in such a way as to minimize the acrimoniousness of the conflict. His re­collections ofconversation he himself had had with the partici­pants, and his descriptions of what was said about them and by them, are all made to suggest that the trial was conducted in a calm and reasonable frame of mind on all sides. But we
1 Historia Ponti/kalis, p. 27. 2 Ibid.

OLD ARTS AND
NEW THEOLOGY


To The Beginnings of Theology as an
MY PARENTS

Academic Discipline
BY
G. R. EVANS
CLARENDON PRESS' OXFORD 1980



222222222222222222


Qurestio I. de sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad qUa! se extendat
Et ut intentio nostra sub* certis limitibus comprehendatur necessarium est primo investigare de ipsa sacra doctrina, qualis sit et ad qua: se exten­dat. Circa qua: qmerenda sunt decem:
1.
de necessitate hujus doctril1a:;

2.
utrum sit scientia;

3.
utrum sit una vel plures;

4.
utrum sit speculativa vel practica;

5.
de comparatione ejus ad alias scientias;

6.
utrum sit sapientia;

7.
quid sit subjectum ejus;

8.
utrum sit argumentativa;

9.
utrum uti debeat metaphoricis vel symbolicis locutionibus;

10.
utrum scriptura sacra hujus doctrina: sit secundum plures sensus exponenda.


articulus I. utrum sit necessarium prater philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi
AD PRIMUM sic proceditur:1 Videtur quod non sit necessarium pra:ter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi. Ad ea enim qua: supra rationem sunt homo non debet conari, secundum illud Eccli. Altiora te ne qucesieris. 2 Sed ea qua: rationi subduntur sufficienter traduntur in philo­sophicis disciplinis. Superfluum igitur videtur pra:ter philosophicas dis­ciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi.
2. Pra:terea, doctrina non potest esse nisi de ente; nihil enim scitur nisi verum, quod cum ente conve.rtitur. Sed de omnibus partibus entist
*mss. aliquibus, some definite bounds
tPiana, Leonine: de omnibus entibus, with all things lcf 2a2re. 2, 3, 4. I Sent. Pro!' I. CG I, 4, 5. De veritate XIV, 10 2Ecclesiasticus 3, 22 aThe Summa is divided into 'questions' composed of 'articles'; their titles are set out at the beginning of the question. Appendix I, Structure of the Summa 3, 4.
This first question can be grouped into three parts; article I, why revealed teaching is necessary; articles 2-8, the character assumed by this teaching in our minds; articles 9-10, with particular regard to the Holy Scriptures.
All the articles bear on the one single body of holy teaching; distinct functions are noted, but these do not make for different parts merely assembled in a collection. Appendix 5, Sacra Dectrina 8-12. . bThe usual approach is to inquire whether something is, an sit?, and then to
4
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

Question I. on what. sort of teaching Christian theology is and what it covers
In order to keep our efforts within definite bounds we must first investigate this holy teaching and find out what it is like and how far it goes. Here there are ten points of inquiry:
1.
about the need for this teaching;

2.
whether it be science;

3.
whether it be single or several;

4.
whether it be theoretical or practical;

5.
how it compares with other sciences;

6.
whether it be wisdom;

7.
what is its subject;

8.
whether it sets out to prove anything;

9.
whether it should employ metaphorical or symbolical language;

10.
whether its sacred writings are to be interpreted in several senses.a


article I. is another teaching required apart from philosophical studies?
THE FIRST POINT:1 1. Any other teaching beyond that of science and philosophy seems needless.b For man ought not to venture into realms beyond his reason; according to Ecclesiasticus, Be not curious about things far above thee. 2 Now the things lying within range of reason yield well enough to scientific and philosophical treatment. Additional teaching, therefore, seems superfluous. c
2. Besides, we can be educated only about what is real; for nothing can be known for certain save what is true, and what is true is identical with
proceed to discuss its nature, quid sit?: for example, the next question, on the being of God (Ia. 2). Here, however, the intention is not to establish the fact of Revelation, which is held by faith (2a2re. 1-2), but to show the need for it: the same procedure is adopted with other mysteries that depend on God's free-giving, for instance in the treatises on grace (la2re. 109), on the Incarnation (3a. I), and on the Atonement (3a. 46).
Philosophical studies: take to include not merely what now is called philosophy, but also all branches of the explanatory sciences. cAll articles in the Summa begin with arguments from a point of view different from that taken up later in the discussion. They should not be read as flat objections to a thesis, but as contributions to a debate, the whole of which must be taken into account if its conclusion is to be appreciated. Introduction I. Appendix 2, Method of the Summa I. Appendix I, Structure of the Summa 5-6.

tractatur in philosophicis disciplinis, etiam de Deo; unde quredam pars philosophire dicitur theologia sive scientia divina, ut patet per Philosophum in VI Meta. 3 Non fuit igitur necessarium prreter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam fieri sive haberi.*
SED CONTRA est quod dicitur II ad Tim. Omnis Scriptura divinitus inspirata utilis est ad docelldum, ad arguendum, ad corripiendum, ad erudiendum ad justitiam. 4 Scriptura autem divinitus inspirata non pertinet ad philo­sophicas disciplinas qure sunt secundum rationem humanam inventre. Utile igitur est prreter philosophicas disciplinas esse aliam scientiam divinitus inspiratam.
RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod necessarium fuit ad humanam salutem esse doctrinam quamdam secundum revelationem divinam prreter philosophicas disciplinas qure ratione humana investigantur.
Primo quidem quia homo ordinatur a Deo ad quemdam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit, secundum illud Isai. Oculus non vidz't, Deus, absque te quce prceparasti diligentibus te.5 Finem autem oportet esse prrecognitum hominibus qui suas intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in finem. Unde necessarium fuit homini ad salutem quod ei nota fierent quredam per revelationem divinam qure rationem humanam excedunt.
Ad ea etiam qure de Deo ratione humana investigari possunt necessa­rium fuit hominem instrui revelatione divina. Quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione multorum errorum homini proveniret; a cujus tamen veritatis cognitione dependet tota hominis salus, qure in Deo est. Ut igitur salus hominibus
*Piana, Leonine: omit fieri sive, to come about or 8Metaphysics VI, I, I026aI9. I, 2, 983aIO. Also, possibly not authentic, XI, 7, I062b2 & XII, 6-7, I07Ib3-I073aI2 4II Timothy 3, 16 5Isaiah 64, 4 dThe divine science: philosophical or natural theology, sometimes called theodicy, the culminating part of metaphysics which reaches to the first cause, the divine fount of being, not to the godhead revealed in Jesus Christ; the distinction between God as the integrator of the universe and God in himself is expressed by some scholastics as that between God sub ratione entitatis and sub ratione deitatis, namely God as being and God as God. See Ia. 1,6,7. Appendix 2, Method of the Summa I, 2, 4, 5. Appendix 5, Sacra Doctrina 12. Appendix 6, Theology as Science 16, 20. Appendix 9, Doctrinal Development 17, 32, 35, 36. eThe sed contra, the third part of a Summa article. Appendix I, Structure of the Summa 6. Usually, but not always, can be taken to represent the author's own position. IAppendix 13, Biblical Inspiration.
6
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

what really is. Yet the philosophical sciences deal with all parts of reality, even with God; hence Aristotle refers to one department of philosophy as theology or the divine science.3 That being the case, no need arises for another kind of education to be admitted or entertained. d
ON THE OTHER HANDe the second epistle to Timothy says, All Scripture inspired of God is profitable to teach, to reprove, to correct, to instruct in righteousness.4 Divinely inspired Scripture, however, is no part of the branches of philosophy traced by reasoning. Accordingly it is expedient to have another body of sure knowledge inspired by God.f
REPLy:g It should be urged that human well-being called for schooling in what God has revealed, in addition to the philosophical researches pursued by human reasoning.h
Above all because God destines us for an end beyond the grasp of reason; according to Isaiah, Eye hath not seen, 0 God, without thee what thou hast prepared for them that love thee. 5 Now we have to recognize an end before we can stretch out and exert ourselves for it.! Hence the necessity for our welfare that divine truths surpassing reason should be signified to us through divine revelation. j
We also stood in need of being instructed by divine revelation even in religious matters the human reason is able to investigate. For the rational truth about God would have appeared only to few, and even so after a long time and mixed with many mistakes; whereas on knowing this depends our whole welfare, which is in God.k In these circumstances, then, it was to prosper the salvation of human beings, and the more widely and less
gThe opening of the exposition, the third part or body of the article. Appendix I,
Structure of the Summa 6. hWell-being: salus, health, welfare, salvation-the last should not be confined to its negative connotation, of being saved from something. We are not born sound and happy, but may become so by later acquirement or endowment. For the habitus of health, like beauty, a balance and harmony of parts, involving proportion to a principle and adaptation to an end, cf Ia2re. 49. lEnd: finis, not merely an eventual terminus, but a present cause of what is now meant and done. Ia2re. 1-5. For the teleology of believing see 2a2re. 2, 3. IAppendix 7, Revelation. The difference between divine revelation and divine inspiration may be briefly noted; the first is the disclosure of truth to the mind, the second is the impulsion to the will to act, in the case of scriptural inspiration, to set down certain truths according to God's purposes. kThe natural truths of religion are preliminaries to faith, preambula fidei. Ia2re. I, I ad 3. 2a2re. 8, 2. CG I, 5. Appendix 6, Theology as Science 20.
The impediments to our reaching them unaided by revelation, taken from Maimonides, are discussed at greater length CG I, 4-5 & De veritate XIV, 6. God our health: Ia. 93-5, on the realization in us of the divine image.

communius et securius* proveniat necessarium fuit quod de divinis per divinam revelationem instruantur. Necessarium igitur fuit etiam prreter philosophicas disciplinas qure per rationem investigantur sacram doctrinam per revelationem haberi.
1.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet ea qure sunt altiora hominis cognitione non sint ab homine per rationem inquirenda, sunt tamen a Deo revelata suscipienda per fidem: unde et ibidem subditur, Plurima supra sensum hominum ostensa sunt tibi. 6 Et in his sacra doctrina consistit.

2.
Ad secundum dicendum quod divers a ratio cognoscibilis diversi­tatem scientiarum inducit. Eamdem enim coriclusionem demonstrant astro­logus et naturalis, puta quod terra est rotunda; sed astrologusper medium mathematicum, idest a materia abstractum, naturalis autem per medium circa materiam consideratum. Unde nihil prohibet de eisdem rebus de quibus philosophicre disciplinre tractant secundum quod sunt cognoscibilia lumine naturalis rationis, etiam aliam scientiam tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine divinre revelationis. Unde theologia qure ad sacram doctrinam pertinet differt secundum genus ab illa theologia qure pars philosophire ponitur.


*Piana, Leonine: convenientius et certius, the more fitly and certainly 6Ecclesiasticus 3, 25 IPractical needs are not to be measured by detached theory. Means to an end may be divided into the indispensable and the advantageous, 3a. I, 2. How far can we know truth and will good without grace? cf la2re. 109, 1-2. ruThe replies to the opening arguments fonn the fifth part of a Summa article. Appendix I, Structure of the Summa 6. nphysicist: naturalis, rpiJrJLx6r;, a student of natural philosophy, rather than what is now called natural science. St Thomas follows Aristotle (cf Physics II, 2, 193b22­194bI5) in grouping the deductive sciences into three; first, Physics directed to objects (e.g. snub-nosed) which cannot exist or be defined without matter; secondly, Mathematics, directed to objects (e.g. curvature) which are found only in material things but can be defined without reference to materia sensibilis or natural bodies perceived through sensation (so called by contrast to materia intelligibilis, the potential principle in bodily.substances inferred by the reason); thirdly, meta­physics directed to objects (e.g. substance) which depend on matter neither for their being nor for their being understood. One implication of this division is that
8
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
anxiously, that they were provided for by divine revelation about divine things) These then are the grounds of holding a holy teaching which has come to us through revelation beyond the discoveries of the rational sciences.
Hence:m 1. Admittedly the reason should not pry into things too high for human knowledge, nevertheless when they arc revealed by God they should be welcomed by faith: indeed the passage in Ecclesiasticus goes on, Many things are shown thee above the understanding of men. 6 And on them Christian teaching rests.
2. The diversification of the sciences is brought about by the diversity of aspects under which things can be known. Both an astronomer and a physical scientist may demonstrate the same conclusion, for instance that the earth is spherical; the first, however, works in a mathematical medium prescinding from material qualities, while for the second his medium is the observation of material bodies through the senses.n Accordingly there is nothing to stop the same things from being treated by the philosophical sciences when they can be looked at in the light of natural reason and by another science when they are looked at in the light of divine revelation. Consequently the theology of holy teaching differs in kind from that theology which is ranked as a part of philosophy.0
natural philosophy cannot be completely rendered in mathematical terms. In De
Trin. v, 1-4. In Physic. I, leet. I; II, leet. 3. For the division of Physica, see In De
gen. Procemium.
°Yet natural theology can be possessed by Christian theology as its own. Appendix 2,
Method of the Summa I, 4, 5. Appendix 6, Theology as Science 24. Appendix 7,
Revelation 18. Appendix 9, Doctrinal Development 8, 12, 14, 18.

The reply introduces a distinction that will frequently reappear in the Summa and be applied not only to kinds of knowing but also to all powers and habits of activity, namely between the material object, objectum materiale, and the formal object, objectum formale. The material object is the thing about which an activity is concerned; thus man is the subject of many interests, physiological, psycho­logical, historical and so forth. The formal object denotes the specialist interest engaged, t~e facet or aspect that introduces the specific difference into the activity directed to it; thus man as animal, as rational animal, as happening in history. Refinements on this primary distinction will appear later, e.g. Ia. 1,3, 7.

articulus 2. utrum sacra doctl'ina sit scientia
AD SECUNDUM sic proceditur:1 I. Videtur quod sacra doctrina non sit scien­tia. Omnis enim scientia procedit ex principiis per se notis. Sed sacra doctrina procedit ex articulis fidei qui non sunt per se noti, cum non ab omnibus concedantur; non enim omnium est fides, ut dicitur II Thess. 2 Non igitur sacra doctrina est scientia.
2. Prreterea, scientia non est singularium. Sed sacra doctrina tractat de singularibus, puta de gestis Abrahae, Isaac et Jacob, et similibus. Ergo sacra doctrina non est scientia.
SED CONTRA est quod Augustinus dicit, Huic scientice tribuitur z7lud tantum­modo quo fides saluberrima gignitur, nutritur, defenditur, roboratur. 3 Hoc autem ad nullam scientiam pertinet nisi ad sacram doctrinam. Ergo sacra doctrina est scientia.
RESPONSIO: Dicendum sacram doctrinam scientiam esse. Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quredam enim sunt qure procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus, sicut arithmetica, geome­tria, et hujusmodi; quredam vero sunt qure procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientire, sicut perspectiva procedit ex principiis noti­ficatis per geometriam et musica ex principiis per arithmeticam notis.
Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientire, qure scilicet est Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut musica credit principia sibi tradita ab arithmetico ita sacra doctrina credit principia revelata a Deo. .. . ~ _
r
I. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod principia cujuslibet scientire vel sunt nota per se vel reducuntur in notitiam superioris scientire. Et talia sunt principia sacrre doctrinre, ut dictum est.
lcf 2a2re. I, 5 ad 2. I Sent. Pro!' 3, 2. De veritate XIV, 9 ad 3. In De Trin. II, 2 2II Thessalonians 3, 2 3De Tl'initate XIV, 7. PL 42, 1037 aAppendix 6, Theology as Science 1-14. To begin with science can be taken ~n.its general sense of knowledge which is reasoned and certain, as opposed to opmlOn or sentiment or simple belief, but soon the stricter sense of deductive knowledge is developed and applied. Appendix 6, 16-29. The probative processes involved in theological science are discussed later, la. I, 8. Appendix 2, Method of the Summa 5, 6. bAn echo of Plato's and Aristotle's teaching that the world of contingent events is not amenable to the pure theory of scientific demonstration, which neglects particular incidents to concentrate on the general truths within its system of reference. cA characteristic sed contra, in which usage is supported by citing an authority, and then afterwards justified in the body of the article. . dFor optics as applied geometry, and music as the application of number to pitch and beat, see In De Tl'in. II, 7 ad 5, 7. For perspective see la. 79, 9; la2re. 35,8.
10
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
article 2. is Christian theology a sciencet

THE SECOND POINT:1 I. Christian theology does not look like science. a For every science advances from self-evident principles. Yet Christian theo­logy advances from the articles of faith and these are not self-evident, since not everybody grants them; for not all have faith, says the second epistle to the Thessalonians.2 Consequently it is not a science.
2. Besides, a science is not concerned with individual cases.b Sacred doctrine, however, deals with individual events and people, for instance the doings ofAbraham, Isaac, Jacob and the like. Therefore sacred doctrine is not a science.
ON THE OTHER HAND. Augustine says that this science alone is credited with begetting, nourishing, protec#ng, and making robust the healthiestfaith. 3 These functions belong to no science other than holy teaching. Therefore it is a science.c
REPLY: Christian theology should be pronounced to be a science. Yet bear in mind that sciences are of two kinds: some work from premises recognized in the innate light of intelligence, for instance arithmetic, geometry, and sciences ofthe same sort; while others work from premises recognized in the light of a higher science, for instance optics starts out from principles marked out by geometry and harmony from principles indicated by arithmetic. d
In this second manner is Christian theology a science, for it flows from founts recognized in the light of a higher science, namely God's very own which he shares with the blessed. e Hence as harmony credits its principles which are taken from arithmeticf so Christian theology takes on faith its principles revealed by God.
Hence: I. Let us repeat that the premises of any science, no matter what, are either evident in themselves or can be resolved back into what a higher science recognizes. Such, as we have observed, are the principles of Christian theology.
"The argument treats Christian theology as subordinate to faith, itself subordinate to the vision of the blessed; 2a2re. I, 5. It is because of this continuity with these principles that theology is a science, and also supernatural; otherwise it would be an external inquiry, working around and not in its subject. Appendix 6, 17-34. The vision of God; Appendix 7, Revelation 6, 12.
For analogies of 'higher' and 'lower' knowledge consult la. 58, 6, 7 on the dawn and dusk light of the angels, cognitio matutina and vesper tina ; also la. 79, 9 on St Augustine's ratio superior and ratio inferior. fFor instance, that a tone in a 9/8 scale cannot be divided between two equal semitones. In Meta. III, lect. 6.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod singularia traduntur in sacra doctrina, non quia de eis principaliter tractetur, sed introducuntur tum in exem­plum vitre, sicut in scientiis moralibus, tum ad declarandum auctoritatem virorum per quos ad nos revelatio divina processit, supra quam fundatur sacra Scriptura seu doctrina.
articulus 3. utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia
AD TERTIUM sic proceditur:1 I. Videtur quod sacra doctrina non sit una scientia. Quia secundum Philosophum in I Post. Una scientia est quce est unius generis subjecti.2 Creator autem et creatura, de quibus in sacra doc­trina tractatur, non continentur sub uno genere subjecti. Ergo sacra doctrina non est una scientia.
2. Prreterea, in sacra doctrina tractatur de angelis, de creaturis corporali­bus, de moribus hominum. Hujusmodi autem ad diversas scientias philo­sophicas pertinent. Sacra igitur doctrina non est una scientia.
SED CONTRA est quod sacra Scriptura de ea loquitur sicut de una scientia; dicitur enim Sap. Dedit illi scientiam sanctorum.3
RESPONSIO: Dicendum sacram doctrinam unam scientiam esse. Est enim unitas potentire et habitus consideranda secundum objectum, non quidem materialiter sed secundum rationem formalem objecti; puta homo, asinus, et lapis conveniunt in una formali ratione colorati, quod est objectum visus. Quia igitur sacra Scriptura considerat aliqua secundum quod sunt divini­tus revelata, secundum quod dictum est,4 omnia qurecumque sunt divinitus
lcf Ia. I, 4. I Sent. Prol. 2, 3, 4, 5 ad 2. In Meta. III, lect. 6. IV, lect. 2 2Posterior Analytics I, 28. 87a38 3Wisdom IO, IO 4la. 1,2 gNote the identification of the Bible and Christian theology. Appendix II, The Summa and the Bible. Ia. I, 8 ad 2.
For the place of 'historic' truth in theology, Appendix 6, Theology as Science 31. Appendix 9, Doctrinal Development 13, 3D-5. Historic fact is brought into closer connection with the substance of faith else­where, cf 2a2a!. I, I ad I; 3, ad 3, 4. In De Trin. III, 3 ad 2.
For theological 'authority', Appendix 2, Method of the Summa 3. Appendix 9, 14-15. Appendix II, I. "Namely metaphysics for spiritual substances, natural philosophy for material substances, ethics or moral philosophy for conduct. ' bFaculty: potentia, a psychological power, aptitude, ability, thus the human will, the sense of imagination, etc. Ia. 77.
12
2. Sacred doctrine sets out individual cases, not as being preoccupied with them, but in order both to introduce them as examples for our own lives, as is the wont of moral sciences, and to proclaim the authority of the men through whom divine revelation has come down to us, which revelation is the bas,is of sacred Scripture or doctrine.g
article 3. is Christian theology a single science?
THE THIRD POINT:1 1. The holy teaching would not appear to form one science. For, according to Aristotle, a science has unity by treating of one class of subject-matter. 2 Now here the Creator and creatures are both treated of, yet they cannot be grouped together within the same class of subject-matter. Therefore holy teaching is not just one science.
2. Further, Christian theology discusses angels as wellas bodily creatures and human conduct. These ofl;'er fields for diverse philosophical sciences.a Christian theology, then, is not a single unified science.
ON THE OTHER HAND holy Scripture refers to it as being one; thus the
Wisdom of Solomon, he gave to him the science of holy things. 3
REPLY: Holy teaching should be declared a single science. For you gauge the unity of a faculty and its trainingb by its object, and this should be taken precisely according to the formal interest engaged and not according to what is materially involved;c for instance the object of the sense of sight is a thing as having colour, a formal quality exhibited by men, donkeys, and stones in common. Now since holy Scripture looks at things in that they are divinely revealed, as already noted,4 all things whatsoever that can be divinely revealedd share in the same formal objec-
Training: habitus, an additional quality to a power giving it an operative bent, thus a science in the mind, or the habit of justice in the will. la2re. 49-50. cFormal and material objects: note 0 to Ia. I, I above. The formal object com­prises both the special medium in which the object is reached and the special term which is there reached. This article considers the medium in which divine truths are held, namely revelation; article 7 will consider the term or inner end of know­ledge by grace, namely God himself. Note d to Ia. I, I above; note c to la. I, 7. dThat can be revealed: )'evelabile, revealable, a strong word like cognoscibile credibile, and appetibile; the suggestion is not that these truths await revelatio~ (which appears from the adjectival form of the verb) but that of their nature they are implicit in what is revealed. The choice of the word allows for the progressive extensIOn of revealed truth in our minds and the development of doctrine. Appen­dix 9, 5-13. The revelabilia include all truths that can be part of the economy of salvation, including natural truths and decencies. Ia. I, I. Appendix 6, Theology as Science 17-22. Appendix 7, Revelation 1-3, 18. Appendix 9, 12.


I
revelabilia communicant in una ratione formali objecti hujus scientire. Et ideo comprehenduntur sub sacra doctrina sicut sub scientia una.
r. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sacra doctrina non determinat de Deo et de creaturis ex requo, sed de Deo principaliter et de creaturis secundum quod referuntur ad Deum, ut ad principium vel finem. Unde unitas scientire non impeditur.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod nihil prohibet inferiores potentias vel habitus diversificari circa illas materias qure communiter cadunt sub una potentia vel habitu superiori; quia superior potentia vel habitus respicit objectum sub universaliori ratione formali. Sicut objectum sensus com­munis est sensibile, quod comprehendit sub se visibile et audibile; unde sensus communis cum sit una potentia extendit se ad omnia objecta quinque sensuum. Et similiter ea qure in diversis scientiis philosophicis tractantur potest sacra doctrina una existens considerare sub una ratione inquantum scilicet sunt divinitus revelabilia: ut sic sacra doctrina sit velut quredam impressio divinre scientire, qure est una et simplex omnium.
articulus 4. utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia practica
AD QUARTUM sic proceditur:1 I. Videtur quod sacra doctrina sit scientia practica. F£nis enim practicce est operatio, secundum Philosophum.2 Sacra autem doctrina ad operationem ordinatur, secundum illud Jac. Estote factores verbi et non auditores tantum.3 Ergo sacra doctrina est scientia practica.
2. Prreterea, sacra doctrina dividitur per legem veterem et novam. Lex autem pertinet ad scientiam moralem, qure est scientia practica. Ergo sacra doctrina est scientia practica.
lcf I Sent. Prol. 3, I 2Meta. II, I. 993b21 8James I, 22 "Christian theology is not like mathematics which can be treated like a genus and divided into specifically different parts, e.g. arithmetic, geometry, etc. It forms one whole, totum, which may be compared to a body, an integral whole, with various members, or to one substance with various powers and functions, cf la. 76,
8. But there should be no split between scriptural and systematic theology (notice in the text that Christian theology is simply called Holy Scripture, Appendix II, The Summa and the Bible I) or between dogmatic and moral theology, or between moral, ascetical, and mystical theology, and no separation oftheology from devotion and living revelation, Appendix 10, The Dialectic of Love in the Summa. !God is beyond the categories and not in a classification, la. 3, 5. gCentral internal sense: the sensus communis, one of the four internal senses of the Aristotelean list, the others being the imagination, the memory, and the vis cesti­mativa or cogitativa, the instinctive appreciation of what is beneficial or harmful; it perceives, discriminates between, and combines the data of the five external senses, touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight, about a present object of sense experience. ])e Anima III, 2. 426b12. St Thomas, lect. 3. la. 78, 4.
14
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
tive meaning. On that account they are included under holy teaching as under a single science. e
Hence: 1. Holy teaching does not pronounce on God and creatures as though they were counterbalancing, but on God as principal and on creatures in relation to him, who is their origin and end.! Hence its unity as science is not hampered.
2. Nothing debars the distinct subject-matters which diversify the lower and more particular faculties and trainings from being treated in common by a higher and more general faculty and training; this is because the latter envisages an object in a wider formal scene. Take for instance the central internal sense;g visual and audible phenomena are both included in its object, namely a thing the senses can perceive, and while gathering in all the objects of the five external senses it yet remains a single unified faculty. Likewise different classes ofobject separately treated by the diverse philosophical sciences can be combined by Christian theology which keeps its unity when all of them are brought into the same focus and pictured in the field of divine revelation: thus in effect it is like an imprint on us of God's own knowledge, which is the single and simple vision ofeverything.h
article 4. is Christian theology a practical science~
THE FOURTH POINT: 1 I. Christian theology appears to be a practical science. II For Aristotle says that a practical science is that which ends in action. 2 But Christian theology is for action, according to St James, Be ye doers of the word and not hearers only.3 Therefore Christian theology is a practical science.
2. Moreover, sacred doctrine is divided into the Old Law and the New Law.b Now law is part of moral science, which is a practical science. c Therefore sacred doctrine is a practical science.
hGod's own knowledge: la. 14. In which we can share by the beatific vision, la. 12. Faith and Christian theology lead up to this knowledge of the blessed, 2a2re. I, 5. The continuity between nature, grace, and glory, or, in terms ofknowledge, between reason, faith, and vision, is a constant theme through the Summa. The word scientia is applied to all three, thus scientia rationalis, scientia fidei, scientia sanctorum or beata.
apractical science: knowledge directed to doing and making, contrasted with theoretical or speculative science, and governed by the virtues of prudence and art. Ia. 79, II; la2re. 57. Appendix 6, Theology as Science 6. Theoretic science seeks truth for its own sake; if, in a sense, disinterested, it is not necessarily a merely 'looking at', for to St Thomas contemplation is an intimate sharing with the object: this article does not rate academic above pastoral theology. Compare la2re. 3, 5-8. 2a2re. 8; 9; 45. The active and contemplative lives, 2a2re. 179-82. bThe Mosaic Law and the Gospel Law; la2re. 99; 106. cThe relationship oflaw and morals; la2re. 92, I; 93,3,6; 94,3; 95, 2; 96, 2, 3,4.
l-c 15

SED CONTRA, omnis scientia practica est de rebus operabilibus ab homine, ut moralis de actibus hominum et a:dificativa de a:dificiis. Sacra autem doctrina est principaliter de Deo, cujus magis homines sunt opera. Non ergo est scientia practica sed magis speculativa.
RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod sacra doctrina, ut dictum est,4. una existens se extendit ad ea qua: pertinent ad diversas scientias philosophicas propter rationem formalem quam in diversis attendit, prout sunt divino lumine cognoscibilia. Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque, sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit et ea qua: facit.
Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica, quia principalius agit de rebus divinis quam de actibus humanis; de quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem in qua beatitudo reterna consistit.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad objecta.
articulus 5. utrum sacra doctrina sit digniol' aliis scientiis
AD QUINTUM sic proceditur:! 1. Videtur quod sacra doctrina nonsit dignior aliis scientiis. Certitudo enim pertinet ad dignitatem scientia:. Sed alia: scientia:, de quarum principiis dubitari non potest, videntur esse certiores sacra doctrina, cujus principia, scilicet articuli fidei, dubitationem reci­piunt. Alia: igitur scientia: videntur ista digniores.
2. Pra:terea, inferioris scientia: est a superiori accipere, sicut musicus ab arithmetico. Sed sacra doctrina accipit aliquid a philosophicis disci­plinis; dicit enim Hieronymus quod doctores antiqui intantum philoso­phorum doctrinis atque sententiis suos resperserunt libros ut nescias quid in illis primitus admirari debeas, eruditionem sceculi an scientiam Scripturarum. 2
Ergo sacra doctrina est inferior aliis scientiis.
SED CONTRA est quod alia: scientia: dicuntur ancilla: hujus; Provo Misit ancillas suas vocare ad arcem. 3
RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod cum ista scientia quantum ad aliquid sit
·ra. r, 3 Icf ra2re. 66, 5 ad 3. I Sent. Prol. r. CG II, 4 2Epistola ad Magnum Oratorem Urbis Romee, Ep. 70. PL 22,668 aproverbs 9, 3 dThe distinction between doing and making implies the distinction between morality and art. ra2re. 57, 4. era. r4, 5 !Human acts: limited by moral theology to deliberate acts; ra2re. r, r.
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY

ON THE OTHER HAND, every practical science is concerned with what men can do and make,d thus ethics is about human acts and architecture about building. Christian theology, however, is about God, who makes men and is not made by them. It is therefore more contemplative than practical.
REPLY: As already remarked;" the holy teaching while remaining single nevertheless embraces things belonging to the different philosophical sciences because of the one formal meaning which is its interest in all manner ofthings, namely the truth they bear in the light of God. Whereas some among the philosophical sciences are theoretical and others are prac­tical, sacred doctrine takes over both functions, in this being like the single knowledge whereby God knows himself and the things he makes.e
All the same it is more theoretical than practical, since it is mainly concerned with the divine things which are, rather than with things men do; it deals with human acts only in so far as they prepare men for that achieved knowledge of God on which their eternal bliss reposes. f
This leaves the way open for the answer to the difficulties.
article 5. is Christian theology more valuable than the other sciences?

THE FIFTH POINT:! 1. It would seem that Christian theology is not more valuable than the other sciences. For certainty is part of a science's value. Now the other sciences, the premises of which are indubitable, look more assured and certain than Christian theology, of which the premises, namely the articles of faith, are open to doubt. a Accordingly these other sciences seem more valuable.
2. Again, a lower science draws on a higher, like the musician on the arithmetician.b Holy teaching, however, draws on philosophical learning; for St Jerome allows that the ancient writers so filled their books with the theories and verdicts of philosophers that at first you are at a loss which to admire more, their secular erudition or their skill in the Scriptures. 2 Holy teaching, then, has a lower standing than other sciences.
ON THE OTHER HAND the book of Proverbs describes the other sciences as its maidservants: She hath sent her handmaids to invite to the tower. 3
REPLY: Having noticed that this science is theoretical in one respect and
Achieved knowledge: no longer reasoning to conclusions or adapting means to ends.
That happiness consists in knowledge, ra2re. 3, 3-8. aFor uncertainty and doubts in faith, see 2a2re. 4, 8. bNotes d & f to ra. r, 2.
16 17
r


speculativa et quantum ad aliquid* sit practica omnes alias transcendit tam speculativas quam practicas.
Speculativarum enim scientiarum una altera dignior dicitur tum propter certitudinem tum propter dignitatem materire. Et quantum ad utrumque hrec scientia alias speculativas scientias excedit. Secundum certitudinem quidem, quia alire scientire certitudinem habent ex naturali lumine rationis humanre qure potest errare, hrec autem certitudinem habet ex lumine divinre scientire qure decipi non potest. Secundum dignitatem vero materire, quia ista scientia est principaliter de his qure sua altitudine rationem transcendunt, alire vero scientire considerant ea tantum qure rationi sub­duntur.
Practicarum vero scientiarum ilIa dignior est qure ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur; sicut civilis militari, nam bonum exercitus ad bonum civitatis ordinatur. Finis autem hujus scientire inquantum est practica est beatitudo reterna, ad quam sicut in ultimum finem ordinantur omnes alii fines scientiarum practicarum.
Unde manifestum est secundum omnem modum aliis eam digniorem esse.
1.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nihil prohibet id quod est certius secundum naturam esse quoad nos minus certum propter debilitatem in­tellectus nostri, qui se habet ad manifestissima rerum sicut oculus noctuce ad lumen solis, sicut dicitur in II Meta. 4 Unde dubitatio qure accidit in ali­quibus circa articulos fidei non est propter incertitudinem rei sed propter debilitatem intellectus humani. Et tamen minimum quod potest haberi de cognitione rerum altissimarum desiderabilius est quam certissima cog­nitio qure habetur de minimis rebus, ut dicitur in De Animal.5

2.
Ad secundum dicendum quod hrec scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quasi ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad majorem manifestationem eorum qure in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis sed immediate a Deo per revela­tionem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tamquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tamquam inferioribus et ancillis; sicut architectonicre utuntur subministrantibus ut civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis non est propter defectum vel insufficientiam ejus, sed propter defectum intel­lectus nostri, qui ex eis qure per naturalem rationem ex qua procedunt alire scientire cognoscuntur, facilius manuducitur in ea qure sunt supra rationem qure in hac scientia traduntur.


*mss: omit quantum ad aliquid 4Meta. II, I. 993blo 5De Partibus Animalium I, 5. 644b3I
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CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
practical in another we now go on to observe how it ranks above all the other sciences, theoretical and practical alike.
Among the theoretical sciences one is reckoned more important than another, first because of the certitude it brings, and next because of the worth of its subject. On both counts sacred doctrine surpasses the others. As to certitude, because theirs comes from the natural light of human reason which can make mistakes, whereas sacred doctrine's is held in the light of divine knowledge which cannot falter. As to worth of subject, because their business is only with things set under reason, whereas sacred science leads to heights the reason cannot climb.
Then among the practical sciences, that stands higher which has the further purpose, for instance statesmanship commands military skill be­cause the efficiency of the fighting services subserves the good of the commonwealth. Now in so far as sacred doctrine is .a practical science, its aim is eternal happiness, and this is the final end governing the ends of all the practical sciences. C
Hence it is clear that from every standpoint sacred doctrine excels all other sciences.
Hence: 1. There is nothing to stop a thing that is objectively more certain by its nature from being subjectively less certain to us because of the disability of our minds, which, as Aristotle notes, blink at the most evident things like bats in the sunshine.4 Doubt about the articles of faith which falls to the lot of some is not because the reality is at all uncertain but because the human understanding is feeble. d Nevertheless, as Aristotle also points out, the slenderest acquaintance we can form with heavenly things is more desirable than a thorough grasp of mundane matters.5
2. Holy teaching can borrow from the other sciences, not from any need to beg from them, but for the greater clarification of the things it conveys. For it takes its principles directly from God through revelation, not from the other sciences. On that account it does not rely on them as though they were in control, for their role is subsidiary and ancillary; so an architect makes use of tradesmen as a statesman employs soldiers. That it turns to them so is not from any lack or insufficiency within itself, but because our understanding is wanting, which is the more readily guided into the world above reason, set forth in holy teaching, through the world of natural reason from which the other sciences take their course. e
CAppendix 6, Theology as Science 14. lazre. I, 4, 5, 6.
dzazre. 4, 8
"Ia. I, 8 ad 2. In De Trin. II, 3. Appendix 6, Theology as Science 17-19.


articulus 6. utrum hcec doctrina sit sapientia
AD SEXTUM sic proceditur:1 Videtur quod hrec doctrina non sit sapientia. Nulla enim doctrina qure supponit sua principia aliunde digna est nomine sapientire, quia sapientis est ordinare, et non ordinari. 2 Sed hrec doctrina supponit principia sua aliunde, ut ex dictis patet.3 Ergo hrec doctrina non est sapientia.
2.
Prreterea, ad sapientiam pertinet probare principia aliarum scien­tiarum; unde et caput scientiarum diC£tur, ut patet in VI Ethic. 4 Sed hrec doctrina non probat principia aliarum scientiarum. Ergo non est sapientia.

3.
Prreterea, hrec doctrina per studium acquiritur. Sapientia autem per infusionem habetur, unde inter septem dona Spiritus Sancti connumera­tur, ut patet per Isa.5 Ergo hrec doctrina non est sapientia.


SEn CONTRA est quod dicitur Deuter. in principio legis, Hcec est nostra sapientia et intellectus coram populis.6
RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod hrec doctrina maxime sapientia est inter omnes sapientias humanas, non quidem in aliquo genere tantum sed simpliciter.
Cum enim sapientis sit ordinare et judicare, judiciumautem per altiorem causam deinferioribus habeatur,ille sapiens dicitur in unoquoque genere qui considerat causam altissimam illius generis. Dt in genere redificii, artifex qui disponit formam domus dicitur sapiens et architecton respectu
Icf I Sent. Pro!. 3, I, 3; II Prol. CG II, 4 "Meta. I, 2. 982al8 31a. I, 2, that holy teaching derives from God's own knowledge and the knowledge of the blessed in heaven. <Ethics VI, 7. II41a16. 'The most finished of the forms of knowledge.' Aristotle is comparing philosophic and practical wisdom. "Isaiah II, 2 6Deuteronomy 4,6 -Wisdom: the noblest of the intellectual virtues, which judges things in their highest causes. Aristotle's praise of it at the beginning of the Metaphysics is very much in St Thomas's mind; see his commentary, In Meta. Prol. and I, lect. 1-3. For his own teaching on theoretic wisdom see la2re. 57, 1,2: it is not an opposite of or alternative to science, but science developed to its utmost. In De Trin. II, 2 ad I. Appendix 6, Theology as Science 4-6. Prudence, which rules the moral virtues, is sometimes called practical wisdom, as in the body of this article. See 2a2re, 47, 6, 8. The reply to the third argument introduces the Christian wisdom which is a Gift of the Holy Ghost and judges through sympathy ramer than scientific instruc­tion. 2a2re. 45. Appendix 10, The Dialectic of Love in the Summa I, II. bSuppositions: hypotheses, postulates, propositions laid down as the basis of argument. It is assumed that they can be proved outside that argument. Given agreement that proof is likely, such a proposition is called a supposition, suppositio,
20
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
article 6. is this teaching wisdom (

THE SIXTH POINT:1 1. Apparently ii: is not wisdom. a For no teaching which assumes its principles from elsewhere deserves the name of wisdom, since, as Aristotle remarks, the office of the wise is to govern others, not to be governed by them. 2 Now the principles of this teaching are suppositionsb from another place, as noted earlier on.3 Therefore it is not wisdom.
2.
Further, one charge on wisdom is to prove the premises ofthe other sciences; that is why Aristotle calls it the chief of the sciences.4 But theo­logical teaching does not prove the premises of the other sciences, and therefore it is not wisdom.

3.
Besides, this teaching is acquired by study. Wisdom, however, is received from the outpouring of the Spirit, and as such is numbered among the seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit, set forth by Isaiah.5 This teaching, then, is not wisdom.


ON THE OTHER HAND Deuteronomy says early on, before setting down the ten commandments, This is our wisdom and understanding in the presence of the people.6
REPLY; Holy teaching should be declared to be wisdom highest above all human wisdoms, not indeed in some special department but uncon­ditionally.
To govern and judge belongs to the wise person, and since judgment in the light of the higher cause also holds judgment in the light of lower causes, that person is called wise about any matter who there maturely considers the highest cause. c Take architecture for example: you apply
vn60wu;; otherwise it is accepted as a postulate, petitio, al-r:'YJf!a. The first principles of reason, the pervasive judgments of thought or the communes animi conceptiones, are not cases in point, since they are indemonstrable because you cannot get outside them or seek to prove them by anything else (Posterior Analytics I, 10. 76a30-77a5. St Thomas, lect. 19). So also the first principles of faith are not proved by anything else in this world; holy teaching takes, supponit, them from the blessed knowledge of God, as the reply will say. cCause: a positive principle on which a distinct reality depends for its being and being known. Appendix 6, Theology as Science 10, II. Appendix 9, Doctrinal Development 34.
Highest cause: altus, high, seen from below upwards; deep, seen from below downwards. The wise judgment takes into account both the ultimate purpose and the fundamental origin of the effect.
Judgment by me higher does not substitute for or swamp judgment by the lower. See St Thomas on 'subordination' passim. Appendix 6, 12, 18. Also on the justice of equity beyond the letter of the law, 2a2re. 120, I, 2.

inferiorum artificum qui dolant lapides* vel parant cementum; unde dicitur I Cor. Ut sapiens architectusfundamentum posui. 7 Etrursus, in genere totius humanre vitre, prudens sapiens dicitur inquantum ordinat humanos actus ad debitum finem; unde dicitur Provo Sapientia est viro prudentia.S Ille igitur qui considerat simpliciter altissimam causam totius universi, qure Deus est, maxime sapiens dicitur; unde et sapientia dicitur esse divinorumt cognitio, ut patet per Augustinum VI De Trin.9
Sacra autem doctrina propriisime determinat de Deo secundum quod est altissima causa, quia non solum quantum ad illud quod est per crea­turas cognoscibile (quod philosophi cognoverunt, ut dicitur Rom. Quod flOtum est Dei manifestum est illis10) sed etiam quantum ad idquod notum est sibi soli de seipso et aliis per revelationem communicatum. Unde sacra doctrina maxime dicitur sapientia.
1. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sacra doctrina non supponit sua principia ab aliqua scientiahumana, sed a scientia divina, a qua sicut a summa sapientia omnis nostra cognitio ordinatur.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod principia aliarum scientiarum vel suntperse nota et probari non possunt, vel per aliquam rationem naturalem probantur in aliqua:j: alia scientia. Propria autem hujus scientire cognitio est qure est per revelationem, non autem qure est per naturalem rationem. Et ideo ad earn non pertinet probare principia aliarum scientiarum, sed solum judicare de eis. Quidquid enim in aliis scientiis invenitur veritati hujus scientire repugnans totum condemnatur ut falsum; unde dicitur II Cor. Consilia destruentes, et omnem altitudinem extollentem se adversus scientiam Dei.ll
3. Ad tertium dicendum quod cum judicium ad sapientem pertineat, secundum duplicem modum judicandi dupliciter sapientia dicitur. Con­tingit enim aliquem judicare uno modo per modum inclinationis, sicut qui habet habitum virtutis recte judicat de his qure sunt secundum virtutem
*Piana, Leonine: qui dolant ligna vel parant lapides, the carpenters and masons tmss: dignior cognitio, the higher knowledge tmss: in una alia: in one other science
71 Corimhians 3, 10 8Proverbs 10, 23 9De Trinitate 12, 14. PL 42, 1009 lORomans I, 19 11n Corinthians 10,4-5 dra2re. 57, 4, 5. 2a2re. 47, 6. eLiterally 'decides about God most properly', that is, for himself, not as part of a system. !Note d to la. I, I. Appendix 7, Revelation 1-7, 9. gNote e to Ia. I, 2. In De Trin. II, 3, the relationship of theology to the natural sciences. Also la. I, 8. hTheology may pass judgment on the other sciences, negatively by correcting inferences that may be drawn from them, positively by interpreting them in the light of God's :dealings with men, for instance when history is read theologically.
22 CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
the terms 'wise' and 'master-builder' to the artist who plans the whole structure, and not the artisans under him who cut the stones and mix the mortar; hence the reference in the first epistle to the Corinthians, As a wise architect I have laid the foundations. 7 Then again, take the scene of human living by and large, and you call that person wise because he directs human acts to their due end for good and all;d hence Proverbs say, Wisdom is prudence to a man.s That person, therefore, who considers maturely and without qualification the first and final cause of the entire universe, namely God, is to be called supremely wise; hence wisdom appears in St Augustine as knowledge of divine things.9
Now holy teaching goes to God most personallye as deepest origin and highest end, and that not only because of what can be gathered about him from creatures (which philosophers have recognized, according to the epistle to the Romans, What was known of God is manifest in them10) but also because of what he alone knows about himself and yet discloses for others to share.f Consequently holy teaching is called wisdom in the highest degree.
Hence: 1. Holy teaching assumes its principles from no human science, but from divine science, by which as by supreme wisdom all our know­ledge is governed.g
2.
The premises of other sciences are either self-evident, in which case they cannot be proved, or they are proved through some natural evidence in some other science. What is peculiar to this science's knowledge is that it is about truth which comes through revelation, not through natural reasoning. On this account establishing the premises of other sciences is none of its business, though it may well be critical of them. For what­soever is encountered in the other sciences which is incompatible with its truth should be completely condemned as false:h accordingly the second epistle to the Corinthians alludes to the pulling down oframparts, destroying counsels, and every height that rears itself against the knowledge of God.ll

3.
Since having a formed judgment characterizes the wise person, so there are two kinds of wisdom according to the two ways of passing judg­ment.I This may be arrived at from a bent that way, as when a person who possesses the habit ofa virtue rightly commits himself to what should be done in consonance with it, because he is already in sympathy with it;


Yet their proper autonomy is to be respected; their field is not to be invaded or their evidence twisted; they are ruled 'civilly' not despotically. Note that theo­logical condemnation does not amount to refutation, which means that a conclusion has been met on its own ground and there disproved. There are historical cases of theologians making mistakes, either because they have not understood the science they have been talking about or their own science, or both. IThe human mind is true or false by judging, not apprehending, la. 16,2.

agenda inquantum ad illa inclinatur; unde et in X Ethic. dicitur quod virtuosus est mensura et regula humanorum actuum.12 Alio modo per modum cognitionis, sicut aliquis instructus in scientia morali posset judi­care de actibus virtutis etiamsi virtutem non haberet.
Primus igitur modus judicandi de rebus divinis pertinet ad sapientiam qure ponitur donum Spiritus Sancti; secundum illud I Cor. Spiritualis homo judicat omnia,t3 et Dionysius dicit de Div. Nom. quod Hierotheus doctus est non solum discens sed et patiens divina. 14 Secundus autem modus judicandi pertinet ad hanc doctrinam secundum quod per studium habetur; licet ejus principia ex revelatione habeantur.
articulus 7. utrum Deus sit subjectum hujus scientice
AD SEPTIMUM sic proceditur:1 1. Videtur quod Deus non sit subjectum hujus scientire. In qualibet enim scientia oportet supponere de subjecto quid est, secundum Philosophum in I Posteriorum. 2 Sed hrec scientia non supponit de Deo quid est; dicit enim Damascenus, In Deo quid est dicere est impossibile.3 Ergo Deus non est subjectum hujus scientire.
2. Prreterea, omnia qure determinantur in aliqua scientia comprehendun­tur sub subjecto illius scientire. Sed in sacra Scriptura determinatur de multis aliis quam de Deo, puta de creaturis et de moribus hominum. Ergo Deus non est subjectum hujus scientire.
SED CONTRA, illud est subjectum scientire de quo est sermo in scientia. Sed in hac scientia fit sermo de Deo; dicitur enim theologia, quasi sermo de Deo. Ergo Deus est subjectum hujus scientire.
RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod Deus est subjectum hujus scientire. Sic enim
12Ethics x, 5. 1I76al7 131 Corinthians 2, 15 14De Divinis Nominibus II, 9. PG 3, 648. Dionysius, or the Pseudo-Dionysius, held to be Denis the Areopagite converted by St Paul at Athens (Acts 17, 34), or the founder of the Abbey of Saint Denis near Paris; in fact the unknown author­possibly a Syrian monk-of the Corpus Areopagiticum or Dionysiacum (text PG 3-4), a collection of theological treatises, including On the Divine Names, On Mystical Theology, On the Heavenly Hierarchy, and On the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, of high authority in medieval thought, which can be dated between 485 and 513. lcf I Sent. Pro!. 4. In De Trin. v, 4 'Posterior Analytics I, 4. 71aI3 3De Fide orthodoxa I, 4. PG 94, 797 IAppendix 10, The Dialectic of Love in the Summa. kTo take an extreme case, a person can be out of love and sympathy with God
24
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
hence Aristotle remarks that the virtuous man himself sets the measure
and standard for human acts.12 Alternatively the judgment may be arrived
at through a cognitive process, as when a person soundly instructed in
moral science can appreciate the activity of virtues he does not himself
possess)
The first way of judging divine things belongs to that wisdom which is
classed among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost; so St Paul says, The spiritual
man judges all things,13 and Dionysius speaks about Hierotheus being taught
by the experience of undergoing divine things, not only by learning about
them.14 The second way of judging is taken by sacred doctrine to the
extent that it can be gained by study; even so the premises are held from
revelation.k
article 7. is God the subject of this science?

THE SEVENTH POINT:1 1. God would not seem to be the subject of this science.a For, according to Aristotle, every science should begin by pre­supposing what its subject is. 2 This science, however, does not start by making the assumption of defining God; as St John Damascene remarks, In God we cannot say what he is.3 It follows that God is not the subject of this science. b
2. Besides, all matters about which a science reaches settled conclusions enter into its subject. Now sacred Scripture goes as far about many things other than God, for instance about creatures and human conduct. Therefore its subject is not purely God.
ON THE OTHER HAND, what a science discusses is its subject. In this case the discussion is about God; for it is called theology, as it were, talk about God. Therefore he is the subject of this science.
REPLY: That God is the subject of this science should be maintained. For
because of his settled affection for grave sin, yet his faith, fides informis, can remain genuine and his theology acute and learned. A merely thinking theology, even though deriving from faith, is not a fully living theology unless quickened by the Gifts of the Spirit, and can be rather an arid study of concepts. All the same St Teresa preferred accuracy to devotion when it came to advice from a spiritual director.
aSubject: that to which a science's predicates are attributed, the centre round which its judgments turn. Neglect here the meaning of 'subject' contrasted with 'object'. la. I, 3 has considered the medium in which theology works; this article considers the thing it is about. bThe argument is adopted later, la. 2, I, 2, to show that philosophical theology neither starts with an intuition of God nor advances by a priori deduction.


se habet subjectum ad scientiam sicut objectum ad potentiam vel habitum. Proprie autem illud as:-ignatur objectum alicujus potentire vel habitus sub cujus ratione omnia referlmtur ad potentiam vel habitum; sicut homo et lapis referuntur in visum inquantum sunt colorata, unde coloratum est proprium objectum visus. Omnia autem tractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum ut ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit subjectum hujus scientire.
Quod etiam manifestum fit ex principiis hujus scientire qure sunt articuli fidei, qure est de Deo. Idem autem est subjectum principiorum et totius scientire, cum tota scientia virtute contineatur in principiis.
Quidam vero, attendentes ea qure tractantur in ista scientia, et non ad rationem secundum quam considerantur, assignaverunt aliter materiam hujus scientire, vel res et signa, vel opera reparationis, vel totum Christum, idest caput et membra. De onmibus enim istis tractatur in ista scientia, sed secundum ordinem ad Deum.
I. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod nos de Deo non possumus scire quid est, utimur tamen in hac doctrina effectu ejus, vel naturre vel gratire loco definitionis, ad ea qure de Deo in hac doctrina considerantur. Sicut in quibusdam scientiis philosophicis demonstratur aliquid de causa per effectum, accipiendo effectum loco definitionis causre.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnia alia qure determinantur in sacra Scriptura comprehenduntur sub Deo, non ut partes-vel species vel accidentia-sed ut ordinata aliqualiter ad ipsum.
CNotes b & c to Ia. I, 3. St Thomas will constantly apply the general principle
that a potentiality is defined by its actuality within the dynamism, psychological and
moral, of human acts, and attribute the force and meaning of powers, habits, and
their exercise to their objects. A power is an inborn ability to act in a certain way,
a habit is an additional quality giving a power a settled bent. All of us have some
power of thinking mathematically, only some possess, for example, the science of
geometry. dNotes d & 0 to Ia. I, 1.
cThe objective term of the assent of faith is not the articles of faith, but God
himself, veritas prima; they are the canonized expressions, enuntiabilia, of that
assent; 2a2re. I, 1,2, 6, 9. For St Augustine's distinction between believing about
God, believing because of God, and believing in God, see 2a2re. 2, 2.
1St Thomas is thinking of a deductive science where the terms of the discourse

,are seen to be interiorly related, not of an inductive science where they are con­
nected by observation, experiment, hypothesis, and practical results. Appendix 6,
Theology as Science 7, 8. Appendix 9, Doctrinal Development 21-8. The deposit of
faith implicitly contains all that is definitively articulated from it by the Church.
gres et signa, the Blessed Trinity and the Christian sacraments; so Peter Lombard,
I Sentences I, 1.
bopera reparationis., the works of restoration; Hugh of St Victor, De sacramentis
christian<E vit<E, I, Pro!' 2. PL 176, 183.
IThe mystical body; so Robert of Melun, Gilbert de la Porree, Robert Grosseteste,

26
a subject is to a science as an object is to a psychological power or training. C Now that properly is designated the object which expresses the special term why anything is related to the power or training in question; thus a man or a stone is related to eyesight in that both are coloured, so being coloured is the proper object of the sense ofsight. Now all things are dealt with in holy teaching in terms of God, either because they are God himself or because they are relative to him as their origin and end. d Therefore God is truly the object of this science.
This also is clear from the fact that the first principles of this science are the articles of faith, and faith is about God. e Now the subject of a science's first principles and of its entire development is identical, since the whole of a science is virtually contained in its principles.f
Some writers, however, preoccupied with the things treated of by sacred doctrine rather than with the formal interest engaged, have indi­cated its subject-matter otherwise, apportioning it between the reality and its symbols,g or regarding it as the works of redemption,h or the whole Christ, namely head and members.! All these indeed are dwelt on by this science, yet as held in their relationship to God.
Hence: I. Though we cannot know what God is, nevertheless this teaching employs an effect of his, of nature or of grace, in place of a defi­nition, and by this means discusses truths about him. Some of the philo­sophical sciences adopt a similar method, of grounding the argument on the effect, not on the definition, of the cause when demonstrating some­thing about a cause through its effect. j
2. All other things that are settled in Holy Scripture are embraced in God, not that they are parts of him-such as essential components or accidents-but because they are somehow related to him.I<
Robert Kilwardby. The reference may bt' applied to the exclusive reservation of theology to Christology. Some writers have criticized St Thomas for relegating Christology to the Tertia Pars, but this is to misread and coarsen his method of drawing distinctions in a single whole. Appendix I, Structure of the Summa I; Appendix 2, Method of the Summa. 'Christ as man is our way of going to God', Ia. 2, Pro!.; the whole of the Summa moves along that way, yet the goal is God, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. What this article is concerned to show is that Christian theology, centred on God and nothing but God, has this one ultimate object. IIa. 2, 2 ad 2. Classical examples of this method are the five ways of showing that God exists, Ia. 2, 3. kGod is completely simple and not composed of parts of any sort. The various types of composition are considered and rejected in Ia. 3. The two referred to here are the essential composition of primary matter and substantial form in things of material nature, and the composition of substance and accident in all created things.

Things as known in God are most intimately known for what they are, Ia. 14, 6, and their very creatureliness is a relationship to him, Ia. 45, 3.

articulus 8. utrum hac doctrina sit argumentativa
AD OCTAVUMsicproceditur:1 1. Videturquod hrec doctrinanonsitargumen­tativa. Dicit enim Ambrosius in lib. de F£de Cathol. Tolle argumenta ubi fides quceritur. 2 Sed in hac doctrina prrecipue fides qureritur, unde dicitur Joan. Hac scripta sunt ut credatis.3 Ergo sacra doctrina non est argu­mentativa.
2. Prreterea, si sit argumentativa aut argumentatur ex auctoritate aut ex ratione. Si ex auctoritate, hoc non videtur congruere ejus dignitati, nam locus ab auctoritate est infirmissimus, secundum Boetium.4 Si autem ex ratione, hoc non congruit ejus fini, quia secundum Gregorium in homil. Fides non habet meritum cujus humana ratio prabet experimentum.6 Ergo sacra doctrina non est argumentativa.
SED CONTRA est quod,-aicitur ad Tit. de episcopo, Amplectentem eum qui quid secundum doctrinam est, fidelem sermonem ut potens sit exhortari in doctrina sana, et eos qui contradicunt arguere. 6
RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod sicut alire scientire non argumentantur ad sua principia probanda, sed ex principiis argumentantur ad ostendenduni alia in ipis scientiis, ita hrec doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, qure sunt articuli fidei, sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid ostenden­dum, sicut Apostolus I ad Cor. ex resurrectione Christi argumentatur ad resurrectionem communem probandam.7
Sed tamen considerandum est in scientiis philosophicis quod inferiores scientire nec probant sua principia nec contra negantem disputant; sed hoc relinquunt superiori scientire. Suprema vero inter eas, scilicet meta­physica, disputat contra negantem sua principia si adversarius aliquid concedit; si autem nihil concedit non potest cum eo disputare, potest tamen solvere rationes ipsius.
Unde sacra Scriptura, cum non habeat superiorem, disputat cum ne­gante sua principia, argumentando quidem si adversarius aliquid concedat eorum qure per revelationem divinam habentur, sicut per auctoritates
Icf 2a2re. I, S ad 2, 3. CG I, 3, 8, 9. I Sent. Pro!' S. In De Trin. II, 3. Quodl. IV, 9, 3 2De fide Catholica I, 13. PL 16, S70 3John 20, 31 4In Topicis Ciceronis I. PL 64, 1166. De differentia Topicol'um 3. PL 64, 1199. Boethius
(c. 480-S2S), a main bridge between classical and early scholastic philosophy.
"In Evang. ,II, 26. PL 76, 1197 6Titus I, 9 71 Corinthians IS, 12
aLit. 'argumentative', not merely a rhetoric or an exegesis, but adducing proofs
and evidences.
bGround, locus, .611;0" a passage in an author accepted as a court of appeal.
Appendix 2, Method of the Summa 3. Melchior Cano wrote his celebrated De Locis
Theologicis (Salamanca, IS63) on the ten bases of theological argument: Scripture,
oral tradition, the Church, Councils, the Roman Church, the Fathers, the scholastic
theologians, the rational sciences, philosophers, and history.

28
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
article 8. is this teaching probative?

THE EIGHTH POINT: 1 1. This teaching does not seem to be probative. a For St Ambrose says, Away with arguments where faith is at stake. 2 Now faith is the principal quest of this teaching, according to St John: These things are written that you may believe. 3 Therefore it is not probative.
2. Again, were it to advance arguments, they would be either from authority or from the evidence of reason. Iffrom authority, then the pro­cess would be unbefitting the dignity of this teaching, for, according to Boethius,4 authority is the weakest ground ofproof.b Iffrom the evidence of reason, then the process would not correspond with its purpose, for according to St Gregory, Faith has no merit where the reason presents actual proof from experience. 5 Well then, holy teaching does not attempt proofs.
ON THE OTHER HAND the epistle to Titus requires ofa bishop that he should
embrace the faithful word which is according to doctrine that he may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and convince the gainsayers. 6
REPLY: As the other sciences do not argue to prove their premises, but work from them to bring out other things in their field of inquiry, so this teaching does not argue to establish its premises, which are the articles of faith, but advances from them to make something known, C as when St Paul adduces the resurrection of Christ to prove the resurrection of us all. 7
Then bear in mind that among the philosophical sciences subordinate sciences neither prove their premises nor controvert those who deny them; these functions they leave to a superior science. d The supreme science among them, namely metaphysics, contests the denial ofits principles with an opponent who will grant something; if nothing, then debate is impos­sible, though his reasonings may be demolished. e
So sacred Scripture, which has no superior science over it,! disputes the denial of its principles; it argues on the basis of those truths held by revelation which an opponent admits, as when, debating with heretics,g it
CAppendix 6, Theology as Science 21, 27, 28. dAppendix 6, 12-14.
eA precis of Aristotle's Metaphysics, IV, 4-S. lOoSb3S-IolOa37. Commentary,
lect. 6-11, on the establishment of first principles. Epistemology, or the Theory
of Knowledge, forms part of metaphysics. Appendix 6, 12.
IChristian theology is subordinate to the scientia Dei et beatorum (Ia. I, 2), but
not to any other systematic body of knowledge.
gHeresy: a species of infidelity, 2a2re. 10 & II. It chooses some parts, but not the
whole of the Christian revelation. Actual sin (formal heresy or formal infidelity)
enters with deliberate disbelief from unwarranted rejection or contempt, not with
merel~ negative unbelief (material heresy or material infidelity). Appendix 9,

Doctnnal Development 14, IS.


I

sacrre doctrinre disputamus contra hrereticos, et per unum articulum appeals to received authoritative texts ofChristian theology,lland uses one contra negantes alium. Si vero adversarius nihil credat eorum qure divini­~. article against those who reject another. If, however, an opponent believes
tus revelantur, non remanet amplius via ad probandum articulos fidei per rationem; sed ad solvendum rationes, si quas inducit, contra fidem. Cum enim fides infallibili veritati innitatur, impossibile autem sit de vero demon­strari contrarium, manifestum est probationes qure contra fidem inducun­tur non esse demonstrationes, sed solubilia argumenta.
I. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod licet argumenta rationis humanre non habeant locum ad probandum qure fidei sunt, tamen ex articulis fidei hrec doctrina ad alia argumentatur, ut supra dictum est.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod argumentari ex auctoritate est maxime proprium hujus doctrinre, eo quod principia hujus doctrinre pel' revela­tionem habentur; et sic oportet quod credatur auctoritati eorum quibus revelatio facta est. Nec hoc derogat dignitati hujus doctrinre, nam licet locus ab auctoritate qure fundatur super revelatione* humana sit infirmis­simus, locus tamen qure fundatur super revelatione divina est efficacissimus.
Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidem, quia pel' hoc tolleretur meritum fidei, sed ad manifes­tandum aliqua qure traduntur in hac doctrina. Cum igitur gratia non tollat naturam sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei sicut et naturalis inc1inatio voluntatis obsequitur charitati: unde et Apostolus dicit II ad Cor. In captivitatem redigentes omnem intellectum in obsequium Christi.8 Et inde est quod etiam auctoritatibus philosophorum sacra doc­trina utitur, ubi per rationem naturalem veritatem cognoscere potuerunt, sicut Paulus inducit verbum Arati dicens, Sicut et quidam poetarum vestro­rum dixerunt, genus Dei sumus.9
Sed tamen sacra doctrina hujusmodi auctoritatibus utitur quasi extraneis
argumentis et probabilibus. Auctoritatibus autem canonicre Scripturre
utitur proprie, ex necessitate argumentando. Auctoritatibus autem aliorum
doctorum Ecc1esire, quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter.
Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi apostolis et prophetis factre
qui canonicos libros scripserunt, non autem revelationi, si qua fuit, aliis
*Piana, Leonine: ratione, on human reason
811 Corinthians 10,5 9Acts 17, 28
bAuthoritative texts: Appendix 2, Method of the Summa 3. Appendix II, The
Summa and the Bible I.

ITheology, then, has a threefold function; to make explicit what is contained in
the deposit offaith, to relate the truths of Christianity to one another, and to defend
them against and recommend them to half-believers and non-believers.
lInference from one to another in theology: Appendix 9, Doctrinal Development 21­
29·
kAppendix 7, Revelation 10-14.


I
nothing of what has been divinely revealed, then no way lies open for making the articles of faith reasonably credible; all that can be done is to solve the difficulties against faith he may bring upJ For since faith rests on unfailing truth, and the contrary of truth cannot really be demon­
strated, it is clear that alleged proofs against faith are not demonstrations, but charges that can be refuted.
Hence: I. Though arguments of human reason reach no position to prove the things of faith, nevertheless, as noted above, holy teaching does work from the articles of faith to infer other things)
2. Argument from authority is the method most appropriate to this teaching in that its premises are held through revelation; consequently it has to accept the authority of those to whom revelation was made)-Nor does this derogate from its dignity, for though weakest when based on what human beings have disclosed, the argument from authority is most forcible when based on what God has disclosed.
All the same holy teaching also uses human reasoning, not indeed to prove the faith, for that would take away from the merit of believing, but to make manifest some implications of its message. Since grace does not scrap nature but brings it to perfection, so also natural reason should assist faith as the natural loving bent of the will yields to charity.I St Paul speaks of bringing into captivity every understanding unto the service of Christ. 8 Hence holy teaching uses the authority of philosophers who have been able to perceive the truth by natural reasoning, for instance when 8t Paul quotes the saying of Aratus, As some of your poets have said, we are of the race of God.9
Yet holy teaching employs such authorities only in order to provide as it were extraneous arguments from probability. Its own proper authori­ties are those of canonical Scripture, and these it applied with convincing force. It has other proper authorities, the doctors ofthe Church, and these it looks to as its own, but for arguments that carry no more than probability.m
. For our faith rests on the revelation made to the Prophets and Apostles who wrote the canonical books, not on a revelation, if such there be, made
lAppendix 8, Natural and Supernatural. For charity as our love, see 2a2re. 23,2.
For the merit of faith, 2a2re. 2, 9, 10. For merit, Ia2re. II4.
mThree kinds of theological authority are enumerated: the external authority of
rational science which may recommend a truth of faith, the proper and internal
authority of the Scriptures which may prove it, and the proper and internal, but
not final, authority ofDoctors ofthe Church. Appendix 2, Method 01 the Summa 2,3.
Appendix 9, Doctrinal Development 38. Appendix II, The Summa and the Bible x.
Probability: may amount to fair certainty. See probabilis certitudo from the agreement of many witnesses, 2a2re. 70, 2.
I-D 31

doctoribus factre. Unde dicit Augustinus in epistola ad Hieronymum; Solis eis Scripturarum libris qui canonici appellantur didici hunc honorem deferre, ut nullum auctorem in scribendo errasse aliquidfirmissime credam. Alios autem ita lego ut, quantalibet sanctitate doctrinaque prcepolleant, non ideo verum putem quod ipsi ita senserunt. 10
articulus 9. utrum sacra Scriptura debeat uti metaphoris vel symbolicis locutionibus
AD NONUM sic proceditur:1 1. Videtur quod sacra Scriptura non debeat uti metaphoris. Illud enim quod est proprium infimre doctrinre non videtur competere huic scientire, qure inter alias tenet locum supremum, ut jam dictum est.2Procedere autem per similitudines varias et reprresentationes est proprium poeticre, qure est infima inter omnes doctrinas. Ergo hujus­modi similitudinibus uti non est conveniens huic scientire.
2.
Prreterea, hrec doctrina videtur esse ordinata ad veritatis manifesta­tionem; unde et manifestatoribus ejus prremium promittitur, Eccli. Qui elucidant me vitam aeternam habebunt. 3 Sed per hujusmodi similitudines veritas occultatur. Non ergo competit huic doctrinre divina tradere sub similitudine corporalium rerum.

3.
Prreterea, quanto aliqure creaturre sunt sublimiores tanto magis ad divinam similitudinem accedunt. Si igitur aliqure ex creaturis tran­sumerentur* ad Deum tunc oporteret talem transumptionem maxime fieri ex sublimioribus creaturis et non ex infimis; quod tamen in Scripturis frequenter invenitur.


SED CONTRA est quod dicitur Osee, Ego visionem multiplicavi eis, et in manibus prophetarum assimilatus sum.4 Tradere autem aliquid sub simili­tudine est metaphoricum. Ergo ad sacram doctrinam pertinet uti metaphoris.
RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod conveniens est sacrre Scripturre divina et spiritualia sub similitudine corporalium tradere. Deus enim omnibus pro­videt secundum quod competit eorum naturre. Est autem naturale homini ut per sensibilia ad intelligibilia veniat, quia omnis nostra cognitio a sensu
*mss: aliqua .•• transumeretur ••• oportet: a property ... is to be read ... then
let it be lOEpist. 82, I. PL 33, 277 lcfI Sent. Prol. 5; 34, 3, I, 2. CG III, II9. In De Tl'in. II, 4 2Ia. I, 5 3Ecclesiasticus 24, 3 I 4Hosea 12, 10 "Private revelations do not belong to the body of Christian teaching. Appendix 7, Revelation 17, 18.
32
to any other teacher.n In this sense St Augustine wrote to St Jerome;
Only to those books or writings which are called canonical have I learnt to pay such honour that I firmly believe that none of their authors have erred in composing them. Other authors, however, I read to such effect that, no matter what holiness and learning they display, I do not hold what they say to be true because those were their sentiments.1o
article 9. should holy teaching employ metaphorical or symbolicallanguageP
THE NINTH POINT:1 1. It seems that holy teaching should not use meta­phors.a For what is proper to a lowly type of instruction appears ill­suited to this, which, as already observed,2 stands on the summit. Now to carryon with various similitudes and images is proper to poetry, the most modest ofall teaching methods. Therefore to make use of such similitudes is ill-suited to holy teaching.
2.
Moreover, this teaching seems intended to make truth clear; and there is areward held out to those who do so: Those who explain me shall have life everlasting.3 Such symbolism, however, obscures the truth. Therefore it is not in keeping with this teaching to convey divine things under the symbolic representation of bodily things.

3.
Again, the nobler the creatures the closer they approach God's like­ness. If then the properties of creatures are to be read into God, then at least they should be chiefly of the more excellent not the baser sort; and this is the way frequently taken by the Scriptures.


ON THE OTHER HAND it is declared in Hosea, I have multiplied visions and I have used similitudes by the ministry of the prophets.4 To put something across under imagery is metaphorical usage. Therefore sacred doctrine avails itself of metaphors.

REPLY: Holy Scripture fittingly delivers divine and spiritual realities under
. bodily guises. For God provides for all things according to the kind of
things they are. Now we are ofthe kind to reach the world of intelligence
through the world of sense, since all our knowledge takes its rise from

&Metaphor: from 'to carry from place to place', to transfer to one the sense of another by a figure of speech in which the proper meaning of a term is not verified in the subject to which it comes to be applied from some likeness to its proper meaning in another subject. Our God is a consuming fire: a truth is expressed, yet properly speaking God neither consumes nor burns. However, as will be seen ~n the next article (ad 3), the metaphorical meaning of a phrase is the literal meaning mtended by the author. For a careful discussion of the proper and metaphorical use of terms about God, see Ia. 13, 9. Also Ia. 33, 3.

HutlUm habet. Unde convenienter in sacra Scriptura traduntur nobis spiritualia sub metaphoris corporalium. Et hoc est quod Dionysius dicit
I Cael. Hier. Impossibile est nobis aliter lucere divinum radium nisi varietate sacrorum velaminum circumvelatum.5 '
Convenit etiam sacrre Scripturre qure communiter omnibus proponitur, secundum illud Rom. Sapientibus et insipientibus debitor sum,6 ut spiritualia sub similitudinibus corporalium proponantur; ut saltem vel sic rudes eam capiant, qui ad intelligibilia secundum se capienda non sunt idonei.
I. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod poetica utitur metaphoris propter reprresentationem, reprresentatio enim naturaliter homini delectabilis est. Sed sacra doctrina utitur metaphoris propter necessitatem et utilitatem, sicut jam dictum est.
2. Ad secundum dicendum quod radius divinre revelationis non des­truitur propter figuras sensibiles quibus circumvelatur, ut Dionysius dicit, sed remanet in sua veritate, ut mentes quibus revelatio fit non permittantur in similitudinibus remanere sed elevet eas ad cognitionem intelligibiliuffi; et per eos quibus revelatio facta est alii etiam circa hrec instruantur. U nde ea qure in uno loco Scripturre traduntur sub metaphoris in aliis locis expressius exponuntur. Et ipsa etiam occuItatio figurarum utilis est ad exercitium studiosorum et contra irrisiones infidelium; de quibus dicitur
Matt. Nolite sanctum dare canibus.7
3. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut docet Dionysius, magis est con­veniens quod divina in Scripturis tradantur sub figuris vilium corporum quam corporum nobilium.8 Et hoc propter tria. Primo, quia propter hoc magis liberatur humanus animus ab errore, manifestum enim apparet quod hrec secundum proprietatem non dicuntur de divinis; quod posset esse dubium si sub figuris nobilium corporum describerentur divina, maxime apud illos qui nihil aliud corporibus nobilius excogitare noverunt. Secundo, quia hic modus est convenientior cognitioni quam de Deo habe­mus in hac vita. Magis enim manifestatur nobis de ipso quid non est quam quid est; et ideo similitudines illorum qure magis elongantur a Deo
5De Ca;lestia hiemrchia I, 2. PG 3, 121 6Romans I, 14 7Matthew 7, 6 8De Ca;lestia hierarchia II, 2. PG 3, 136 bIa. 84,6 cThe objection has not been derogatory about poetry as such, but has scaled it down as a method of communicating clear ideas; philosophical pedagogics prefers reasons, J.6yot, to pictures or tales, ",fJ()Ot. Notice the implied compliment of the reply; poetry is for delight (a wider and nobler term than easy pleasure) which is about ends, whereas sacred doctrine is for usefulness which is about means; Ia. 5, 6. dThe content of divine revelation is expressed in the mind of the believer less by the images and ideas than by the judgments that are formed. Faith is a special judgment, not a special idea. Yet revelation comes to us as a historical fact, not
34
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
sensation.b Congenially, then, holy Scripture delivers spiritual things to us beneath metaphors taken from bodily things. Dionysius agrees, The divine rays cannot enlighten us except wrapped up in many sacred veils. 5
Then also holy Scripture is intended for all of us in common without distinction of persons, as is said in the epistle to the Romans, To the wise and the foolish I am a debtor, 6 and fitly puts forward spiritual things under bodily likenesses; at all events the uneducated may then lay hold ofthem, those, that is to say, who are not ready to take intellectual truths neat with nothing else.
Hence: I. Poetry employs metaphors for the sake ofrepresentation, in which we are born to take delight. Holy teaching, on the other hand, adopts them for their indispensable usefulness, as just explained.c
2.
Dionysius teaches in the same place that the beam of divine revela­tion is not extinguished by the sense imagery that veils it, and its truth does not flicker out, since the minds of those given the revelation are not allowed to remain arrested with the images but are lifted up to their meaning;d moreover, they are so enabled to instruct others. In fact truths expressed metaphorically in one passage of Scripture are more expressly explained elsewhere. Yet even the figurative disguising serves a purpose, both as a challenge to those eager to find out the truth and as a defence against unbelievers ready to ridicule;e to these the text refers, Give not that which is holy to the dogs. 7

3.
Dionysius also tells us that in the Scriptures the figures of base bodies rather than those of fine bodies more happily serve the purpose of conveying divine things to us.8 And this for three reasons. First, because thereby human thinking is the more exempt from error, for the expressions obviously cannot be taken in the proper sense of their words and be crudely ascribed to divine things; this might be more open to doubt were sublime figures evoked, especially for those people who can summon up nothing more splendid than physical beauty. Secondly, because understatement is more to the point with our present knowledge of God. For in this life what he is not is clearer to us than what he is; and therefore from the likenesses of things farthest removed from him we can


merely as a formal meaning set out in a dogmatic system; it is addressed to the whole man, not merely to his abstract reason. The reply touches on the importance of imagination for catechetics. 2a2a!. I, 2; 2, I; 173, 2, 3; 174, 2 ad 4. In De Trin. II, 4; VI, 2. Appendix 7, Revelation 2, 4, II, 17. "Matthew 13, 10-17; Mark 4,10-12; Luke 8, 9-10. The kingdom of heaven is still the hidden design (rtva7:fJ(!Wv) of God, not completely disclosed, and presented in such a way as to lead on men of good will, but to be a stumbling-block to those who harden their hearts, and a matter of condemnation. The sentiment here in the Summa is rougher and less poignant than in the Gospels.

veriorem nobis faciunt restimationem de Deo quod sit supra illud quod de Deo dicimus vel cogitamus. Tertio, quia per hujusmodi divina magis occultantur indignis.
articulus 10. utrum sacra Scriptura sub una littera habeat plures sensus
AD DECIMUM sic proceditur:1 1. Videtur quod sacra Scriptum sub una littem non habeat plures sensus, qui sunt historicus vel litteralis, alle­goricus, tropologicus sive moralis, et anagogicus. Multiplicitas enim sen­suum in una Scriptura parit confusionem et deceptionem, et tollit arguendi firmitatem. Unde ex multiplicibus propositionibus non procedit argumen­tatio, sed secundum hoc aliqure fallacire assignantur. Sacra autem Scrip­tum debet esse efficax ad ostendendam veritatem absque omni fallacia. Ergo non debent in ea sub una littera plures sensus tradi.

2.
Prreterea, Augustinus dicit quod Scriptura quce vetus testamentum vocatur quadrifariam traditur, scilicet secundum historiam, secundum cetiolo­giam,* secundum analogiam, secundum allegoriam.2 Qure quidem quatuor a quatuor pnedictis videntur esse aliena; non igitur videtur conveniens quod eadem littera sacrre Scripturre secundum quatuor prredictos sensus exponatur.


3.
Prreterea, prreter prredictos sensus invenitur parabolicus, qui inter . 1 illos sensus quatuor non continetur.


SED CONTRA est quod dicit Gregorius, Sacra Scriptura omnes scientias ipso locutionis suce more transcendit, quia uno eodemque sel'mone, dum narrat gestum, prodit mysterium.3
RESPONSIO: Dicendum quod auctor sacrre Scripturre est Deus, in cujus potestate est ut non solum voces ad significandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest) sed edam res ipsas. Et ideo, cum in omnibus scientiis voces significent, hoc habet proprium ista scientia quod ipsre res signifi­catre per voces etiam significant aliquid. Illa ergo prima significatio qua voces significant res pertinet ad primum sensum, qui est sensus historicus
*mss: secundum ethymologiam, according to etymology lcfI Sent. Prol. 5; IV, 21,1,2, i ad 3. De potentia IV, I. Quodl. III, 30; VII, 14, IS, 16. In ad Gal. 4, lect. 7

,'·""i.Q~('1f~flj.t,qr.~,tIf!c4,f;.1z.cA3"J",.:{"A.2,!68"~,,,,,
-Moraltum xx, I. PL 76, i35 rIa. 3, I &Appendix 12, The Senses oj Scripture. Etymologies: historical, from !arOeew, to narrate; allegorical from dAA1)yoeew, to speak so as to imply other than what is
more fairly estima~e.how far above our speech and thought he is. Thirdly, because thereby dlVll1e matters are more effectively screened against those unworthy of them.f
article 10. can one passage oj holy Scripture bear several senses?
THE TENTH POINT: 1 1. It would seem that the same text of holy Scripture does not bear several senses, namely the historical or literal the allegorical
. "
I
the tropo oglcal or moral, and the anagogical. a Allow a variety of readings to one ~assage, and you produce confusion and deception, and sap the foundatIons ofargument; examples ofthe stock fallacies, not reasoned dis­course, follo~ from. the medley of meanings.b Holy Scripture, however, should effectlVely dIsplay the truth without fallacy of any sort. One text, therefore, should not offer various meanings.
2.
Besides, St Augustine holds that Scripture which is entitled the Old Testament has a fourfold meaning, namely according to history, to etiology,C to analogy,d and to allegory.2 Now these four appear inconsistent with the four mentioned above; which therefore appear awkward headings for interpreting a passage of Scripture.

3.
Further, there is also a parabolic sense,e not included among them .


ON THE OTHER HAND, St Gregory declares that holy Scripture transcends all other sciences by its very style of expression, in that one and the same dis­course, while narrating an event, transmits a mystery as well.3

REPLY: That God is the author ofholy Scri~ture should be acknowledged,! and.he has the power, not only of adaptll1g words to convey meanings (WhICh men also can do), but also of adapting things themselves. In every branch of.knowledge words have meaning, but what is special here is that the thll1gs meant by the words also themselves mean something. That first meaning whereby the words signify things belonO's to the sense first­mentioned, namely the historical or literal. That bmeaning however
. ' ,

said; tropological from reono" turn, direction, way, hence behaviour custom
character; anagogical from dvciyw, to lead up from lower to higher.' ,
bcf D.ejallaciis ad quo~dam nobiles artistas. An early work of St Thomas held to be
genume on good authority; it is a study of the logical fallacies and c1o~ely follows
Aristotle's De Sophisticis Elenchis. '
CEtiology, the indication of the cause at work, alrta.
dAnalogy, dvaAoyla, resemblance of relations or attributes.
'Parable, from naea{3oA'I}, a placing side by side.
'Appendix 13, Biblical Inspiration.




vellitteralis. Illa vero significatio qua res significatre per voces iterum res alias significant dicitur sensus spiritualis; qui super litteralem fundatur et eum supponit.

Hic autem sensus spiritualis trifariam dividitur. Sicut enim dicit Apo­stolus ad Hebr. Lex vetus figura est novce legis,4 et ipsa nova lex, ut Diony­I sius dicit, est figura futurce glorice. 5 In nova etiam lege ea qure in capite sunt gesta sunt signa eorum qure nos agere debemus.
Secundum ergo quod ea qure sunt veteris legis significant ea qure sunt novre legis est sensus allegoricus; secundum vero quod ea qure in Christo sunt facta vel in his qure Christum significant sunt signa eOl'um qure nos agere debemus est sensus moralis; prout vero significant ea qure sunt in reterna gloria est sensus anagogicus.
Quia vero sensus litteralis est quem auctor intendit, auctor autem sacrre Scripturre Deus est qui omnia simul suo intellectu comprehendit, non est inconveniens, ut Augustinus dicit XII Confess. si etiam secundum litteralem sensum in una littera Scripturre plures sint sensus.6
1.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod multiplicitas horum sensuum non facit requivocationem aut aliam speciem multiplicitatis, quia, sicut jam dictum est, sensus isti non multiplicantur propter hoc quod una vox multa significet, sed quia ipsre res significatre per voces aliarum rerum possunt esse signa. Et ita etiam nulla confusio sequitur in sacra Scriptura, cum omnes sensus fundentur super unum, scilicet litteralem. Ex quo solo potest trahi argumentum, non autem ex his qure secundum allegoriam dicuntur, ut Augustinus dicit in epistola contra Vincentium donatistam. 7 Non tamen ex hoc aliquid deperit sacrre Scripturre, quia nihil sub spirituali sensu continetur fidei necessarium quod Scriptura per litteralem sensum alicubi manifeste non tradat.

2.
Ad secundum dicendum quod tria ilIa, historia, retiologia, * analogia, ad unum litteralem sensum pertinent. Nam historia est, ut ipse Augustinus exponit, cum simpliciter aliquid proponitur; retiologiat vero cum causa dicti assignatur, sicut cum Dominus assignavit causam quare Moyses permisit licentiam repudiandi uxores, scilicet propter duritiam cordis ip­sorum;8 analogia vero est cum veritas unius Scripturre ostenditur veri­tati alterius non repugnare. Sola autem allegoria inter ilIa qpatuor pro tribus spiritualibus sensibus ponitur. Sicut et Hugo de Sancto Victore sub sensu allegorico etiam anagogicum comprehendit, ponens in tertio suarum


*mss: ethymologia, etymology
tibid 4Hebrews 7, 19 5De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia v, 2, PG 3, 501 6Confessions XII, 31. PL 32, 844 7Epist. XCIII, 8. PL 33,334 8Matthew 19, 8
whereby the things signified by the words in their turn also signify other things is called the spiritual sense; it is based on and presupposes the literal sense.
Now this spiritual sense is divided into three. For, as St Paul says, The Old LazlJ is the figure of the New, 4 and the New Law itself, as Dionysius says, is the figure of the glory to come. 5 Then again, under the New Law the deeds wrought by our Head are signs also of what we ourselves ought to do.
Well then, the allegorical sense is brought into play when the things of the Old Law signify the things of the New Law; the moral sense when the things done in Christ and in those who prefigured him are signs of what we should carry out; and the anagogical sense when the things that lie ahead in eternal glory are signified.
Now because the literal sense is that which the author intends, and the author of holy Scripture is God who comprehends everything all at once in his understanding, it comes not amiss, as St Augustine observes, if many meanings are present even in the literal sense of one passage of Scripture.6
Hence: 1. These various readings do not set up ambiguity or any other kind of mixture of meanings, because, as we have explained, they are many, not because one term may signify many things, but because the things signified by the terms can themselves be the signs of other things. Consequently holy Scripture sets up no confusion, since all meanings are based on one, namely the literal sense.g From this alone can arguments be drawn, and not, as St Augustine remarks in his letter to Vincent the Donatist, from the things said by allegory.7 Nor does this undo the effect of holy Scripture, for nothing necessary for faith is contained under the spiritual sense that is not openly conveyed through the literal sense elsewhere.
2. These three, history, etiology, and analogy, are grouped under the one general heading of the literal sense. For as St Augustine explains in the same place, you have history when any matter is straightforwardly recorded; etiology when its cause is indicated, as when our Lord pointed to men's hardness of heart as the reason why Moses allowed them to set aside their wives;8 analogy when the truth of one Scriptural passage is shown not to clash with the truth of another. Of the four senses enumer­ated in the argument, allegory stands alone for the three spiritual senses of our exposition. For instance Hugh of St Victor included the anagogical
gNot that the literal sense is to be reduced to one bare meaning, but its complexity, as suggested in the concluding paragraph of the exposition and further explained in the replies to the next two arguments, is not such as to give rise to the fallacy of double-meaning.

Sententiarum solum tres sensus, scilicet historicum, allegoricum, et tropologicum.9
3. Ad tertium dicendum quod sensus parabolicus sub litteraIi con­tinetur, name per voces significatur aliquid proprie et aliquid figurative; nec est litteralis sensus ipsa figura, sed id quod est figuratum. Non enim cum Scriptura nominat Dei brachium est litteralis sensus quod in Deo sit membrum hujusmodi corporale, sed id quod per hoc membrum signifi­catur, scilicet virtus operativa. In quo patet quod sensui litterali sacrre Scripturre nunquam potest subesse falsum.
9De Sacramentis I, Pro!. 4. PL 176, 184
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY
sense under the allegorical, and enumerated just three senses, namely the historical, the allegorical, and thetropological.9

3. The parabolical sense is contained in the literal sense, for words can signify something properly and something figuratively; in the last case the literal sense is not the figure of speech itself, but the object it figures. When Scripture speaks of the arm of God, the literal sense is not that he has a physical limb, but that he has what it signifies, namely the power of doing and making. This example brings out how nothing false can underlie the literal sense of Scripture.h
hAppendices 12 & 13